

Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

MAY-JUNE 2008

<http://militaryreview.army.mil>



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Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE JUN 2008		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-05-2008 to 00-06-2008	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Military Review: The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army. May-June 2008			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Combined Arms Center ,Fort Leavenworth,KS,66027			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 127	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			



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Military Review (US ISSN 0026-4148) (USPS 123-830) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army, CAC, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254. Paid subscriptions are available through the Superintendent of Documents for \$42 US/APO/FPO and \$58.80 foreign addresses per year. Periodical postage paid at Leavenworth, KS, and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954.



Addendum: Anbar Awakens

Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army

*You old guys need to
get over that s—t.*

Young Marine to Marine
sergeant major when asked
how he felt about fighting
alongside an Army unit
in Al Anbar, Iraq.

Colonel Sean MacFarland commanded the Ready First Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, in Al Anbar province, returning with the unit in February 2007. He holds a B.S. from the United States Military Academy and an M.S. from Georgia Tech, and he is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. COL MacFarland's deployments include Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and two tours as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He currently serves as chief of the Iraq Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Office (J5), Joint Chiefs of Staff.

PHOTO: With U.S. Navy SEALs aboard, a USMC patrol boat works Lake Habbaniyah, South of Ramadi, in November 2006. An Army National Guard Apache flies overwatch. (courtesy of author)



IN THE MARCH-APRIL 2008 ISSUE of *Military Review*, Major Niel Smith and I wrote about the accomplishments of the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who fought in Ramadi from June 2006 through February 2007. I would like to elaborate on an important point raised in the article: the Al Anbar campaign was a model of joint operational effectiveness.

One of the great legacies of the fight for Al Anbar province will be the enduring, mutual respect earned by the various service-members who fought side by side. This respect was nowhere more evident than in Ramadi, where our Army brigade combat team, the 1st BCT, 1st Armored Division (Ready First Combat Team), fought under the command of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). The Ready First was not a pure Army BCT. It contained U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) elements, including a reinforced rifle battalion (initially 3/8 Marines and later 1/6 Marines), two rifle companies from a Marine Expeditionary Unit (2/4 Marines), a riverine patrol unit, an air and naval gunfire liaison platoon, and a civil affairs detachment. The Air Force supported the Ready First with an air liaison team embedded in the BCT. The brigade staff itself was a de facto joint organization—it had Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine officers and NCOs throughout. The electronic warfare officer, a Catholic chaplain, and the head surgeon were all Navy commanders. The civil affairs and public affairs officers were Marines. Outside the brigade, support came from a Marine logistics group and I MEF's air combat element. Numerous other external USMC units, including a platoon from a radio battalion, a postal unit, explosive ordnance disposal teams, fire-fighting teams, air traffic controllers, and military transition teams, also provided support. So did the Navy, in the form of surgical teams and corpsmen, SeaBee battalions, electronic warfare experts, and SEAL platoons from SEAL Teams 3 and 5.

The Ready First enjoyed a particularly good working relationship with the Special Forces and other special operations forces in and around Ramadi. Soldiers bestowed the affectionate nickname of “Army SEALs” on the members of SEAL Team 3 in Ramadi who fought and died alongside them. The brigade is particularly proud of its association with SEAL MA2 Mike Monsoor, who while supporting an operation in Ramadi won the Medal of Honor.

The Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen in Ramadi were deeply grateful for the lifesaving heroics of their Navy doctors and corpsmen. The spiritual aid given by Navy chaplains to all services will never be forgotten. The skill

and courage of Marine Corps pilots who attacked targets to assist troops in contact will likewise never fade from memory. In return, the Army's Apache pilots won the respect of Marines and Sailors who, in the mix, also came to rely on Army Paladins for timely and accurate fire support.

A command could not have asked for a better higher headquarters. The I MEF staff was dedicated to ensuring that there were no "haves" and "have-nots" among the units in Al Anbar. Often, the Army received first priority, ahead of the MEF's own Marines. The MEF commander at the time, Major General Richard C. Zilmer, ensured the Ready First had the resources it needed to fulfill his intent, and he never questioned or second-guessed us, even during the darkest hours. His forbearance demonstrated his trust in, and respect for, the professionalism and competence of the Soldiers under his command.

Altogether, the joint effort in Ramadi worked because, no matter what service uniforms they wore, professionals dedicated to the mission performed

as expected. This professional dedication evinced itself in shared values and shared understanding. It was not uncommon to see Soldiers and Marines march forward side by side in final honors at memorial services for their lost comrades. At times, the helmets atop inverted M4 carbines reflected a mix of Army and Marine Corps camouflage.

The U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps, each today without peer in its domain of land warfare, have not shared such a strong bond of common experience and understanding since the island campaigns of World War II. The services should nurture those bonds and sustain them over time. Those who share experiences on the battlefield with comrades from sister services can help strengthen these bonds and create closer ones by contributing to the discourse. Articles and other forms of media spawned from joint endeavors, co-written perhaps in cooperative cross-service efforts, will help feed the knowledge base for all services and make us stronger yet as a joint force. **MR**

Master at Arms Second Class Michael A. Monsoor, United States Navy Awarded the Medal of Honor

The family of U.S. Navy SEAL Master at Arms Second Class Michael A. Monsoor accepted the Medal of Honor, awarded posthumously, during a ceremony at the White House on 8 April 2008.

On 29 September 2006, Navy SEAL Michael A. Monsoor was serving as a member of a sniper overwatch element on a rooftop in an insurgent-held sector of Ramadi. The enemy assaulted the element, engaging them with rocket-propelled-grenade and small-arms fire. As enemy activity increased, Petty Officer Monsoor took position with his machine gun between two teammates on an outcropping of the roof. An insurgent threw a hand grenade, which bounced off Monsoor's chest and landed in front of him. Although only he could have escaped the blast, Monsoor chose instead to protect his teammates. Instantly and without regard for his own safety, he threw himself onto the grenade to absorb the force of the explosion with his body, giving his life to protect the lives of his two teammates.





THE MOST IMPORTANT THING: Legislative Reform of the National Security System

James R. Locher III

*Don't confuse enthusiasm
with capability.*

—General Peter J. Schoomaker,
Commander, USSOCOM, 2000

James R. Locher III is currently the executive director of the Project on National Security Reform, a nonpartisan initiative sponsored by the nonprofit Center for the Study of the Presidency. Mr. Locher was a principal architect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that modernized the military system along joint lines. He subsequently was involved in passage of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment and served as assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.

PHOTO: Wreckage of a Sea Stallion helicopter burned up during Desert One, the failed attempt to rescue U.S. hostages from Iran in April 1980. Problems among the services during the mission would eventually lead to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols reform bill, six years later. (Courtesy 1st Special Operations Wing historian)

THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM that the president uses to manage the instruments of national power, and the manner in which Congress oversees and funds the system, do not permit the agility required to protect the United States and its interests in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world. From 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and emerging threats to the homeland, 21st-century national security challenges demand more effective communication across traditional organizational boundaries. Meeting these challenges requires a common vision and organizational culture and better integration of expertise and capabilities.

The current national security system was based on lessons from World War II and was designed to enable the president to fight the Cold War. Many of the assumptions underpinning this system are no longer valid. The world has moved on, and the United States needs to adjust commensurately to the new realities impinging on its security. The current system gives the president a narrow range of options for dealing with national security affairs and causes an over-reliance on the military instrument of national power. The cost of not changing this system is fiscally unsustainable and could be catastrophic in terms of American lives. To make needed changes, the U.S. government requires comprehensive reform of the statutory, regulatory, and congressional oversight authorities that govern the 60-year-old national security system. The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) was founded in September 2006 as a public-private partnership to support this reform process.

Origins of the National Security System

America's national security system was devised for a different era, when national security was primarily a function of military capabilities wielded by one department. At the time the National Security Act of 1947—legislation that established this system—was written, the U.S. had recently emerged from World War II as a virtually unchallenged industrial and economic giant. The main threat to the United States was the Soviet Union, with its emerging nuclear ballistic missile arsenal and its conventional forces parked on the borders of the U.S.'s European and Japanese allies.

With major combat operations and nuclear deterrence the principal focus of national security strategy, the national security system required only

Where was America's national security system? As the floodwaters recede and the dead are counted, what went wrong during a terrible week that would render a modern American metropolis of nearly half a million people uninhabitable and set off the largest exodus of people since the Civil War, is starting to become clear. Federal, state, and local officials failed to heed forecasts of disaster from hurricane experts. Evacuation plans, never practical, were scrapped entirely for New Orleans' poorest and least able. And once floodwaters rose, as had been long predicted, the rescue teams, medical personnel and emergency power necessary to fight back were nowhere to be found. Compounding the natural catastrophe was a man-made one: the inability of the federal, state, and local governments to work together in the face of a disaster long foretold. In many cases, resources that were available were not used, whether Amtrak trains that could have taken evacuees to safety before the storm or the U.S. military's 82d Airborne Division, which spent days on standby waiting for an order that never came. Communications were so impossible the Army Corps of Engineers was unable to inform the rest of the government for crucial hours that levees in New Orleans had breached.

—Susan B. Glasser and Michael Grunwald,
“The Steady Buildup to a City's Chaos,”
The Washington Post, Sunday, 11 September 2005

limited coordination between vertically structured departments and agencies. The architects of the national security system gave little thought to structures and processes that might be needed between departments. The National Security Council, the only body that could coordinate the activities of different departments, was an afterthought in the 1947 National Security Act.

Managing National Security in the 21st Century

Whatever its adequacy in a former era, today's national security system is a clumsy anachronism not suited for the current strategic environment. The stovepiped structure designed to mobilize

industrial resources against a single peer competitor has been rendered dangerously inadequate. As noted in the Center for the Study of the Presidency's *Comprehensive Strategic Reform*, “The structures and doctrines the nation developed to win the Cold War have in some cases become weaknesses, many of their assumptions no longer valid.”¹

From global terrorism, cyber attacks, and challenges to the neutrality of space, to armed horsemen in Sudan, transnational religious leaders in Iraq, and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, the challenges to national security today defy traditional categories. National security now involves a wide array of issues that can be addressed only with a broader set of highly integrated and carefully calibrated capabilities.

The economic and social interdependence of the contemporary global system requires the United States to be able to act globally with more precision and with fewer unintended consequences—the latter because collateral damage can now incur major strategic liability. Globalization also facilitates the spread of disease, technology, ideas, and organizations at previously unimagined rates.

The political environment requires the United States to be able to deal with the actions and intentions of many more states, as well as newly empowered sub-state and non-state actors. Our world is much more fluid today than during the Cold War, when friends and foes were neatly arrayed in fixed alliances. These alliances made it easier to predict how states would act in any given situation; hence, the military contingencies we had to plan and train for were limited in number. Today, the demise of a single threat and the rise of diffuse threats have weakened alliances. It is often difficult to predict how states will react in any given crisis. We have to be prepared for a much wider array of contingencies. At the same time, sub-state and non-state actors can wield much greater influence through enabling technologies that allow much greater coordination

Whatever its adequacy in a former era, today's national security system is a clumsy anachronism not suited for the current strategic environment.

“Real Problems; Real Consequences”

In October of 2000, FBI Agent Ali Soufan was investigating the attacks on the USS Cole. Working around the clock in Yemen, Agent Soufan found a possible connection between the bombing and Al-Qaeda in the person of a one-legged jihadi named Khallad. Over the course of the following months, Agent Soufan would send multiple entreaties to the CIA asking for more information about the terrorist organizer Khallad, specifically in conjunction with an alleged meeting of Al-Qaeda agents in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The CIA had information that could have led Agent Soufan to discover that two of the future 9/11 hijackers had attended that meeting. He could have placed them at their current location: the United States. Three times Agent Soufan was denied the information that he—and the American people—so desperately needed. As a result, a combination of turf wars between national security agencies, an unwillingness to share information, a failure to identify credible threats to U.S. national security, and even personal animosity contributed to the success of one of the most destructive terrorist attacks in history. For nearly two years, two Al-Qaeda operatives lived in the United States with the CIA’s knowledge. Had that information been shared with the FBI, American citizens might be living in a different world today. Agent Soufan didn’t know it at the time, but he was the nation’s best chance to stop the 11 September 2001 attacks. Our national security system prevented information critical to America’s safety from reaching the people who needed it most. As a direct result of this national security failure, more than 2,000 people lost their lives on American soil.

of their activities and increase the destructive impact of their actions. Many of these same technologies are weakening the ability of nation-states to exercise traditional sovereign responsibilities.

The emerging security environment is being shaped by demographic pressures not present in 1947. Exploding populations in undeveloped states, and their rising expectations for achieving economic prosperity and security, threaten conditions of stability in the developed world. Greater individual mobility across borders and access to information on the Internet highlight economic disparities. Perceptions of economic exploitation have fueled widespread resentment among underdeveloped states when they compare themselves to the advantages enjoyed by the developed world.

As a result, America will face dynamic and perhaps unpredictable enmity. Inflammatory issues as well as vulnerable geographic areas can catapult from obscurity to strategic significance (e.g., energy, cultural clashes, effects of global warming, food shortages, and diseases). The United States will frequently be unable to anticipate the exact capabilities needed to address the next crisis.

Today, the U.S. lacks the agility to meet these evolving strategic priorities. The weaknesses inherent in the contemporary national security system are now much graver than ever before. Pandemics could threaten large parts of the population if, for instance,

Health and Human Services and state and local governments fail to communicate effectively. Terrorists could more easily employ weapons of mass destruction inside the country if the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense (DOD) continue to allow the foreign/domestic divide to rigidly define their areas of responsibility. If a nuclear device is detonated on American soil, who would be in charge of managing the consequences? How will the government handle contamination, domestic disintegration, and the inevitably chaotic economic immobilization that would likely lead to famine? Consideration of such an unfortunately probable scenario should catalyze us and focus us on the urgency of national security system reform.

System versus Leadership

Many say that leadership is central to solving these problems. There is, of course, no substitute for good leadership, and without it no system will be adequate. But a good leader alone is not enough, and we do not need to choose between the two. We need both. Leaders cannot by themselves effectively deal with the complexities emerging from 21st-century challenges. We need a *system* that can bring coherence to how our national government understands and responds to these challenges. The numerous bureaucracies involved in national security today all operate through

The numerous bureaucracies involved in national security today all operate through the lens of their own organizational culture. There is no common national government culture that facilitates the development of common national objectives and a shared vision.

the lens of their own organizational culture. There is no common national government culture that facilitates the development of common national objectives and a shared vision. There is also no mechanism the president can use to enforce the implementation of his or her decisions by the departments.

When the president is able to effect cooperation between departments, it usually occurs only by the accident of compatible personalities serving in the right posts at the right times. Such instances of cooperation-by-exception are laudable, but the nation and its security cannot depend upon such happenstance.

Reform in the 1980s and Reform Today

The challenges of integrating and coordinating the instruments of national power today are analogous in some ways to the problems DOD faced during the 1980s, when, in the wake of failures in Vietnam, Beirut, Grenada, and Iran, it became clear that the United States needed to reform the way its military services operated together. Unfortunately, internal Pentagon efforts to encourage voluntary joint operations made little meaningful progress. Advocates of “jointness” were often ostracized within the ranks by service chiefs who viewed such initiatives as threats to their budgets, power, and prestige. Senior service leaders often unsobly pursued the interests of their own branches above efforts intended to achieve better economy of resources and more focused joint efforts benefiting the common defense. Ultimately, it took congressional action to force the Defense Department to ensure cooperation and compatibility among the services.

Today, numerous government departments and agencies continue, both subtly and openly, to resist efforts to integrate them formally and institution-

ally into an overall system of national security. This hampers the Nation’s ability to meet evolving security requirements. The multifaceted, nuanced security threats facing America demand better cooperation and synchronization. Many of the good efforts to improve our ability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as Defense Directive 3000.05, National Security Presidential Directive 44, and the Interagency Management System, have been frustrated by bureaucracies that were not designed to work together in this fashion. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which is making terrific progress under its “500-day Plan” to reorganize and train for the challenges of the 21st century, is nevertheless finding it difficult to integrate and align the different parts of the intelligence community. At every turn, organizational cultures and independent budgets resist collaboration.

In other ways, the problems we face today are very different from the problems we faced in the 1980s. Interagency reform involves a much broader scale, stretching across slices of the many departments and agencies and involving the executive office of the president. There are important constitutional issues to consider. The problem is also more complicated in the sense that it involves numerous congressional committees, departments, and agencies whose main “day jobs” do not include national security.

The need for national security reform is also not limited to other departments and agencies or the interagency system. It must include the Department of Defense.

While the strategic environment of the future promises to be dynamic and difficult to predict, there is consensus that certain threats are much more likely than others. America has not succeeded in substantially reorienting DOD’s main functions toward these probable threats. For instance, even though DOD has increased its attention to planning for missions involving ethnic insurgencies and failing states, most large acquisitions are still focused on a major symmetric foe. While the United States needs to hedge strategically against the emergence of peer competitors, the near-term probability of major symmetrical warfare is insignificant. On the other hand, the military has assumed—or been forced to assume—some mission areas for which



U.S. Air Force, TSGT William Greer

Soldiers, USAID personnel, and local Iraqis walk through a market during a mission in Taji, Iraq, 8 February 2008.

it is ill suited. Support to public diplomacy and developmental assistance have been mixed together with counterinsurgency and stability operations. Now DOD is discussing the need for a “civilian reserve system.” Such an approach to meeting gaps in our national toolbox will prove to be enormously and unsustainably expensive. The current defense budget supplemental spending process will likely be subject to new fiscal constraints and scrutiny in the near future. This will likely curtail the military’s ability to prepare for and execute such non-core missions. These missions, however, are essential for security, and America must be prepared to find other ways to execute them.

At the same time, however, the government under-resources other departments such as the Department of State, whose core competencies include diplomacy and foreign assistance. As a nation, we remain locked in a mind-set that views international relations more or less as they have been for hundreds of years: formal, high-level relations between the governments of unitary nation-states, each of which has a conveniently similar way of interfacing with other states. This world no longer exists. While relations between states remain

an essential aspect of the international system, the effects of globalization have created innumerable ways by which states and societies communicate, interact, and respond to events. Actions directly affecting national security and international stability often occur at levels below traditional official bilateral or multilateral discourse.

These same effects of globalization have also added new international dimensions to the jurisdiction of traditionally domestic U.S. government departments and agencies. The Environmental Protection Agency deals with climate change throughout the world. The Department of Health and Human Services must be heavily engaged with health organizations around the world to responsibly protect the health of American citizens at home. Yet, despite this trend, the government remains focused on crisis-management in international relations, only dealing with problems when they can no longer be ignored. By then, leaders have perversely limited their options, often leading them to respond with military force. The national security system does not readily facilitate the formulation and execution of long-term, comprehensive national security policies that could diminish the probabilities of threats before they materialize.

On the whole, America faces major challenges in ensuring it is able to capably, constructively, and efficiently project power and influence in the 21st century. If the United States does not reform its system to meet the needs of a new era, it will run the risk of disastrous consequences. Because of the nature of bureaucracies, it is not reasonable to expect that the institutions themselves will initiate successful reform—and even if they were able to, such reform would not be sustainable without substantial changes in oversight from Congress. The whole system needs an overhaul from the top down, and only Congress can effect that sort of change.

The Project on National Security Reform

To meet the need for reform, concerned citizens from many diverse professional and political backgrounds have joined together to create the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). Project members are united in thinking that the government does not have the ability to resource and integrate the instruments of national power well enough to meet current and future security needs.

This public/private cooperative effort is engaged in carefully studying the national security system, in order to make recommendations on how to improve it and make it more responsive to current and future strategic and operational challenges. The project will also be active in supporting the implementation of these recommendations. PNSR is taking a comprehensive approach to national security reform, both in terms of the expanding and evolving nature of national security, and in terms of the interrelationships between the executive branch and Congress.

The effort is expected to last two years. Its goal is to get approval of a new national security system shortly after inauguration of the next president. The PNSR anticipates that three sets of reforms will be necessary:

- A new national security act replacing many provisions of the 1947 act.
- New presidential directives to implement changes that do not require statutory prescription.

- Amendments to Senate and House rules to provide sufficient support for and oversight of interagency activities.

PNSR is sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization led by Ambassador David Abshire in Washington, D.C. The project has over 300 members situated in government, the military, academia, law firms, foundations, and private industry.

The Guiding Coalition, a group of 21 distinguished Americans with extensive service in the public and private sectors, sets strategic direction for the project. These individuals ensure a careful, bipartisan consideration of major issues, and they will help communicate the project's ultimate findings and proposals to national-level constituencies and the general public. PNSR has also recently created a board of advisors and a government advisory council to ensure broad input into the reform process. PNSR is working closely with the House National Security Interagency Reform Working Group, co-chaired by Congressman Geoff Davis (R-KY) and Congresswoman Susan Davis (D-CA). This bipartisan group has 13 members. They come from many different committees involved with national security affairs.

PNSR has received private foundation support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the General Atlantic Corporation, and the McCormick Tribune Foundation. Additional pro bono support has been provided by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Brookings Institute, the Hoover Institution, the Hudson Institute, the Heritage Foundation, MPRI Inc., SAIC, and SRA. The Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of State, and the National Defense University are also helping to advance PNSR's objectives. PNSR has collaborative relationships with the Office of Personnel Management and the Interagency Strategic Planning Group.

The Conference Report for the National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 2008 requires an evaluation of the national security system by an

***The whole system needs an overhaul from the top down,
and only Congress can effect that sort of change.***

Recommendation 75: Iraq Study Group Report

For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how its constituent agencies—Defense, State, Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others—respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this decade’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decade’s operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.

independent organization, for which it authorized \$3 million. The Defense Appropriations Act for 2008 allocated \$2.4 million for this purpose. In February 2008, DOD concluded a \$2.4 million cooperative agreement with PNSR, which will conduct the evaluation and present a report to Congress and the president by 1 September 2008. This report will include a comprehensive set of alternative solutions and recommendations, as well as a straw-man National Security Act to initiate discussion about the need for new legislation. PNSR will also issue an interim report on 1 July 2008 focused on interagency problems, their causes, and their consequences. Both of these reports will be available for public examination and comment on the PNSR website (www.pnsr.org).

With separate funding (still to be raised), PNSR will turn the recommendations from the 1 September report into a full legislative proposal with accompanying draft presidential directives. After the presidential election of 2008, PNSR will make these products available for consideration by the president-elect and his or her team. At the same time, the project will send draft amendments to Senate and House rules to congressional leaders.

The Project’s Approach

PNSR will attempt to benefit from some of the models employed in the development of the historic Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986. As a result of that legislation, DOD was transformed from a system in which parochial service interests dominated resource allocation and strategy decisions, to today’s system, in which joint participation, with vital input from regional warfighting commands, drives strategic and resource decisions. The reformed system has given the Nation an unprecedented, world-class capability to develop, train, equip, and deploy forces. The battlefield successes

of Desert Storm and the early stages of operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are in part attributable to the jointness mandated by Goldwater-Nichols. In stark contrast, the lackluster and in some cases dismal execution of follow-on stability operations in OEF and OIF reflect the complete lack of a similarly resourced, disciplined, coordinated, and synchronized process throughout the national security system.

PNSR will also seek to leverage some of the methodology employed in developing Goldwater-Nichols. That legislation was the end result of a long analytic process that focused on defining problems and understanding causes before moving to solutions and recommendations. While many people come to reform initiatives with personal views of what the problems and solutions are, ultimate success results from employing a rigorous, transparent, and collective process to define and understand problems.



A U.S. Soldier chats with Andrew Passen, leader of the Baghdad PRT, on a visit to the Abu Nawaz district of the city where many small business loans sparked a rebirth of commerce, 28 August 2007.

...implementing change in the national security system will undoubtedly entail a long-term, sustained effort that will require leadership, collaboration, and a shared vision.

The project is currently engaged in analyzing obstacles to national security system performance. It is primarily investigating the linkages between the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, cabinet secretaries, and congressional oversight committees. Theories of change management suggest that bureaucracies and organizational cultures can begin to evolve organically if they first change output requirements and oversight processes. However, implementing change in the national security system will undoubtedly entail a long-term, sustained effort that will require leadership, collaboration, and a shared vision.

The project is looking at the national security system through the lens of organizational effectiveness theory and its standard elements. Analytical working groups are configured around these elements, which include human capital, resourcing, structures, processes, oversight, vision, and knowledge management. The project will not approach its task thematically or according to mission areas. Such approaches risk prejudicing the outcome of the study, and they may identify only some of the systemic reforms that are required. Instead, the groups will analyze a series of historical case studies to identify recurrent problems across issue areas and across different presidential administrations. Shared findings from the studies will inform the analytic groups' ongoing work. A legal working group will address national security reform from a legal perspective and construct the project's legislative proposals. A congressional affairs working group will establish collaboration with Congress. A public affairs working group will engage in dialogue with the public about the need for national security reform. Finally, an implementation working group will support reform implementation.

Initial Observations

Unsurprisingly, PNSR's analysis shows that the U.S. government has had great difficulty integrating the instruments of national power—although it tends to do better in some circumstances than others. Moreover, the project has found that, in general, the integration of government agencies is becoming increasingly difficult even as it becomes increasingly important.

A threshold question in PNSR's analysis has to do with the scope of national security. The definition of the overall problem is heavily contingent on how one defines national security. The project has thus far agreed that the scope of national security is broadening but still has ill-defined limits. Progress on resolving interagency problems depends in part upon an emerging political consensus on the definition and scope of national security.

The project is also analyzing where past problems concerning cooperation and synchronization have originated: with national-level policy makers or with the regional and country teams tasked with implementing policies. Some blame regional and country teams for poor implementation of good national-level policies. Others contend that regional and country teams work well but have been ineffective because they receive insufficient guidance from national decision-makers. PNSR analysis shows, however, that cooperation and synchronization failures have occurred and continue to occur at every level—national, regional, and country-team. Failures cannot be attributed solely to deciders at the national level or to actors at regional or country-team level; rather, they seem to be inherent in the system.

The architects of the National Security Act of 1947 were not concerned with interagency collaboration. At the time, the country needed a massive industrial mobilization of its assets. It also appears that some of those involved in developing that legislation actually wanted to prevent too great a concentration of power, whether to protect the interests of their individual organizations or as a safety mechanism against tyranny. As a consequence, the inability of the interagency system to compel individual cabinet agencies and departments to collaborate short of personal involvement by the president was, and continues to be, a serious weakness. The president simply does not have the time to direct and manage the more numerous, complex,

and pressing issues arising today. Delegating the authority to organize interagency national security missions has not worked: the process has been ad hoc and ineffective.

Additional preliminary observations include the following:

- The civilian national security system does not effectively train or cultivate leadership in a sustained and systematic manner.
- Leadership is a critical factor in the performance of the national security system, but it is not the only one, and it is not necessarily the dominant one either.
- The organizational cultures of the different components of our national security system do not reward collaboration and information sharing, nor are they conducive to the development of shared vision, values, and objectives.
- The lack of strategic planning for the human resources needed for national security affairs encourages many departments to outsource work beyond their oversight capacity and beyond what would be considered efficient.
- The current national security policy development and execution process does not adequately integrate nontraditional government departments and agencies into the national security system. Nor does it provide an effective formal link between strategic policy and operational planning.
- There is no established process to monitor and assess the execution of national security policies and plans.
- There is no common interagency planning process, methodology, or lexicon. Thus, it is highly difficult to link strategy to resource allocation decisions.
- Government undervalues knowledge (and more generally human capital), and in this respect is out of step with both business trends and the global environment.
- No matter how well integrated the elements of national power are, if America is not able to resource a mission at the right level and make rapid adjustments to account for changing circumstances, it will not succeed.
- There is inadequate capacity in civilian national security organizations, especially, but not only, for expeditionary and post-conflict operations.
- Currently, there are insufficient mechanisms to reprogram or transfer resources easily and quickly within the national security system.

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Summary

The national security system is showing its age: stovepiped, slow, and lacking flexibility, it continues to hobble the president by narrowing the range of options available for dealing with national security affairs. The tools for managing national security were forged in the 1950s and 1960s, when the world was more predictable; they are not suited to addressing contemporary challenges. To provide for our security today, we need sweeping reforms that create a much more agile, nimbler national security system. Such changes will broaden the president's options, lead to increased efficiency in an era of shrinking resources, and perhaps decrease the Nation's reliance on military force to solve global problems. It is highly unlikely that such reform will occur unless it is brought about through new legislation. Such legislation will also require presidential directives, as well as leadership with a common vision dedicated to the long-term process of reform. **MR**

NOTES

1. Center for the Study of the Presidency, *A Panel Report for the President and Congress: Comprehensive Strategic Reform* (Washington: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 2001), 1.

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The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947

Charles A. Stevenson, Ph.D.

HARRY TRUMAN was at Washington D.C.'s National Airport on Saturday, 26 July 1947, waiting impatiently to fly home to Missouri to see his dying mother. First, however, he wanted to sign a long-delayed bill reorganizing the government to deal with national security matters. Congress had completed action on the measure, but the printing office had closed, so there was a delay in preparing the bill for Truman's signature.

A little after noon, congressional clerks brought the bill on board the *Sacred Cow*, the four-engine C-54 presidential plane. Truman promptly signed it, as well as an executive order setting forth roles and missions for the Armed Forces and a paper nominating James Forrestal to be the first Secretary of Defense. An hour later, en route to Missouri, Truman learned that his mother had died. Meanwhile, just before adjourning until November, the Senate quickly approved Forrestal's nomination by voice vote.¹

The press hailed the National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 80-253, as a major accomplishment. Headlines called it a "Unification Bill," although it fell far short of merging the Armed Forces. In fact, it created an independent Air Force and preserved the autonomy of the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. The new law did not even create the Department of Defense—only the awkwardly named National Military Establishment headed by a Secretary of Defense with just three special assistants. The secretary had only limited power to "establish general policies and programs" and "exercise general direction, authority, and control" over the service departments.²

In 1949, amendments to the law gave the position more power and created a regular Department of Defense. However, there have been few other significant changes in the 60 years since Truman signed the original bill.

The story behind the act is a tale of bitter interservice rivalry, clever alliance building with Congress, clashing ambitions—and, yes, a desire to strengthen America's defenses so it could exert global leadership and counter the emerging Soviet threat.

Wartime Experience

President Franklin D. Roosevelt ran World War II directly from the White House, working with and through four senior military officers—two Navy admirals, Ernest King and William Leahy, and two Army generals, Chief of Staff George Marshall and Chief of the Army Air Forces Hap Arnold. These four became the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), but the president never issued an order describing their roles or powers. They met at least weekly as a group to develop consensus recommendations to the president, and they

Dr. Charles A. Stevenson, a longtime professor at the National War College, now teaches at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of SecDef: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense (Potomac Books, 2006); Warriors & Politicians: U.S. Civil-Military Relations Under Stress (Routledge, 2006); and Congress at War: The Politics of Conflict Since 1789 (Potomac Books, 2007).

PHOTO: President Harry S. Truman signing the National Security Act Amendment of 1949, 10 August 1949. (NARA)

met with their British counterparts as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Although the system seemed to work surprisingly well, General George C. Marshall and others in the Army started advocating a clearer, centralized structure early on.

Marshall believed that unity of command in the various theaters of war needed to extend to Washington as well—in the form of a single chief of staff who could resolve disputes among the military and assign clear priorities for plans and budgets. Reformers also wanted to create a policy structure that minimized the role of personal idiosyncrasies and maximized rational strategic planning. FDR's management style dismayed even his loyal admirers, such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson. As Stimson confided to his diary in 1943, "The President is the poorest administrator I have ever worked under in respect to the orderly procedure and routine of his performance. He is not a good chooser of men and he does not know how to use them in coordination."³ Many senior leaders did not want the same organizational chaos to continue under Harry Truman.

In April 1945, a JCS committee on "Reorganization of National Defense" recommended creating a single Department of the Armed Forces with a civilian head above a military commander of the Armed Forces. The senior Navy member dissented from the otherwise unanimous report, and the committee noted that most Army officers, but only half the Navy officers, favored a single department.⁴ This Army-Navy split was the defining feature of the fight over postwar defense organization.

The New Commander in Chief

Only 82 days after taking the oath as vice president, Harry Truman became president. He brought strong views and valuable experience on military matters to the White House. As a captain in World War I, he commanded a field artillery battery in France, and he remained in the Army reserves thereafter. As a Senator, he served on the Military Affairs Committee and headed a special investigative panel on wartime contracting. He was pro-Army, in contrast to his pro-Navy predecessor.

Truman also had little regard for the Marine Corps. Once, after losing numerous fights to USMC supporters on Capitol Hill, he vented his true feelings in a letter to a congressman advocating a JCS

seat for the USMC commandant: "The Marine Corps is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President that is it what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's."⁵

Even before the 1944 elections, Truman made it clear he supported unification of the Armed Forces. In a magazine article, he wrote: "The end, of course, must be the integration of every element of America's defense in one department under one authoritative, responsible head. Call it the War Department or the Department of National Security or what you will, just so it is one department . . . One team with all the reins in one hand."⁶ He later told his staff that wartime experience had hardened his views: "We must never fight another war the way we fought the last two," he told his staff. "I have the feeling that if the Army and the Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other, the war would have ended much earlier."⁷

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—President Harry S. Truman, 1944

The Postwar Challenge

World War II had convinced most American political and military leaders that isolation was no longer possible, and that postwar security required U.S. involvement and leadership. Roosevelt especially wanted to avoid repeating mistakes made after World War I, when the United States retreated from the world stage and refused to join the League of Nations. Thus, the administration consulted with congressional leaders in 1943 and 1944 to build support for postwar institutions to promote security and economic growth. The United States took the lead and built new international organizations that reflected and helped maintain its superpower status. A conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944 devised the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade. A San Francisco conference in 1945 established the United Nations, a global body to keep the peace and deter aggression, but subject to an American veto.

The role of military power in this postwar world was not clear in 1945 and 1946. The Soviet Union had been a wartime ally and was just beginning to demonstrate its uncooperativeness in rebuilding a democratic Europe. Only the United States had atomic bombs, but there was still debate on whether these were merely bigger explosives or a quantum leap requiring a completely new strategy. A few theorists—mainly air power advocates—argued that all you needed for future conflicts was an Air Force, but most military men foresaw the requirement for a full spectrum of ground, sea, and air capabilities.

How to organize and equip these forces was another challenge. The wartime disputes made Army leaders determined to centralize command and control. They also thought that a single budget bill for all services would best protect Army programs, since they had already witnessed political enthusiasm for ships and planes in separate measures in previous years. Army aviators, long envious of the Royal Air Force's independent status since 1918, were determined to achieve a separate Air Force, but they believed that goal was likely as an equal branch within a unified department.⁸

The Navy valued its autonomy and traditions and was resistant to change, as even Franklin Roosevelt acknowledged: "The Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing compared with the Na-a-vy. The admirals are really something to cope with—and I should know. To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn

bed just as it was before you started punching."⁹ The Marine Corps, which had survived Theodore Roosevelt's efforts to amalgamate it into the Navy and drastically reduce its role, was also determined to protect its size and separate identity.¹⁰

The Army Plan

General Marshall had presented his own proposal for a single military department in 1943, and the Army went public with its plan in 1944 before a House Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy. The plan called for a Secretary of the Armed Forces over civilian undersecretaries, and military chiefs of staff for Army, Navy, and air. The act gave the chiefs of staff, plus a military chief of staff to the president, the role of recommending strategies and budgets directly to the president.¹¹

Secretary of War Stimson made the case for change, arguing that there were "many duplications of time, material, and manpower, with the loss of effectiveness, resources, and power which such duplications inevitably produce." He also said that current interservice harmony was due "not to the form of the present organization, but to the personalities of the military leaders, their good will, and their intelligent and devoted efforts." Stimson knew that many admirals were opposed to unification, but Navy Secretary Knox had told him that he favored a single department. The day before Knox was to testify, however, he suffered a fatal heart attack.¹²

The new Navy secretary, James Forrestal, who had enlisted as a Seaman in 1917 and later taken flight training, was a strong opponent of unification. He spent the next three years spearheading the fight against it.

The Navy Counterattack

The Navy had cultural, budgetary, and strategic reasons to oppose unification. Seafaring, especially in the days before radio, inculcated in officers fierce habits of independence and self-reliance. Once over the horizon, a ship's captain became an all-powerful god. It was unthinkable that anyone else, certainly not a land-based warrior or a mere civilian, could tell a Navy man what to do, or how to do it. To preserve its autonomy, the Navy needed resources, which until 1947 were funneled through a Navy Department that had strong allies in congressional Naval Affairs Committees which were dominated by people from

[Air power advocates] argued that all you needed for future conflicts was an Air Force, but most military men foresaw the requirement for a full spectrum of ground, sea, and air capabilities.



Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal leaving the White House after a Cabinet meeting, 10 August 1945.

places that built ships. A single military department, funded by a single defense appropriations bill, risked putting the Navy in competition with the other services, perhaps to the Navy's detriment. Strategically, the Navy feared the loss of its air and ground components: Naval Aviation and the Marine Corps. What the Navy viewed as a powerful synergy of land, sea, and air capabilities was seen by others as unnecessary duplication. But Forrestal believed that

loss of these components would be "fatal" to the sea service.¹³

The chair of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, Sen. David Walsh (D-MA), shared those concerns and suggested a countering strategy to Forrestal. In a 15 May 1945 letter, Walsh said, "I doubt very much if any useful purpose would be served by merely objecting to plans which propose the consolidation of the War and Navy Departments." Instead, Walsh suggested a Council on National Defense for planning and coordination and urged a Navy study of the issue.¹⁴

Forrestal saw the potential value of such an approach and promptly turned to an old friend, Ferdinand Eberstadt, who had served on the Army-Navy Munitions Board and the War Production Board, to conduct the study. He also assigned 30 Navy personnel to help prepare the report. Eberstadt was not a Navy partisan, and he got assurances from Forrestal that he could "let the chips fall where they may."¹⁵ But his report, by broadening the issue from military organization to whole-of-government handling of national security, gave the Navy an alternative that it could argue was both more important than military unification and sufficient by itself to strengthen the government for future challenges.

Eberstadt submitted a 250-page report in September, and it was sent to Congress in October 1945.

The Eberstadt report marshaled the arguments against consolidation and fleshed out the idea of a national security council (NSC) as a substitute. Eberstadt argued that military unification "looks good on paper," but "has never been put to the acid test of modern war." The idea "strikes deeply into the traditions, fiber, morale, and operations of our military services," he claimed. He also noted that the only countries that had tried such systems were ones where the military dominated and there was no civilian control. He doubted that a single person could run the huge consolidated department. "The lone civilian Secretary would run the risk of becoming a mere puppet completely hemmed in by the regular establishment." And he warned, "Under unification Congress would be presented only with a single 'organizational line.'"¹⁶

The case for an NSC was powerful in its own right. Eberstadt argued that "strategic planning and operational execution were good" during the war, but that "there were serious weaknesses in coordination." He cited "gaps between foreign and military policy—between the State Department and the Military Establishments. Gaps between strategic planning and its logistical implementation—between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military and civilian agencies responsible for industrial mobilization. Gaps between and within the military services—principally in the field of procurement and logistics. Gaps in information and intelligence—between the executive and legislative branches of our Government, between the several departments, and between Government and the people."¹⁷

Eberstadt proposed an NSC to formulate and coordinate policies in political and military fields; to assess and appraise U.S. foreign objectives, commitments, and risks; and to keep these in balance with American military power. "It would be a policy-forming and advisory, not an executive, body." He also said that such a structure could wage both peace and war. The members were to be the president as chairman, plus the secretaries of State and the three military departments, the chairman of a new National Security Resources Board that was to plan defense mobilization, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁸

Unification advocates readily accepted the NSC proposal—except for, interestingly, Harry Truman. The president suspected that Forrestal truly wanted

a British-style cabinet—a system to force him to listen to people like Forrestal. In fact, even after the passage of the 1947 act, Forrestal expected to run the NSC and its staff, and even house them in the Pentagon.¹⁹ But the president would have none of that. Despite his service in the Senate, President Truman was a strong defender of presidential prerogatives and responsibilities. He made little use of the NSC before the Korean War, in part because he believed that only the president could make decisions or be accountable. “There is much to this idea,” Truman wrote in his memoirs. “In some ways a Cabinet government is more efficient—but under the British system there is a group responsibility of the Cabinet. Under our system the responsibility rests on one man—the President.” In the final stages of the legislation, Truman had his staff insist on word changes to make the NSC clearly advisory, with no power to coordinate or integrate policy.²⁰

During the next two years, Truman played a deft political game, pushing Forrestal and his Army counterpart to reach some kind of agreement but never making demands that might force his Navy secretary to resign in protest, since he knew that would jeopardize the unification effort.

Congressional Allies

On Capitol Hill, the battle lines were drawn. Three of the four chairmen of the military committees were opponents of unification. Carl Vinson (D-GA) had been in Congress since 1914 and had already opposed consolidation efforts in 1925 and 1932. He saw to it that House committees pigeonholed various reorganization proposals in 1945 and 1946.²¹ The Senate Military Affairs Committee was more involved. It held hearings in the fall of 1945 with Eberstadt and others and seemed favorable toward some reorganization. Truman met with Forrestal, Walsh, and Vinson on 21 November to get the Navy viewpoint. Vinson cautioned the president against offering a bill of his own, saying that no such bill would pass “either this winter, next winter, or the winter after.”²²

But Truman went ahead on 19 December, sending a message to Congress calling for a Department of National Defense, combining the War and Navy Departments. As a gesture to his adversaries, he agreed to let the Navy retain its own aviation and to keep the U.S. Marine Corps as a separate military branch. He also called for rotation of the chief of

staff position among the military branches. But most significantly, he granted Forrestal and other Navy witnesses permission to “express their personal views on this subject without restraint” when called before congressional committees.²³

Meanwhile, both the Army and Navy mobilized their supporters among the public. Forrestal established a special office to publicize the Navy viewpoint and the Army aviation community made a grassroots effort to lobby Congress. In favor of the Army position were such groups as the Air Force Association, American Legion, Catholic War Veterans, Daughters of the American Revolution, and the Reserve Officers Association. Opposing them were the Navy League, Marine Corps League, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars.²⁴

Throughout 1946, both sides made their case in every available forum. While pumping out its own propaganda very effectively, the Navy also seized upon statements by its opponents that confirmed their worst suspicions. In March, Carl Spaatz, new commanding general of the Army Air Forces, made a supposedly off-the-record talk to aviation writers in which he said, “The Air Force that the nation must have, if it is to be properly protected, is the Army Air Force. It would be a waste of the taxpayers’ money to have two. . . . Why should we have a Navy at all? . . . In this day and age, talking of fighting the next war on the oceans is a ridiculous assumption. It will be fought in the air by an Air Force.”²⁵ His remarks did not stay off the record for long.

Even Dwight Eisenhower got caught, in a secret memo to the JCS, recommending limiting the Marine Corps to 50,000 or 60,000 men, one-tenth of their size in World War II. The Marine Corps commandant, General Alexander Vandegrift, revealed the Eisenhower proposal in congressional

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—General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, 1946



Army Air Force generals, from left to right, Hap Arnold, Tooey Spaatz, and Hoyt Vandenberg, pose for photo, circa 1946.

testimony in May 1946, creating such a firestorm that Truman's unification bill was set aside for the rest of the year.²⁶

Chairman Elbert Thomas (D-UT) of the Senate Military Affairs Committee brought a few of his members to meet with Truman on 4 April to discuss the bill they were preparing to report. They went through the measure paragraph by paragraph, and the president was pleased. He pledged to do everything possible to push for passage. The Thomas bill created a Council of Common Defense and a Unified Department of Common Defense. It also created a Joint Staff of the Service Chiefs and a Chief of Staff of Common Defense.²⁷

On 13 May, Truman orchestrated a meeting of senior civilian and military officials to try to break the impasse and get them behind a common bill. His staff had persuaded him to drop the idea of a single chief of staff in the hope of getting Forrestal's support for a single department headed by a single secretary. He got his military liaison officer, Admiral William D. Leahy, to suggest that compromise. Then Truman himself said he agreed that there was some danger of "the man on horseback," and the provision should be dropped. Secretary of War Patterson said he was not prepared to "jump into the ditch and die" for the single chief of staff.²⁸ Forrestal and Patterson then agreed to report back by the end of the month.

Their 31 May letter noted agreement on eight points, including creation of a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a JCS without a single chief or chairperson. However, Forrestal and Patterson remained in disagreement on the issues of a single department, a single civilian secretary, and the status of naval aviation and the Marine Corps. Truman responded two weeks later with his position on the disputed issues: he was for a single department and three coordinate services, but also for substantial naval aviation and guaranteed status for the Marine Corps.²⁹

Meanwhile, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee held hearings into the summer, giving opponents of the Thomas bill full opportunity to express their concerns. With Congress moving toward adjournment for the forthcoming elections, Truman accepted the advice of Democratic leaders that the bill was dead for the time being.

On 10 September, Truman reconvened his senior officials to press for action. He said he wanted an immediate agreement, and urged everyone to "let (their) hair down and express (their) true feelings about this." Patterson offered a concession: to limit the Secretary of Common Defense to broad matters of policy and not allow interference in the administration of the services. Forrestal, growing increasingly emotional, insisted that the secretary have no real authority over the services. He also warned that he could not agree to testify before Congress in favor of any bill "which did violence to my principles." Eisenhower calmed things down by noting that everyone had accepted the concept of a Secretary of Common Defense. Let the details be worked out later, he suggested. Truman asked the service secretaries to get together to try to work things out.³⁰

Final Congressional Action

In January 1947, Patterson and Forrestal finally came to an agreement. They would give general authority to the Secretary of National Defense, but individual secretaries would administer the three departments as separate units. In a victory for future flexibility, they also agreed to let an executive order rather than permanent law define service roles and missions.³¹ Truman sent a revised bill to Congress on 26 February. Forrestal remained suspicious at every turn. Even the day after the Army capitulated to another series of Navy demands, he warned, "We are going to have to watch them [the Army] very carefully."³²

Changes in Congress made favorable action more possible in 1947. The elections gave the Republicans overwhelming control of both the Senate and House, and the power of the Naval Affairs Committees had been somewhat reduced by their merger into armed services committees overseeing both the Army and the Navy. In the House, Speaker Joe Martin (R-MA) supported reorganization and made key rulings when challenged by pro-Navy congress-

men.³³ One key decision was to refer the administration bill to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments rather than the more hostile Armed Services Committee. The Expenditures Committee had jurisdiction over reorganization legislation, and an anti-unification congressional representative, Clare Hoffman (R-CA) chaired it. Despite his personal views, Hoffman headed a full committee review between April and early July.

In the Senate, president pro tempore Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) made another key decision, referring the reorganization bill to the newly combined Armed Services Committee, whose chairman supported the measure, rather than to the Senate counterpart to Hoffman's committee, whose chairman opposed the bill.³⁴ The Senate panel held hearings over the course of two months and reported its bill on 5 June.

However, the Navy, and especially the Marines, still fought a rearguard action. Senators met with Forrestal and White House Counsel Clark Clifford on 18 April and demanded specific language to protect the Marine Corps' special status. Senator Millard Tydings (D-MD) expressed the common view: "This is not a matter of logic but emotion. You can't win this one. These are the boys who took Mount Suribachi [on Iwo Jima]. The American people will not forget them or let them down."³⁵

The Senate reported the bill unanimously, but members reserved the right to offer amendments. The committee measure included language to reassure the Navy, such as inserting "general" to modify the secretary's "direction, authority, and control" and language specifically denying an intent to "merge" the military departments. The bill also declared that its provisions "shall not authorize the alteration or diminution of the existing relative status of the Marine Corps (including the fleet marine forces) or of naval aviation."³⁶

Only one Senator, Edward V. Robertson (R-WY), spoke at length against the bill, and he gave up after the Senate defeated the first three of his 25 planned amendments by voice vote.³⁷ Final passage came on a voice vote on 9 July.

Congress was now hurtling toward adjournment for the year. House hearings had not ended until 1 July, in part because of demands to see JCS papers like the one in which General Eisenhower had proposed slashing the size of the Marine Corps. A

threat to stop action on the reorganization bill led the administration to grant access to the papers. The House committee reported its bill a week after the Senate passed its version. The latest bill added the executive order on roles and missions as bill language and deleted the authority for the secretary to "formulate and finally determine" budget estimates. The majority leader then used parliamentary tactics to clear the way for action without the normal referral to the Rules Committee.³⁸

House debate lasted only seven hours, with numerous speeches and 14 amendments, half of which the committee accepted. One amendment deleted Senate language requiring original service budget requests to be included in submissions to Congress, and another strengthened language on land-based naval aviation. A 36-190 vote defeated a proposal to weaken the defense secretary's powers by deleting language allowing him to exercise general direction and control over the military departments.³⁹ The bill passed on another voice vote.

It took five meetings over the next several days to iron out differences between the houses. Conferees adopted most but not all of the House amendments, with no fundamental change in the basic outline of the bill.⁴⁰ Each house approved the conference report by voice vote, and the measure was sent for the president's signature. On 26 July, it was rushed to National Airport.

The Legacy of Compromise

Just after signing the bill, Harry Truman signed the executive order on service roles and missions, as promised, and also signed the paper nominating Forrestal to be the first secretary of defense. White House Counsel Clark Clifford explained the rationale for the appointment: "If Forrestal remained Secretary of the Navy, he would make life unbearable for the Secretary of Defense; if, on the other hand, *he* was the Secretary, he would have to try to make the system work."⁴¹

Forrestal himself had premonitions of his difficulties. Shortly after taking office, he wrote to a friend, "This office will probably be the greatest cemetery for dead cats in history."⁴² A few months later, and despite his most diligent efforts, he concluded that he had failed, and indeed would continue to fail, unless his position was strengthened with new legislation. By the summer of 1948, he told Clifford,

“I was wrong, I cannot make this work. No one can make it work.”⁴³ The law was not changed until 1949, by which time Forrestal had been fired from his job and had plunged to his death from the 16th floor of the Bethesda Naval Hospital.

The worst fears of the Navy and the greatest hopes of the Army were not realized by passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The act protected the Marine Corps. The Navy kept its airplanes—and eventually got aircraft carriers for them. The

Air Force got its independent status and soaring Cold War budgets for bombers and missiles. The Army suffered continued cutbacks, with the greatest punishment imposed by its five-star hero, Dwight Eisenhower, who as president restructured the Armed Forces for nuclear war.

Even George Marshall had doubts about his handiwork. As secretary of state in March 1947, he wrote to President Truman, complaining that the proposed law would greatly “diminish the responsibility of the Secretary of State” and make him only “the automaton of the [National Security] Council.”⁴⁴

There are other ironies in this landmark law. It arose as a measure to reorganize the military, yet it became basic law for foreign policy and for the intelligence community. It was crafted as a means to impose restraints on military spending, yet it provided the framework for the Cold War military buildup. Its strongest opponent received the job of putting it into practice, yet he himself became an advocate for changes he had fiercely resisted. It had been one of the highest priorities for the president who signed it into law, yet he deliberately ignored and tried to undercut some of its most important provisions.

Perhaps the greatest irony is that, despite the uncertainty over the wording of the law until the very last moment, the language has remained largely fixed for over 60 years. **MR**



President Truman with the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room of the White House. L to R around table: unidentified man, Kenneth C. Royall, Sidney Souers, unidentified man, Roscoe Hillenkoetter, unidentified man, unidentified man, James Forrestal, George C. Marshall, President Truman, and W. John Kenney, 19 August 1948.

NOTES

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3. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947-48), 495.
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10. Charles A. Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians: U.S. Civil-Military Relations Under Stress* (London: Routledge, 2006), 146-7.
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15. Caraley, 40, 40n.
16. Eberstadt Report, 33, 36.
17. Ibid., 30, 5.

18. Ibid., 6, 7.
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20. Eberstadt Report, 18; Paul Y. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 230; Caraley, 155.
21. Caraley, 55, 145, 199.
22. Hoopes and Brinkley, 326.
23. Clifford, 148-149.
24. Caraley, 219-220, 224, 234.
25. Quoted in Thomas D. Boettcher, *First Call: The Making of the Modern U.S. Military, 1945-1953* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992), 83.
26. Ibid., 83, 86-7.
27. Caraley, 127; Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, 52-59.
28. Hoopes and Brinkley, 331.
29. Ibid., 33; Cole et al., *The Department of Defense*, 22-26, 26-8.
30. Clifford, 153-4.
31. Cole et al., *The Department Of Defense*, 52-59.
32. Clifford, 155.
33. Caraley, 208, 210.
34. Ibid., 208.
35. Clifford, 156.
36. Caraley, 167-8.
37. Ibid., 168-9.
38. Ibid., 171, 178-9.
39. Ibid., 180-81.
40. Ibid., 181-2.
41. Clifford, 158.
42. Letter to Robert Sherwood, 27 August 1947, quoted in Walter Millis, [ed.], *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), 299.
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Money as a Force Multiplier in COIN

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BEFORE OPERATION AL FAJR, the second battle of Fallujah (in November-December 2004), an estimated 4,000 insurgents roamed the streets of Fallujah, Iraq, killing government soldiers and policemen and essentially turning the city into a rebel stronghold. They could do so not just because of their numbers and ruthlessness, but because they derived significant strength from the local population. In essence, the people provided the insurgents with the recruits and support necessary to thrive and move freely within the battlespace.

To attack this strength, the Marine Corps' Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) would use a powerful weapon—money—to drive a wedge between the insurgents and the people and help win the second battle of Fallujah. In particular, the combat team's civil affairs units influenced the people by providing money to alleviate their immediate needs, settle grievances, and reduce frustration arising during the course of the battle. At the same time, the units developed long-term reconstruction efforts to help local Iraqi leaders gain control of the area. In this way, RCT-1 built legitimacy for coalition forces and further increased rifts between insurgents and their much-needed popular support. These actions reduced the enemy's base of operations and ability to maneuver.¹ As this article will show, RCT-1 civil affairs units wielded financial power as a combat multiplier and reduced the enemy's overall combat potential.²

Setting Conditions for Success

The initial program to provide money for Iraqi relief and reconstruction was strategically oriented and designed for deliberately planned, long-term reconstruction projects. A modification to the program was needed to allow the use of money in a tactical mode as a mechanism to act on the immediate needs of civilians and to respond to grievances. The change would set the conditions for operational success

Building capability. For Operation Al Fajr, RCT-1 designed a system to allow the immediate payment of money to Iraqis. The system was built around civil affairs elements that contained all the pieces necessary to approve and make on-the-spot payments in a field environment. RCT-1 civil affairs designated one Marine as a paying agent with \$50,000 in cash on hand and a second Marine to execute contracts of up to \$3,000 without having to use normal project-approval procedures.³ This gave the Marines a mechanism similar to a petty cash system to make immediate, discretionary payments as the need arose.

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PHOTO: U.S. Marine Corps Scout Platoon, Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) Marines load their high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) at the civil military operations center in preparation for a patrol through the city of Fallujah, Al Anbar Province, Iraq, on 26 December 2004, during Operation Iraqi Freedom. (U.S. Marine Corps, LCPL Ryan B. Busse)

The author would like to thank team leaders Major Henegar and CWO3 Reese for contributing pictures.

Previously, securing funds required approval at division level or higher and, once approved, cash payments had to be made by a paying agent from the disbursing office. Redundant checks and balances and centralized fiduciary oversight at the division level had created a cumbersome, bottlenecked approval system. The process required submission of electronic documents to 1st Marine Division headquarters in Ramadi for approval and often took several days to complete.⁴ This time lag between identifying a need and disbursing money was an unacceptable operational delay that made outcomes far less effective. If one views the delivery of such funds as analogous to force targeting, then identification-to-execution delays caused Marines to miss a high-profile target while they waited for permission to engage it. Such delays often nullified the money option, especially for fleeting targets of opportunity.⁵

Designated financial officers and comptrollers understandably sought tight accountability of money because of the potential for the misuse of funds in Iraq's chaotic environment. Thus, they built the funding process around centralized financial control, which included earmarking money for projects in Al Anbar province (where Fallujah is located) prior to authorizing its use. For Al Fajr, however, effective disbursement required delegating control to Marines in contact who were in the best position to influence events as they unfolded.

Decentralizing control improved disbursement timeliness and allowed Marines to make immediate transactions to influence events. This streamlined execution proved pivotal.

Delegation of authority was limited to a maximum of \$3,000 per use, a sum that paid for most high-impact projects requiring rapid execution. By design, the \$3,000 limit excluded long-term reconstruction programs—for such undertakings, Marines used normal approval procedures.⁶ This limited approach struck a good balance between responsiveness and control; it decentralized approval for high-impact ventures needing quick execution, yet maintained centralized approval for more costly deliberate reconstruction.

Despite decentralizing controls, RCT-1 preserved accountability by having two Marines in the payment process, one letting contracts and the other dispensing money. Submitting all payment vouchers and contract records to the division on a regular basis provided additional accountability. In the end, the integrity of Marines in money-handling positions ensured the money was used properly.

Funding pipelines. In a report to the U.S. Congress, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) grouped funding sources that supported Iraq relief and reconstruction into three categories: U.S.-appropriated funds, international donor funds, and Iraqi funds. As of 30 June 2006, the combined funds totaled over \$85.4 billion.⁷ Each category contained sub-categories of funds that were received through different means, including seized assets from the old Saddam Hussein regime, Iraqi national government budgets or grants, and pledges or accounts from coalition partners, the world community, and international governments. The various funds' sources and intended uses determined how they could be spent.

For example, in the international donor funds category, multiple non-U.S. donors pledged money for Iraq relief



USMC, CWO3 Reese

Civilian contractors set up of water tanks during Operation Al Fajr, January 2005.

and reconstruction. This money went into a trust under the auspices of the World Bank, and funds went to projects through a local staff of 800 UN representatives.⁸

In the Iraqi funds category, the money in the subcategory of development funds for Iraq (DFI) was “drawn primarily from [Iraqi] oil proceeds and repatriated funds.”⁹ The “CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] established DFI with UN concurrence to serve as the primary financial vehicle for channeling revenue from Iraqi oil sales . . . and repatriated Iraqi assets to the relief and reconstruction efforts of Iraq.”¹⁰

In the U.S.-appropriated funds category, the subcategory Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) served as a funding channel specifically for military commanders. CERP is “a program that [allows] coalition military commanders to respond rapidly to urgent humanitarian, relief, and reconstruction needs in their geographic areas of responsibility.”¹¹ According to the SIGIR, “The aim of CERP . . . [is] highly visible projects that yield immediate benefits and nurture positive relations with the local populace.”¹² CERP gives the coalition flexibility and accessibility to funds and so has become an important tool for the commander. Also in the U.S.-appropriated funds category is the subcategory of Iraq security force funds (ISFF), which allocates money to establish Iraqi security forces. Accordingly, the rules for ISFF limit the money’s use to that purpose.

The funding lines described above have supported relief and reconstruction efforts, each with its own purpose and guidelines for use. Relief and reconstruction funding involves the UN, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Health and Human Services.¹³ In the fall of 2004, the array of funding lines and agencies involved, each with a different objective, created a challenging environment. Maximizing financial power required understanding what funds were available and how to obtain them. For instance, CERP funds often dried up quickly because of their popularity and ease of use. Thus, a command that relied only on CERP ran the risk of an interrupted money flow. Establishing multiple resource lines and creating a financing cell within the command helped RCT-1 maintain a steady funding stream. RCT-1 civil affairs teams understood the system and worked multiple funding lines to avoid interruptions. The steady flow of money was essential for the unit’s success on the battlefield.

Using money on the battlefield. Drawing civilian support away from insurgents was the goal, but it was a tricky endeavor. Cultural and language barriers made progress difficult. Success came slowly and required persistent, time-consuming, resource-heavy efforts, but frequently resulted in small gains, or even setbacks. Commanders had to balance the effort with competing priorities, specifically, the desire to eliminate enemy

forces through kinetic means. Moreover, insurgents placed a high value on civilian support for their operations, and they did their best to undermine coalition efforts with the local population. But in the battle for legitimacy, money employed effectively against the insurgency provided RCT-1 with an economy of force measure—a cheap yet effective method for pulling community support away from the insurgents.

Selecting effective targets. RCT-1 sought targets that offered the best opportunities for financial leverage. Careful target selection proved as important as combat power. Civil affairs teams preferred to have a large number of lower-cost projects. More projects



USMC, Capt Henegar

Iraqis unload humanitarian goods during Operation Al Fajr, January 2005.

meant wider coverage and more people involved. These projects also had better completion rates, and they got money to people quicker to attend to needs faster. Larger-scale projects were vulnerable to insurgent sabotage because they were complex, took much longer, and were more visible.

This small-project approach also created more opportunities to engage civilians constructively and promote positive perceptions. More frequent opportunities to talk with civilians under good circumstances helped build relationships that often yielded actionable intelligence.¹⁴ Sometimes, the financial targeting's real objective was to bolster local leaders' prestige, help them build credibility, and enable them to better control their areas and constituents.¹⁵ Local leaders were often powerful allies who were crucial to attracting people to the coalition. With their positions and status, they influenced broad audiences. Projects aimed at civil, religious, business, and tribal leaders and at town elders, technocrats, and medical and legal representatives were critical in settling intractable grievances.

The high unemployment in Al Anbar province was another target, particularly in areas the insurgents hit heaviest. Insurgents recruited those who were most disaffected by the economy: unemployed military-aged males. Short-term, labor-intensive projects were the best way to counter such recruiting.¹⁶ When Marines evaluated project proposals, they usually chose the one that offered the most local jobs because it would have the greatest impact on reducing the insurgent recruiting pool.

Unfortunately, most reconstruction projects only generate employment that lasts for the duration of the project, after which the jobs expire. Programs that created long-term jobs would have been ideal in Al Anbar, but they were difficult to initiate due to restrictions on the use of CERP funds. (CERP cannot fund projects that enhance an individual's personal gain, e.g., funds cannot be used to help a private business).¹⁷

To promote the growth of long-term jobs, RCT-1 civil affairs proposed offering business grants tied to job creation. This program would have provided money to businesses that planned to grow in a way that directly added jobs. Providing assets to assist or create new businesses was also part of the proposal. For example, it would have given a welding machine or a bread-baking oven to an Iraqi to enable

him to start a new business that employed others. This approach could have had a significant benefit. By giving away equipment, not money, it would have been easy to account for its use. Unfortunately, restrictions on CERP funds remained, and Marines in the field could not act on these proposals.

Throughput of Projects and Reach of Force

Throughput was the constraining factor for the "more projects, low-cost" scheme. A civil affairs team could only manage a limited number of projects effectively at one time. RCT-1's civil affairs detachment added two additional teams, which enabled it to execute more projects and cover a larger geographical area.¹⁸ However, only civil affairs Marines and a few Seabees were permitted to disburse money in Fallujah.¹⁹ Allowing Marines who had daily contact with civilians to pay out money might have worked better, but doing so would have required an even more decentralized control structure—a tough sell to the comptrollers.

RCT-1 built important connections to civilians, and effective throughput over a wider area reinforced those relationships via quick responses to local needs. When the Marines made things happen, civilians saw that Americans kept their promises. The ability to resolve problems better than the insurgents gave the Marines an advantage in building legitimacy and public support.²⁰ Establishing relationships with civilians dovetailed with the 1st Marine Division commanding general's mantra, "Marines, no better friend, no worse enemy."²¹

Shaping the battlefield and assisting civilians. In Al Fajr, Marines gave money to displaced Iraqis to ease their hardship. This helped to expedite evacuation and shape the environment.²² The money enabled displaced persons to purchase items from the local economy while away from Fallujah, reducing the coalition's requirement to provide humanitarian assistance at a later point. In the short term, removing civilians from contested areas helped Marines identify insurgents and limit their mobility, and it reduced the chances of unintended civilian casualties. Furthermore, dislocated civilians helped spread the coalition's message by word of mouth to other areas, adding value to the information operations (IO) campaign.

USMC, Capt Henegar



A civil affairs unit evacuates civilians from Fallujah during Operation Al Fajr, November 2004.

Humanitarian crises tie up military resources and force immediate responses, often with a minimal return on investment.²³ Avoiding them is also critical because insurgents exploit crises to their advantage. These situations promote instability, create fertile ground for enemy recruiting, demonstrate the local government's inability to care for its people, and bring the people closer to the insurgents by estranging them from a government unable to ensure their well-being.

Money not only helped prevent the development of humanitarian assistance problems in Fallujah, but it also provided flexible response options to contain problems. Marines used local resources to solve problems when they occurred instead of doing it themselves. During the battle, for instance, a civil affairs team purchased supplies locally, and Iraqi merchants delivered them. Marines on patrol also distributed supplies when they saw needy people in the city and in Saqlawiyah, a neighboring town.²⁴ In this case, money directly built goodwill with significant economy of effort.

Reconstruction. Given the extent of the damage to Fallujah, it was surprising how fast the city was rebuilt after the assault. Key infrastructure was restored within weeks, and stopgap measures to provide essential services in lieu of repaired infrastructure were established prior to the city's repopulation.²⁵ Reconstruction money, especially with quick project throughput, was critical to success because it fostered positive public opinion for

the Marines and the Iraqi Interim Government.²⁶

Much of the success with reconstruction can be attributed to the Marines' decision to rebuild while they fought. In phase III of the battle (seize and secure the city), sewer-water pumping stations stopped functioning, contributing to significant citywide flooding.²⁷ Marine civil affairs teams paid Iraqi municipal workers to identify the stations' locations, which required the workers to enter the city. Initially, the workers were reluctant to go

while combat operations were underway; however, money provided the necessary incentive. Afterwards, these workers were proud to say they had worked with the Marines. Indeed, they told other Iraqis that they had teamed up with the Marines to save infrastructure and houses—thereby delivering a powerful IO message from Iraqis to Iraqis.²⁸

In this operation, civil affairs teams used on-hand reconstruction funds to hire Fallujan work parties to do a variety of tasks.²⁹ These parties helped clean up the city, alleviating the burden on the Marines to perform such activities, but more important, they provided employment and money for the economy during a critical time.



Iraqi municipal workers work on a generator in a sewer water lift station during Operation Al Fajr, November 2004.

courtesy of author



USMC, Capt Henegar

Iraqi work-party morning formation in Fallujah.

Marines also provided each Iraqi head of household in the city with a \$200 *solatia* (compensation) payment.³⁰ Over 33,000 Iraqis received this payment, which amounted to a total distribution of more than \$6.6 million dollars in a one-week period.³¹ The payment recalled a Marine experience in Vietnam at the Battle of Hue.³² Such disbursements helped

foster goodwill, jump-started the economy and the rebuilding effort, and focused the people's energy on reconstruction instead of trouble.³³

During raids, civil affairs teams followed the assault elements to provide immediate payment to noncombatants who had incurred battle damage.³⁴ This proactive effort eliminated the requirement

for civilians to make a claim at the civil military operations center (CMOC).³⁵ The CMOC often had long lines of claimants, and settling a *solatia* claim usually required multiple trips, creating delays and frustration. Immediate payment for damage after a raid eliminated grievances before the insurgents could exploit them.

The guiding principle for civil affairs during phase IV (transition) was to focus on the people, not solely on reconstruction. Using money to eliminate grievances disarmed the enemy and stifled his initiative because insurgents particularly exploited the aggrieved segments of



DOO

Marines and Iraqi soldiers provide \$200 *solatia* payments to all heads of household during Operation Al Fajr.

the population to build support for their cause. Information operations highlighted the insurgency's destructive nature by contrasting the coalition's efforts with the insurgents' propensity to destroy.

RCT-1 civil affairs knew that to win over civilians in the end, the coalition would have to help them see the situation improving as the insurgents were eliminated. While Marines aggressively sought out insurgents, they also monetarily assisted neutral parties caught up in the conflict. By doing this, Marines helped maintain popular support for the coalition and government forces.

Do's and Don'ts

When selecting projects or spending money in Fallujah, the civil affairs teams considered it important to—

- *Avoid larger, more expensive projects involving only a few people.* Many Iraqis saw such undertakings as favoritism, because the project benefitted only a small number of people.
- *Align projects with the people's needs to achieve a desired effect.* Those who selected projects for a far-removed area rarely knew what the people there needed. In fact, enterprises that seemed like a good idea from afar were often counterproductive. For example, Baghdad officials discussed building a high-cost, state-of-the-art sewer treatment plant in Fallujah. However, the Fallujans cared little about such a project, and it would not have added value to the effort to stabilize the area or win hearts and minds. In addition, the Fallujans lacked the technical expertise to run such a facility.
- *Use the local contractors, even if they are more expensive or do lower quality work.* In Fallujah, some contractors had worked in Baghdad, and so they tended to use workers from Baghdad as well. This did not sit well with the Fallujans.
- *Watch for undue corruption or graft.* Having to deal with a certain level of graft is always a cost of doing business in Iraq, but if it is excessive, a high percentage of it probably includes pay-offs to insurgents.
- *Attempt to gain local buy-in of projects with*

the city council and keep them informed of progress. The city council can either facilitate or hinder the execution of a project, and the council gains credibility with the public for implementing it.

- *Spread-load contracts to promote fairness and expand reach.* Executing contracts in the CMOC or at a central location often leads to repeated use of the same contractors and employment of the same people, and it increases the chances of such criminal activity as stealing from contractors or intimidating them.³⁶

Conclusion

In Fallujah, civil affairs achieved results with money by shaping public opinion and promoting legitimacy. Money provided options to solve local problems, resolve grievances, and reduce frustration. This financial leverage shored up support for the coalition and Iraqi officials by enhancing their credibility and their capability to respond to the local population's needs. It set favorable conditions to draw civilians away from the insurgency and kept "fence-sitters on the fence." Money also exposed the insurgents by stripping away their local support and stimulating dialogue that led to usable information about the enemy. Used wisely, money weakened the insurgency by countering its ability to promote its cause or exploit a situation.

In Iraq, units must be able to spend money in a timely manner. This is especially important when many relief organizations are not willing to enter an area due to security concerns or because they do not understand the local dynamics well enough to operate successfully in the region.³⁷

Commanders asked much of their junior leaders in Fallujah, so arming them properly was important. These "strategic corporals" interacting with civilians on a daily basis needed more constructive and decisive methods to build relationships and engage the local population effectively. Passing out soccer balls and sunglasses was good, but making something useful happen that created a real difference in the life of Iraqis was a far better approach to winning hearts and minds. Money provided that ability. **MR**

NOTES

1. The author commanded Detachment 4-4, 4th Civil Affairs Group. Detachment 4-4 was assigned to Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) from August 2004 to March 2005, a period that included Operation Al Fajr, the second battle of Fallujah. Al Fajr, or "New Dawn," was the name of the November 2004 offensive to seize control of Fallujah. Originally, the name was Operation Phantom Fury, but it was changed early in the operation. The first battle to rid Fallujah of insurgents occurred as part of Operation Vigilant Resolve, in April 2004.

2. In a nonpermissive environment, civil affairs teams were usually the link between the "pots of money" designated for relief and reconstruction and the actual on-the-ground spending of money in a combat environment. This was especially important because most relief organizations outside the military, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), did not operate in nonpermissive environments.

3. First Marine Division promulgated this policy through Fragmentary Order 0364-04 during Operation Al Fajr. The order authorized civil affairs teams to conduct rapid funding of projects. After spending \$50,000, the civil affairs team received a new allocation of money. This ensured that a steady flow of money was available and accessible in a field environment.

4. 1st Marine Division was located at Camp Blue Diamond in Ramadi, the capital of Al Anbar province.

5. The supporting arms field commonly used "targets of opportunity" to refer to lucrative opportunities that present themselves on the battlefield, usually unexpectedly, and which were typically perishable if not acted on quickly. As an example of using money in an unplanned but effective way, the RCT-1 commander gave \$20.00 to an old Iraqi woman carrying groceries down the street of Fallujah, and he hailed a cab for her. He stated at the daily operations and intelligence brief that he had won a friend for life that day.

6. Marines used the normal funding approval process for long-term reconstruction projects not requiring immediate implementation, such as building a school.

7. Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR), *July 2006 Quarterly and Semiannual Report to Congress* (30 July 2006), 90. Congress created SIGIR to provide independent oversight of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, one of the major U.S.-appropriated funds for Iraqi relief and reconstruction. The \$85.4 billion included \$36.2 billion of U.S. appropriated funds, \$14.6 billion of international donor funds, and \$34.6 billion of Iraqi funds.

8. *Ibid.*, 93.

9. *Ibid.*, 90.

10. *Ibid.*, E2. Established shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Coalition Provisional Authority served as an interim governing body for Iraq during the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

11. *Ibid.*, C4.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*, C1, 22.

14. The reasons for this are beyond the scope of this paper. However, civil affairs teams operating in Fallujah repeatedly noticed a direct correlation between money exchanged with civilians and information received. Actionable intelligence included information about the location of improvised explosive devices, weapons caches, or persons intimidating others that led to the commander taking action based on information.

15. Civil affairs teams and unit commanders who were familiar with the local area and understood the atmospherics (see note below) knew which leaders to empower: the ones capable of swaying the people away from the insurgency and most likely to promote stability and local control. Marines felt that using civilian leaders became particularly important when trying to maintain an Iraqi "face" (message delivered by an Iraqi) in an area with respect to civil administration, public safety, and law enforcement. In the long run, this was consistent with the overall objective of gaining local support and the desired end state of transferring local control to the Iraqis. Note: "atmospherics" was a popular term used in OIF to describe the general, collective feel in an area in terms of civilian sentiment towards coalition forces or any issue involving the Iraqi national government. It was critical for the unit commanders to understand the atmospherics in their assigned zones. Indeed, it was often a matter of life and death to understand how the civilians felt about the coalition in a particular area and to know the degree of support that local Fallujans provided to the insurgents.

16. This does not include rebuilding critical infrastructure or improving force protection. These projects had priority and were based on other factors, such as quality of work and time to complete.

17. The inability to use Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds for assisting businesses was a major complaint of the civil affairs teams in Fallujah and limitations on CERP severely hampered economic development.

18. RCT-1's civil affairs detachment had five teams in the city of Fallujah and two in the surrounding areas. A civil affairs team in Fallujah consisted of four to eight Marines specially trained in civil affairs activities, with additional personnel attached or supporting. All teams were HMMWV-mobile, except for one at the civil-military operations center. The number of projects or initiatives a civil affairs team could effectively manage depended on both the operating environment (permissive/nonpermissive) and the size and complexity of the projects. Generally, a nonpermissive environment greatly limited the civil affairs teams' ability to manage projects. Indeed, the environment had much more of an impact on project management than project size or complexity.

19. Other than civil affairs Marines and a contracting cell from the Seabees of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Engineering Group, few Marines spent money on relief and reconstruction in Fallujah. Select senior Marines (battalion commanders

and higher) were authorized to make on-the-spot payments. Staff judge advocates made *solatia* payments (see note 30 below for a description of *solatia*). In addition, a few Marines spent money to establish police, but the civil affairs teams generally let even these contracts.

20. Distributing projects to other units allowed for civil affairs assets to support other projects in an area. In a counterinsurgency, civil affairs assets are a high-demand, low-density force. The tight schedule in Al Fajr meant civil affairs forces often cut short valuable dialogue and relationship-building with civilians associated with a particular project. The demands of supporting numerous other projects left them limited time. This was unfortunate, since positive interaction with civilians can be more important than a project itself.

21. Major General James N. Mattis promulgated the slogan "Marines, no better friend, no worse enemy" in "1st Marine Division Standard Operating Procedures for Stability and Support Operations," dated 15 November 2003.

22. Because it provided the ability to obtain commercial transportation and a place to stay in another area, money made it easier for civilians to leave an area. During Al Fajr, many Fallujans went to the neighboring town of Saqlawiyah.

23. In OIF, humanitarian crises have significantly affected the planning factors of time, force, and space in operations; thus, a commander is well justified in taking preventive measures to avoid such situations.

24. Team 4, Detachment 4, 4th Civil Affairs Group, Command Chronology for January 2005 (Camp Baharia, Iraq, 11 February 2005), 4; and Team 4, Detachment 4, 4th Civil Affairs Group, Command Chronology for February 2005 (Camp Baharia, Iraq, 8 March 2005), 5.

25. 4th Civil Affairs Group, Command Chronology 2005 (Washington, DC, 15 July 2006), 9-10. The speed at which Fallujah restored itself became a powerful theater-wide information operations message that focused on the Iraqi Interim Government's and the coalition's concern for the local population.

26. The Iraqi Interim Government governed Iraq prior to the official elections in January 2005.

27. A number of causes led to massive flooding in Fallujah, including an inoperative sewer system, broken water lines, and high water from a nearly closed sluice gate on a dam on the Euphrates River.

28. Prior to the battle, RCT-1 civil affairs did not know that there was a sewer system for rainwater with nine powered lift stations in Fallujah. Continuous de-flooding became important because many parts of Fallujah were below the Euphrates River water table. The main purpose of the sewer system was to pump water from the Euphrates out of Fallujah, particularly when the river ran high. Employees from the water treatment plant outside the city provided the information and guides to find all nine lift stations. The flooding in the streets created a natural obstacle and caused major problems for the RCT-1 commander to maneuver his forces. It became a major focus and significant issue to resolve for the division commander. Standing water also created a health issue because of dead bodies and the black-water sewage that washed up from septic tanks located throughout the city. The flooding also caused additional damage to civilian homes.

29. Each civil affairs team managed work parties of from 10 to 200 Fallujans. An Iraqi foreman paid these parties daily and served as a point of contact for paying the other workers. Because the work parties consisted of all military-aged males, the Marines jokingly referred to them as "Muj working parties" ("Muj" was short for Mujahideen).

30. During OIF, military commanders used *solatia* to compensate a neutral party (a civilian not affiliated with the enemy) whose house or business had sustained collateral damage or whose family member had been killed or seriously injured. However, providing a *solatia* payment was not an admission of guilt by the U.S. Government.

31. 4th Civil Affairs Group, Command Chronology 2005, 12.

32. Jack Shulimson et al., *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968*, Marine Corps History and Museums Division (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), 604. After the Battle for Hue, the South Vietnamese government launched Operation Recovery, where "each displaced person was entitled to . . . \$85.00 [and rebuilding materials] . . . More than 830 families received reconstruction material and all the displaced received a temporary relief payment."

33. The author of this paper was in Fallujah and saw the repairs to the city begin and the local economy come back to life. Shulimson et al. note that some early improvements were seen in and around Hue during Operation Recovery after the "[South Vietnamese government] had begun reconstruction, resettlement, and economic revival programs" (605).

34. Visiting an area immediately after a raid or other coalition action to pay for battle damage or initiate a contract to fix damage affecting neutral parties became standard operating procedure (SOP) for RCT-1 civil affairs. The SOP called for the civil affairs team to follow "in trace" or directly behind the assault element. Any houses harboring insurgents or weapons caches were not eligible for battle damage remuneration.

35. Fallujah had a civil-military operations center, or CMOC, called the Fallujah Liaison Team about one kilometer to the east of the city. It established another CMOC in late November 2004 during Operation Al Fajr. This second CMOC was called the "Fallujah Help Center," and it was located in the center of the city at the "mayor's complex" or governmental center. Among their numerous functions, CMOCs were places where civilians went to broach issues or get assistance (such as with a battle damage claim.) The CMOCs were often busy places with long lines.

36. In Fallujah, insurgents and thieves monitored activity in the CMOC. Marines at the CMOC frequently distributed large sums of cash to the locals.

37. Relief organizations outside the military included NGOs and IGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Crescent and the UN World Food Program.

REFORMING THE MADRASAH: A Disregarded Dimension in the War on Terrorism

Major Todd Schmidt, U.S. Army

*All battles are first won
or lost in the mind.*

—Joan of Arc

“THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR is a war of ideas.” We have heard this and similar statements repeatedly over the past five years. We read it in the papers and blogs. We listen to it from our leaders and politicians. It is an accurate statement, but it remains widely underappreciated.

The U.S. government has committed itself to a strong, concerted, and necessary effort to fight in the “war of ideas” using strategic communications, information operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs. In an effort to augment this effort, U.S. troops collect beanie babies, soccer balls, and second-hand clothes to distribute to Afghan and Iraqi children. But Soldiers’ well-intentioned actions, like those of their higher-ups in the military and government, have been largely ineffective. Promoting good will via humanitarian assistance and gestures has made little lasting impact, because such actions do not successfully challenge the ideological forces underpinning Middle Eastern cultural perceptions—and these perceptions are at the root of the conflict between Islamic terrorists and the West. To win the war of ideas, the U.S. and its allies must counter the formation of extremist attitudes where they are born and inculcated: in the Islamic madrasah school system.

Radical, violent Islamists understand the significance of education as a fulcrum in the war. They organize lines of operation under the assumption that long-term control of society depends on what the rising generations of Muslim youth are taught to believe—educating Muslim youth is vital to achieving the Islamists’ long-term goals. The Taliban, for example, have attacked non-madrakah schools, murdered teachers, and intimidated parents and children. In 2006, they destroyed over 200 schools, killed 20 teachers, and drove more than 200,000 children from the classroom.¹

The U. S. needs to undertake a major effort to reorient the madrasah system so that education in the Muslim world focuses less on reproducing repressive religious ideologies and more on teaching the skills needed to develop and globalize their economies; think critically and act independently; and exercise freedom of initiative. In the end, victory in the war of ideas will depend on how effectively we persuade Muslim leaders that madrasah reform is in the best interests of their societies and the Islamic faith.

The Madrasah System

The death of a scholar is the death of knowledge.

— The Prophet Mohammad

Throughout the Muslim world, the main source of education is the madrasah (center of learning), a concept that dates back to the ninth century. We can trace

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PHOTO: A schoolhouse in the midst of repair awaits a roof, students, and a teacher in Bagram, Afghanistan, 16 October 2002. Soldiers from Tennessee’s 489th Civil Affairs Battalion rebuilt the school, which had been destroyed by the Taliban. (U.S. Army, SGT Todd M. Roy)

its genesis to gatherings of students (*taliban*, or “seekers of knowledge”) at mosques to learn more about the Qur’an, Sharia (Islamic law), Hadiths (chronicles of the Prophet Muhammad), Muslim history and literature, mathematics, and science. Many of the Islamic world’s greatest contributions to learning originated in ancient madrasahs.

At the height of European colonialism, a noticeable change began to occur in madrasah curricula. The study of the Qur’an, Hadiths, and Sharia were given much more emphasis, while the secular subjects came to be considered less relevant. By the mid-1800s, to meet the perceived threat posed by European Christian missionaries and their Western ideas, religious studies gained even greater impetus. A hostile view of Western knowledge emerged, caused by the perception that Islam was under religious siege from the West via the introduction of new ideas that challenged Islamic beliefs and values.

Unable to defeat colonial powers in physical battle, Muslims embraced a deliberate “educational jihad” that emphasized the most traditional, most conservative teachings of Islam.² Modern knowledge was deemed “un-Islamic” and “worldly,” and the curricula of many madrasahs increasingly shunned anything but originalism, or strict interpretation of religious teachings. The schools began to focus mainly on *hifz*—committing the Qur’an to memory. In addition, students wishing to become scholars (*ulema*) took additional religious courses that prepared them to become leaders (*imams*) in their towns and villages.

Many madrasahs today still follow the *hifz* tradition. However elementary their curricula, these schools are often the only available form of education for children from the most desperate and impoverished backgrounds. As the disadvantaged populations of the Muslim world explode, madrasahs expand their influence by filling an educational void that governments have ignored. Often the madrasahs function as boarding schools, providing meals and care to children that parents cannot otherwise afford. Students go through the rigors of the *hifz* curriculum, in which their world revolves around the teachings of Islam, but they are fed and safely housed. The madrasah provides a “cheaper, more accessible, and more Islamic

As the disadvantaged populations of the Muslim world explode, madrasahs expand their influence by filling an educational void that governments have ignored.

alternative to education” that appeals to illiterate and indigent populations.³

Currently, there are estimated to be several hundred thousand madrasahs in operation. Young imams frequently found and administer madrasahs of their own in their hometowns and villages. Because the imam is often the only person in town who is literate and qualified to preside over daily prayers, weddings, funerals, festivals, and other rituals, he and his madrasah are accorded great respect, and they wield great influence.

Impressionable youth growing up in madrasahs whose imams espouse intolerant, violent teachings are prime recruits for extremist causes. Widespread reporting on such madrasahs and their teachers has led many in the West to see the schools as symbols of extreme Islam. Western descriptions typically reflect this. The *New York Times Magazine* has described the madrasah system as “education of the holy warrior.”⁴ Writing in *Policy Analysis*, Andre Coulson cleverly dubbed madrasahs “weapons of mass instruction.”⁵ The 9/11 Commission Report referred to the schools as “incubators of violent extremism.”⁶

Pakistani madrasahs under the control of extremist imams have received the most unfavorable media attention. The madrasahs’ great influence in Pakistan is largely due to the Pakistani government’s severe, prolonged lack of investment in public education.⁷ According to a 2004 report by the UN Development Program, Pakistan ranks lower on the education index than every non-African country.⁸ Filling the vacuum are an estimated 10,000 madrasahs that have enrolled close to two million students.⁹ If even a small fraction of these students are radicalized and choose to become mujahideen, the schools could produce hundreds of thousands of indoctrinated enemies intent on jihad against the West with little concern for consequences to themselves. Clearly, such a situation is cause for alarm.

Progressive imams and scholars who dare to propose expanding the madrasah curricula to include lessons of more practical value are often “silenced, humiliated, or chased out of their homes.”¹⁰ According to Abdul-Hamid Abu Sulayman, president of the International Institute for Islamic Thought, “The Muslim scholar is either caught between the ignorant Mullahs threatening him with [hell] or the corrupt rulers threatening him with jail.”¹¹

So dire is the current educational situation in the Middle East that a highly respected foreign policy intellectual has asserted, “There is no education system worthy of the name east of Israel.”¹² That is a strong statement, and one disputed in the halls of universities throughout the Middle East. Even so, the madrasahs that so many Muslim children attend do not prepare their students to participate in a modern workforce or become citizens of a peaceful, stable social order. Their education amounts to little more than prolonged indoctrination in an extreme form of Islam whose only purpose is to promote intolerance, which leads to violence and results in political instability.

The link between secular violence and madrasah education has been demonstrated in many countries.¹³ If millions of children are being taught only to recite the principles of Islam by rote, and an increasing percentage of their teachers advocate violent, extremist ideology, the results will be extraordinarily dangerous. Hundreds of thousands of students are matriculating through “dens of terror, hatcheries for suicide bombers, and repositories of medievalism.”¹⁴ In short, the so-called education offered in madrasahs is both a short- and long-term threat to the West.

Fundamentalist Influences

Islam’s history is full of achievements and singular contributions to humankind. But Mohammad had a strategic vision of an all-encompassing Islam: “There is neither East nor West for God.”¹⁵

Hundreds of thousands of students are matriculating through “dens of terror, hatcheries for suicide bombers, and repositories of medievalism.”

As a revealed and messianic religion, Islam shares with other such faiths a conviction about the need to witness, evangelize, convert, and win over the world to its traditions and doctrines. Adherents to all branches of Islam claim global aspirations, which some movements unfortunately express in a manner some have termed “a globalized pathology.”¹⁶ For these sects, the madrasah system is a crucial weapon of jihad.

In particular, three movements, all in the Sunni branch, seek to monopolize the madrasah systems within their respective spheres of influence: the Deobandi, Salafism, and Wahhabism. These movements are puritanical, legalistic, fundamentalist, and emphasize evangelism to spread their version of Islam. The Deobandi, however, abjures violence against non-believers while Salafism and Wahhabism advocate it. All three sects’ missionaries are skilled, well funded, and often charismatic. One of their favored tactics is to establish madrasahs wherever they go.

The Deobandi movement originated in India under British rule. Fear that competition with Hinduism and British culture would gradually lead to Islam’s disappearance or submergence led to a religious revival among Muslims that promoted independence from British colonialism through education. As a result, the madrasah system became deeply entrenched in the Muslim areas of colonial India, now part of modern Pakistan. The Taliban of Afghanistan are heavily influenced by Deobandi Puritanism, and they rely on students recruited from Pakistani religious schools founded by the Deobandi.

Adherents of Salafism and Wahhabism, terms often used interchangeably, also wish to dominate the education system. Salafism originated from the teachings of Ibn Taymiya, who taught a literal interpretation of the Qur’an in the 14th century. In deference to early generations of believers—the so-called “pious predecessors”—Taymiya sought to purge all modern influence from Islam.

Wahhabism stems from an 18th-century revival of Salafism. Based in Saudi Arabia where it is inseparably linked with the Saudi royal family, Wahhabism promotes an abstemious, aggressive, and violent form of Islam. Wahhabi teachings provided spiritual support for the House of Saud’s military conquest of the Arabian Peninsula, and today they continue to justify and rationalize the

spread of Wahhabi doctrine through violent, even terroristic jihad. Because the daughter of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the sect's founder, married into the Saudi royal family in the mid-18th century, Wahhabism draws the bulk of its financial support from followers among Saudi Arabia's royalty and the country's other wealthy families.

Muslim leaders under the sway of these three movements share an obsessive interest in limiting popular exposure to non-Islamic ideas. They fear that cross-cultural communications and uncontrolled, interconnected communication networks arising from the globalization of trade could cause the Islamic world to succumb to "Westernization" or "Americanization."¹⁷ Hence, they spend a great deal of effort trying to insulate their followers from ideas they think are inimical to Islam. It will be difficult to persuade such leaders that they and their people would benefit from madrasah reform.

Global communications, however, seem to penetrate even the most xenophobic societies. Despite all the anti-Western invective and the closed nature of the madrasah system, many observers assert that exposure to global communications appears to be producing volatile situations in disadvantaged places. People in nations with inadequate or diminishing resources, where schools do not offer the education needed to compete in the global marketplace, can readily see the obvious prosperity of others. This is fanning expectations that, unmet, will lead to instability and violence. As Akbar Ahmed, current chair of Islamic Studies at American University and former Pakistani ambassador to the United Kingdom, notes, there is a "breakdown... taking place when a large percentage of the population in the Muslim world is young, dangerously illiterate, mostly jobless."¹⁸ To reach these youths, Muslim leaders need to expand their vision beyond fundamentalist confines. Vastly increased investment in education within these countries might help establish the framework for economic development and thereby ward off instability.

U.S. Aid to Radicalization

The U.S., too, bears some responsibility for the madrasah problem in the Middle East. In prosecuting the Cold War, U.S.

leaders succumbed to the idea that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" and pursued policies toward Afghanistan without due assessment or concern for possible consequences. In doing so, they inadvertently aided the radicalization of the madrasah system in Pakistan and, by relation, elsewhere in the Middle East.

During the 1980s Soviet-Afghan war, the U.S. gave approximately \$3.3 billion, and Saudi Arabia an additional \$1 billion, to the Afghan government and anti-communist forces. This funding, and the anti-Soviet fighters, logistics, and bases it supported, all came together in Pakistan, where the money was disbursed through the Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence Agency.¹⁹ The immediate result was that tens of thousands of Afghan fighters trained and saw combat under the aegis of a religious jihad against Soviet invaders of a Muslim land (with the support of several thousand non-Arab fighters who joined the cause).

Samuel Huntington asserts that 75 percent of the funds provided by the U.S. to train Islamic recruits went to "the more fundamentalist Islamist groups, with 50 percent of the total going to the most extreme Sunni fundamentalist factions."²⁰ Much of the U.S.-supported training took place in madrasahs. Thus, the foreign aid provided to the U.S.'s Cold War Muslim allies had two unforeseen results: it helped indoctrinate, train, and equip battle-hardened legions of mujahideen mainly from the most anti-Western, anti-modernist sects in Islam; and it facilitated and further institutionalized an educational system that inculcated extreme and violent



An Afghan mujahideen demonstrates positioning of a hand-held surface-to-air missile, August 1988.

Even as the madrasahs of these nations continue to churn out anti-Western mujahideen, U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains almost entirely focused on providing military and intelligence-gathering aid...

ideology. When the Cold War ended and the U.S. and its Muslim partners found themselves increasingly at odds, the U.S. learned it had helped create a system that produced—and continues to produce—ideologues and soldiers hostile to the West.

U.S. leaders still do not seem to fully appreciate the lessons available from this experience. Even as the madrasahs of these nations continue to churn out anti-Western mujahideen, U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains almost entirely focused on providing military and intelligence-gathering aid, not on preemptive economic and education development. From 2002 to the present, the U.S. has spent several billion dollars to support and bolster Afghan and Pakistani military and national security efforts. It has spent less than one billion dollars on education initiatives in these countries.²¹

Fighting the Pathology

For more and more Muslims, there is no educational alternative to the madrasah system and its radical teaching. Islamic extremists effectively monopolize the training of the Muslim mind by controlling what enters the marketplace of ideas in those schools. Simultaneously, they attempt to quash competing ideas with violence.

What if a competing good were introduced into the Muslim marketplace of ideas? What incentives might entice Muslims to explore alternative ideas and concepts? For example, what if the competing good was a classic liberal education composed of ideas, beliefs, and areas of study not available in the madrasah-controlled Islamic world? What if an education were available that offered science, mathematics, engineering, and architecture, not just rudimentary literacy through memorization and recitation of the Qur'an? And, rather than primarily encouraging and honoring violence

against unbelievers and apostates, what if Muslim governments subsidized an education founded on art, literature, philosophy, and tolerance? What if education offered training to produce a skilled workforce that could fuel a healthy economy with low unemployment? If ever there were a time to take such initiatives against the ongoing effort to monopolize the minds of Muslim youth, the time is now. The question, of course, is "how?"

Worldwide, there are 55 Muslim states and over one billion Muslim faithful (20 million of whom are settled in the U.S.)²² The Islamic world is large, but not monolithic in its ideology or in the curricula taught in madrasahs: there are branches, orders, sects, movements, and schools of thought within Islam much less myopic than the Deobandi, Salafist, and Wahhabi. Thus, there are opportunities to encourage diversity of thought by promoting the benefits that new ideas, critical thinking, and technical skills would bring to the Islamic people and culture.

Those who would reform the madrasah system must introduce curricula that foster and nurture technical skills and the ability to think critically and analyze. Curricula must be based on the four imperatives necessary for a well-rounded education:

- Good overall quality of curriculum content.
- Emphasis on modern sciences and the humanities.
- Healthy classroom methods.
- Extensive extracurricular activities leading to meaningful employment.

In teaching modern sciences and the humanities, educators must strive to produce students with *eloquentia perfecta*—the ability to think, speak, and write logically, coherently, and gracefully—and the ability to assess data, evaluate knowledge claims, and use problem-solving algorithms skillfully and appropriately.²³

One option Middle Eastern leaders might employ is to implement compulsory national standards and regulation. However, internally developed consensual standards and regulation promoted by incentives and additional funding have been found to be more successful. "The best change," it has been said, "comes from within."²⁴

To achieve education reform, Muslims must come to accept that the relatively narrow historical context in which Islamic leaders made decisions in

the past is no longer valid, and that consequently, Islamic learning and knowledge must change. For Islam to flourish and for Muslims to prosper in the modern world, Islamic nations must embrace modern sciences. Simply for the faith's own survival, so that its adherents can fulfill their responsibility to spread the Prophet's teachings to a modern world that no longer accepts the imposition of faith by force and coercion, Muslims must be well educated. The Qur'an and numerous Hadiths can be cited to bolster this argument because they stress the superiority of the scholar over the worshipper and the martyr.²⁵

The India Model

Because of the links, in terms of shared traditions that some of the leading Indian madrasahs have with madrasahs elsewhere—particularly in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal—and the influence that Indian ulema have, since the last century, had on Muslims in other countries, reforms in the Indian madrasah system have a broader relevance than in the Indian Muslim community alone.

—Yoginder Sikand, *Reforming the Indian Madrasahs*²⁶

India and Pakistan once implemented a hard-line approach to reforming those madrasahs that advocated violence and terrorism. In Pakistan in the mid-1980s, the government proposed to make madrasahs into “mosque primary schools” by adding secular subjects such as math and science. This initiative failed, however, because of suspicions about government intentions and because the vast majority of imams teaching in rural madrasahs had no formal schooling themselves and were incapable of teaching the core subjects.²⁷

Such experiences brought home the challenges involved in changing the madrasah system, including lack of resources and entrenched cultural attitudes that limit the practical measures that might be taken to change the system quickly. As a result, the measures advocating such reform soon changed, particularly in India.

Today, over 30,000 madrasahs operate in India, several thousand of them run by Deobandi clerics.²⁸ Until recently, few taught Hindi, English, science, or mathematics. However, changes in curricula leading to the study of practical subjects have been moving forward, albeit slowly. In 2001, Indian policy-makers initiated an effort to encourage rather

than force change by offering a program that gave grants for certified math, science, and language teachers. The government provided funding to approximately 3,500 madrasahs that voluntarily participated in this program. As a result, approximately 175,000 students were exposed to modern subject matter.²⁹

The Indian concept has real potential. Forcing madrasahs to reform will never be successful given the current state of affairs in India, Pakistan, and similar nations where government authority in outlying regions is both tenuous and suspect. India accepted the fact that the madrasah system provides a public good in rural, tribal areas that the government is unable to help. By augmenting the existing schools, New Delhi created goodwill even as it expanded the scope of madrasah curricula.

In India, much is being done, and done well. Unfortunately, real progress is mainly a question of resources. Here, the U.S. can provide strong, quiet leadership. It is in the Nation's best interest to do so, since changes to the education system that shapes the skills and perceptions of Muslim students can have a huge impact on long-term U.S. security.

Policy Recommendations

There will be intense debate in the U.S. about how to support madrasah reform—whether openly or clandestinely. The many failed examples of mandatory registration and regulation imposed by external initiatives strongly suggest that successful reform can only come from within. Therefore, the U.S. should nurture reform through thoughtful policies that encourage internal change rather than pressuring financially hard-pressed governments to impose solutions.

What policy initiatives should the U.S. consider funding? A commonsense yet comprehensive menu

...the U.S. should nurture reform through thoughtful policies that encourage internal change rather than pressuring financially hard-pressed governments to impose solutions.

of options is available. Policy initiatives and measures that empower madrasahs to provide a wide array of subjects, modern learning tools, and teacher expertise have great potential. They can help induce voluntary participation or, at the least, impede extremist madrasahs that refuse to adopt programs that benefit their students and society.

The U.S. House and Senate are considering legislation to provide such support, including a proposal to create an entity called Global Compact, which would encourage “universal education.” This initiative would pool resources from donor countries and link grants to measurable standards of accountability and performance. The vehicle for this policy proposal would be the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The MCC would need to increase funding for a second tier of assistance and expand the criteria needed to qualify for assistance.³⁰ Unfortunately, the underfunded MCC is a political shell of what it could be—a major contributor to U.S. foreign policy interests on a level with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Programs aimed at reform should fund literacy programs at all grade levels. To prepare students for the global economy, English proficiency should be one objective, as should vocational programs to produce a skilled workforce and further hone student skills. Graduates from madrasahs participating in these programs who meet prescribed levels of aptitude and basic skill proficiency should receive preference in employment programs. Issuing nationally recognized graduation diplomas that guarantee employment is another option to consider.

International exchange programs could target underprivileged Muslim students in middle and high school, equivalent cohorts, and college students. We must provide the incentive for young Muslims with demonstrated potential to receive the best education available in the U.S., to open their eyes to the opportunities, promise, and potential of free, democratic nations. The U.S. and its Western allies could also use student visa programs much more aggressively, and in a more coor-

dinated, strategic fashion than at present. One of the big mistakes the U.S. made following the tragedy of 9/11 was to drastically limit the student visas available to Islamic countries and Muslim students. Another initiative would be to fund scholarship programs at indigenous universities for exceptional graduates of participating madrasahs.

There is a great deal of room for growth in programs that provide professional outreach to imams and other madrasah teachers. The West should consider funding indigenous training academies that certify teachers in secular education. A trained cadre of instructors provided at no or very little expense would be a great incentive to madrasahs to participate in government outreach programs. Besides certification, training academies could offer their students access to related programs and government resources such as lunch programs, curriculum provisions, and foreign exchange and training programs. Summer teacher visitation programs to the U.S., for example, would be a powerful means of outreach to build goodwill and understanding between cultures.

We should also encourage a concerted effort by individual states in the U.S., incentivized by federal funding, to facilitate math and science partnership programs with foreign schools. Collaborating with partner schools and exchanging ideas on math and



Mufti Abdul Waris Niazi (center rear) delivers an interpretation of the collection of God's revelations to Prophet Mohammad and Sunna (The Tradition of Prophet Mohammad) at a local madrasah in Karachi, Pakistan, 23 September 2003.

science would enable participating madrasahs to acquire expertise and some control over the rational sciences they offer. Based on success with math and science partnerships, policy proposals should provide an open door to partnerships at the local community level.

Offering exchange programs that provide workshops, conferences, and professional development to school administrators, not just teachers, should be an integral part of any comprehensive outreach program. U.S. leaders must consider every aspect of policy development and implementation, through outright and simple funding to direct involvement with program development.

Most important, the biggest influence in any child's life is his or her parents. Many times, impoverished, illiterate parents send their children to madrasahs that provide room and board, but they themselves remain bound to their meager livelihoods and illiteracy. We need to consider and pursue adult education and literacy programs that target Muslim parents.

For any of the aforementioned programs and policy options, the U.S. government should not be the sole provider. Along with USAID, large private foundations could support reform. For example, with the assistance of a Middle East Partnership Initiative grant, Scholastic Books, Inc., published a series of libraries for grades K-6 in Arabic and Farsi. The company is currently seeking grants from the State Department to publish editions in Dari and Pashto. So far, ministries of education in 13 Muslim countries have approved the books, some 200 per grade level. Scholastic has shipped and warehoused its books in Dubai, and they are currently in use in many schools throughout the Persian Gulf.³¹ We need to make a much greater effort to distribute products such as these, not just to state schools, but to the thousands of madrasahs hidden away in remote villages that will otherwise never be able to procure such resources.

We should also consider targeting Muslim women with educational initiatives. Nurturing and facilitating the education of generations of Muslim women should be a top priority. It would increase the intellectual capacity of the Islamic world and, in all likelihood, lead to a more peaceful, more stable region that develops its people and gives them fruitful, satisfying employment.

We should also consider targeting Muslim women with educational initiatives.

Conclusion

To determine the strategies needed to defeat the radical, violent strain of Islam that is infecting the Muslim mind, the "long war" requires us to take a long view. Attacking our enemies kinetically only makes them more resilient, more unpredictable, more vicious. We must defeat the catalysts that nurture violent Islam's beliefs and ideology: poverty, illiteracy, hunger, homelessness, crime, and insecurity. Alleviating the environmental conditions that result in near-complete hopelessness can help turn today's enemies into tomorrow's partners.

Imams continue to man the front line, protecting and defending their faith. To the extent that we can help them realize that the most enlightened way to do so is through liberal, secular education, the better off we will be. There will be compromises in working toward our goals. However, the more we (and they) understand that religion can still permeate madrasah curricula, administration, and teacher conduct, the less conflict, suspicion, and skepticism we will encourage. The objective of education must be to form the whole person—body, senses, memory, imagination, intellect, and will. Even the Jesuits, perhaps the Catholic Church's most zealous missionaries, understood that "development will be defective and even dangerous unless it is strengthened and completed by the training of the will and the formation of character."³²

Due to their backward curricula, madrasahs often produce students who feel alienated from or even repulsed by the fast-changing world in which they live. These students "suffer from an intense inferiority complex, hating everybody with modern education."³³ The alarmingly high rates of unemployment among Muslim youth are in direct correlation to the deficient education they currently receive.

We know how important it is to engage our opponents in every conceivable dimension of warfare. We hear it in speeches. Leaders and mentors remind us of it. We read it in our doctrine and history books. We accept it. The most important weapon on the


battlefield is the individual combatant. If this is true for us, it is true for our enemies. Therefore, we must engage with and influence Muslim education.

We must try to influence the marketplace of ideas in Islam. We must seek to fully develop young Muslim minds. **MR**

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From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in the Philippines

Major Gary J. Morea, U.S. Army

WITH THE EXCEPTION of a brief period of American control in the first half of the twentieth century, conflict has persisted in the Mindanao, the southern island group of the Philippines, for 500 years, since the first acts of resistance towards Spanish colonization in the sixteenth century. In fact, this conflict is the second longest internal conflict in history.¹

The population of the Philippines is a mosaic of diverse ideologies, religions, and cultures that have coalesced into three distinct regions of the archipelago. At times, these regions have been at odds with each other. While several attempts at conflict resolution have been made over the years through many different forms of government, the conflict has not yet been resolved and groups continue to struggle against the central government for political consideration, concessions, and/or autonomy. Those living in the Mindanao, for whom resistance is central to identity, still writhe against the forces that wish to control them.

The contemporary struggle between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and Islamic separatists in the Mindanao is the latest evolution of resistance in the Philippines. The social system in the southern region of the archipelago is a complex blend of cultural, nationalistic, and religious consciousness that appeals to various social groups and organizations vying for political legitimacy and control. These groups are struggling against the centralized government of the Philippines for recognition and autonomy. They have organized political elements and have access to and influence over armed fighters ready to carry out subversive acts of violence against government facilities, people, and organizations perceived to be sympathetic to the GRP. The result of this ongoing violence has been an economic stagnation in the Mindanao that has adversely affected the economy of the entire archipelago.

The conflict in the Mindanao has at least three interrelated dimensions: political, security, and economic. The point at which these three dimensions converge is marked by tension, but it also holds the potential for cooperation. It is towards this point that efforts for peace, in the form of amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation (AR2), should be directed.² AR2, a multi-staged and multidimensional approach to healing a fractured society, is fundamental to achieving a sustained peace. While there have been many attempts to pacify the Mindanao via AR2, these overtures have mostly been short-lived and narrowly focused. Hence, the conflict persists, and it will continue to do so until the GRP expands the breadth of its proposed AR2 solutions.

A broader offer of amnesty coupled with an energetic and productive reintegration program would be a testament to the GRP's sincerity and likely

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U.S. Army poster

Jolo, Sulu, Philippines, 11–15 June 1913. Moro resistance to a central Philippine government included resisting American colonial rule long before the Japanese occupation.

pave the path toward full reintegration and reconciliation for all sides. Properly applied, AR2 can assuage the secessionist movements, stabilize the political structure, increase security, and improve the economic posture of the Philippines. AR2 can give the Philippine government the construct it needs to proceed toward conflict resolution.

Roots of Conflict

The Philippine archipelago comprises over 7,000 islands, islets, and atolls covering an area of over 500,000 square miles.³ It divides into three major groupings: to the north, Luzon, which is the largest and most populous of the groupings and where the capital, Manila, resides; in the center, the Visayas; and in the south, the Mindanao group, which extends all the way to Borneo.⁴ Muslim traders from Indonesia made contact with the people of the Mindanao long before Spanish missionaries and traders colonized the Philippines. As a result, most people in Mindanao are Muslim. They are

...AR2 can assuage the secessionist movements, stabilize the political structure, increase security, and improve the economic posture of the Philippines.

commonly referred to as the Bangsamoro, or Moros, a label dating back to an early Spanish pejorative linking the Muslims in the Mindanao with the Moors of Morocco.⁵

In April 1946, following its time as an American Commonwealth and Japanese occupied territory, the Philippines held its first free and independent elections. The United States turned sovereignty over to the Independent Republic of the Philippines on 4 July 1946, and Manuel Roxas became the republic's first president.⁶ The newly created GRP got off to a difficult start trying to recover from the physical damage inflicted by the Japanese occupation. Economic dependence on the United States after the war exacerbated the difficulties of reconstruction and recovery.⁷

Political turmoil culminated under the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos. Elected in 1965, Marcos initially had overwhelming success in advancing public works projects and executing effective tax collection measures. After he was reelected in 1969, political opposition to his presidency increased, slowing governmental projects and the economy. Due to increased social unrest and the growing risk of a communist insurgency, Marcos declared martial law on 21 September 1972. During this same year, he also created the "Presidential Task Force for the Reconstruction and Development of Mindanao." Despite his efforts, by 1974, fighting between the rebel Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had escalated into large-scale, conventional war.

The conflict reached a stalemate in 1976. Prior to the signing of an agreement in Tripoli, Libya (the Tripoli Agreement), Marcos offered amnesty to key rebel leaders. Negotiations soon broke down, however, due to Marcos's alteration of the Tripoli Agreement's provincial autonomy outline, and conflict between the MNLF and AFP resumed. As the fighting worsened, Marcos's policies toward the Mindanao turned increasingly violent. When further attempts at diplomatic resolution were aborted, his authoritarian power began to wane. In 1981, under pressure from Pope John Paul II, Marcos lifted martial law. Five years later he was ousted by a popular revolution.⁸ The next two decades saw the GRP cycle through four presidential administrations, each of which took a slightly different approach to conflict resolution.



NARA

Ferdinand Marcos and Mrs. Marcos with President Lyndon B. Johnson, 23 October 1966.

Following the Marcos family's departure in 1986, Corazon Aquino took over as president of the Philippines. One of her first acts was to appoint a commission to draft a new constitution, which included the establishment of an autonomous Mindanao. GRP and MNLF panels met one year later, but could not come to an agreement on language describing the autonomy mandate in the draft constitution. Despite this obstacle, Aquino briefed Islamic diplomats that the Tripoli Agreement was being implemented through constitutional processes.⁹ In August 1989, a draft autonomy bill was submitted to both houses and the congress passed Republic Act 6734, creating the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).¹⁰ Regional elections gave the ARMM a new governor and a new legislative assembly. Aquino signed executive orders outlining and defining the relationship between the central government and the ARMM.

In May 1992, Fidel V. Ramos was elected president of the Philippines. One of his first official acts was to call for peace. Two months after swearing in as president, Ramos appointed the National Unification Commission (NUC) to formulate an amnesty program.¹¹ In 1993, he created the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process to continue the NUC's work.¹² The high-water mark of Ramos's presidency was his attempt at AR2 in September 1993, when he issued an executive order entitled "Defining the Approach and Administrative Structure for Government's Comprehensive Peace Efforts," also known as the "Six Paths to Peace."¹³ The six paths were—

- Instituting social, economic, and political reforms aimed at addressing the root causes of armed struggle and social unrest.

- Building consensus and empowerment for peace through continuous consultation at the national and local levels.

- Negotiating peace with armed groups.

- Implementing measures for reintegration and reconciliation of former combatants and rehabilitation of those affected by the conflict.

- Taking measures to manage conflict and protect civilians.

- Building, nurturing, and enhancing a positive climate for peace.¹⁴

This executive framework remained the core of the GRP's peace plan, and it continues as such today. While the intent was to pursue the six paths simultaneously (to ensure complete coverage of the problem), this broad approach is not comprehensive enough and has neglected or ignored several key anti-government groups.

In 1994, Ramos issued Proclamation 347, which created a National Amnesty Commission and granted amnesty to rebels.¹⁵ Ramos's ambitious peace initiatives culminated in September 1996 with the signing of the "Final Peace Agreement."¹⁶ This agreement proved not to be so final, however, mostly because some key antagonists decided not to sign it. One of these groups was the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an offshoot of the MNLF. Another was a new and sinister player: Abu Sayyaf.

Because of the incomplete resolution, fighting renewed and, toward the end of Ramos's term, escalated. In 1998, Joseph Estrada became president. His ascent ushered in a period of intensified fighting and intra-governmental debates on the peace agreement. By 2000, the fighting between the AFP and the MILF had intensified, and Abu Sayyaf had begun kidnapping tourists for ransom.¹⁷ In October 2000, allegations of corruption emerged that brought



Joseph Estrada at Malacanang Palace, Manila, 3 August 1998.

an early end to Estrada's administration. As part of his swan song, Estrada held a ceremonial amnesty in which the GRP persuaded approximately 800 MILF fighters to exchange weapons for money and a pardon.¹⁸

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took the oath of the presidency in January 2001. During her inaugural address, Arroyo proclaimed an "all-out-peace" policy.¹⁹ Like most of her predecessors, Arroyo took great strides toward peace in the initial months of her tenure. She appointed members of the GRP to negotiate with the MILF and suspended military operations.²⁰ As a result, Arroyo achieved an important milestone in peace efforts: a meeting in Kuala Lumpur between GRP members and MNLF and MILF representatives during which a "General Framework of Agreement and Intent" was signed. With these groups' representatives involved in constructive negotiations, the GRP launched an "all-out-war" against Abu Sayyaf.

Since the initial negotiations with MILF and MNLF, there has been further progress toward a negotiated peace agreement. However, independent MILF fighters have continued to skirmish with the AFP and have launched attacks throughout the Mindanao. Conflict with Abu Sayyaf and elements of the MILF persists.

Societal Framework

The GRP's attempts at conflict resolution follow, to some degree, the amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation process employed to heal fractured societal frameworks. AR2 is normally initiated from the political dimension, but all the dimensions in the framework are interrelated. Therefore, to understand the AR2 process with regard to the Philippines, we must first explore the political, security, and economic dimensions of the framework to identify the links between the dimensions. Specifically, which organizations are involved in shaping the political decisions that affect the people and provinces of the Mindanao, how do they interact, and how does their interaction affect the society's economic dimension?

Political dimension. The political dimension of the conflict in the Mindanao is a function of the cultural-religious identity of the ancestral inhabitants of these southern Philippine Islands, people who refuse to accept a centralized governance that



U.S. Embassy Manila

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines Hilario Davide swears President Macapagal-Arroyo into office during a ceremony held at the Cebu Provincial Capitol, 30 June 2004.

ignores their distinct social structure and belief system. The key players in this dimension are the central Philippine government, external political/religious organizations, and emergent leaders who claim to represent the interests of the Mindanao people. The main actors are—

- *The GRP.* The make up of the Philippine government today is the result of extensive reform, re-structuring, and constitutional revision along Western lines in the wake of the Marcos regime. Comprised of executive, legislative, and judicial departments, the governmental structure separates, checks, and balances power much as Western democracies do. The president is elected by direct vote of the people for a period of six years and is not eligible for reelection. While the president may offer amnesty and enter into negotiations and treaties, such agreements must be ratified by a two-thirds vote in the Philippine Senate.²¹

- *The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM).* This political organization is comprised of volunteer members of the Islamic international community. It first met in Rabat, Morocco, in September 1969, after an arson attack against Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque in August that year. Since then, the ICFM has met every year to evaluate progress on the implementation of decisions it made to further Islamic causes. The first international organization to officially recognize the MNLF, the conference was instrumental in initiating dialogue between the MNLF and the GRP. It continues to wield influence over the MNLF, the other Islamic separatist movements, and the GRP.

- *The MNLF.* In the late 1960s, increasing suspicion of Manila, the migration of Christians from the north into the Mindanao, and Christian marginalization of native Muslims stimulated the formation of a number of Islamic separatist movements. After martial law was declared in 1972 and all citizens were ordered to surrender their weapons, the Moros spontaneously rebelled.²² Their rebellion consisted of mostly uncoordinated uprisings throughout the Mindanao. Led by Nur Misuari, the MNLF managed to unite the far-flung pockets of resistance, and, in 1972, the organization openly declared its leadership of the Moro secessionist movement. By 1973, at the height of the conflict, the MNLF fielded 30,000 armed fighters. The contest between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the MNLF raged for three years and culminated in the Tripoli Agreement. Signed by Misuari and Defense Under-Secretary Carmelo Barbero, this agreement allowed for some autonomy in 13 provinces of the southern Philippines.²³ Fractious political infighting weakened the MNLF by the early 1980s, but persistent skirmishes marked the decade and kept the AFP occupied in the Mindanao. By 1984, the MNLF was no longer the sole representative for Islamic separatists, although the GRP continued to reach out to it as the only officially recognized voice among the various Muslim movements.

- *The Moro Islamic Liberation Front.* A splinter element of the MNLF, the MILF declared itself active

in March 1984, with the intent of following a religious as well as a nationalist agenda (hence the organization's substitution of "Islamic" for "National"). It was born as the result of an ideological schism between the chairman and vice-chairman of the MNLF. The latter, Hashim Salamat, founded the MILF and moved his headquarters to Lahore, Pakistan, where he successfully promoted his ideas to international Islamic organizations.²⁴ The main political difference between his organization and the MNLF was the MILF's declared determination to establish Islamic law in Muslim Mindanao, as opposed to the MNLF, which emphasized political autonomy.

- *Abu Sayyaf.* In the political dimension, Abu Sayyaf stands out as an anomaly. Although a relatively small group of radical Islamist terrorists with no real political arm, the organization currently represents perhaps the greatest threat to Philippine security. It has therefore become the target of an all-out Philippine military offensive. The group, whose name translates from Arabic as "Bearers of the Sword," was first mobilized in 1991 by Abdurajak Janjalani, a Philippine Muslim scholar who had fought as a mujahedeen against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. His group has connections to Al-Qaeda in the Middle East and apparent aspirations to mimic the Arab organization. Although Abu Sayyaf initially purported to be a political group and courted Islamic sympathies, it has deteriorated into nothing more than a gang of bandits, corroding

the political process and spurring disruptions in the political landscape.

Security dimension. The security dimension of the societal framework of the Mindanao is significant in that it is a means of discourse between the GRP and the fractious separatist movements. When negotiations and dialogue between the political actors break down, the frequency and violence of attacks in the Mindanao typically increase until the parties reconvene in the negotiation process. The key actors in this dimension are



AFP, Romeo Gacad

Armed Muslim rebels of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) display their AK-47 assault rifles and a Soviet made B-40 anti-tank rocket launcher at an undisclosed location, 19 February 1988.



AFP, Romeo Gacad

Guerrillas of the Muslim separatist group Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) at Camp Abubakar, the MILF main headquarters, in southern Maguindanao Province, 10 September 1996.

He was succeeded by his younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, who led the group until 2006. Under Khadaffy's leadership, the group changed its focus from Islamist ideology to fundraising by means of kidnapping. This move had an adverse affect on the organization's character. Many of the members became drug users more inclined to crime than politics. In recent years, as a result of a U.S.-backed effort in the southern Philippines, Abu Sayyaf has suffered major leadership losses. Khadaffy was killed by Philippine troops in September 2006, and his likely successor, Abu Salalman, was killed in January 2007. These

the armed elements that act on behalf of their parent political organizations. The AFP acts on behalf of the GRP, while the armed elements of the MNLF and MILF act on behalf of, although not always in concert with, their parent political organizations.

The main obstacle to stability in the security dimension has been the pseudo-political Abu Sayyaf. This group introduced itself to the world in August 1991 by bombing a ship in Zamboanga harbor and killing two American evangelists in a grenade attack.²⁵ Their established ties with Al-Qaeda (under Janjalani's leadership) led to connections with the Saudi Arabian businessman Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin-Laden's brother-in-law. Khalifa controlled a large financial network of charities and a university in Zamboanga, all of which he used to bankroll Islamic extremists. (His flagship charity was the International Islamic Relief Organization, or IIRO, with an office in Zamboanga.) Abu Sayyaf received money funneled through Khalifa's network to arm and equip its members while it laid plans for its most insidious attacks, among them a plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his 1995 visit to the Philippines.²⁶

The security situation in the Mindanao began to change in 1998, when Janjalani was killed in a fire-fight with Philippine national policemen.

two leaders had the strongest ties to Middle Eastern donors. Now the reins are held by the one-armed, 70-year-old Radullan Sahiron, who demonstrated his belligerence in an August 2007 clash with the Philippine military that left approximately 52 dead (25 soldiers and 27 militants).²⁷

The main convergence between the security and political dimensions of the Mindanao conflict occurs where organizations possess the potential to act in both. In order to be considered credible and worthy of engaging in dialogue, actors have to possess both a recognized political organization and military power. An organization with only political actors and no means of armed resistance is viewed as a toothless pariah; armed fighters without a recognized or effective political parent

The main convergence between the security and political dimensions of the Mindanao conflict occurs where organizations possess the potential to act in both.



Abu Sabaya (left) and Khadaffy Janjalani (right), leaders of the Abu Sayyaf Muslim extremist gang, pose for a photo in Basilan, Philippines, July 2000.

are seen as criminal and not worth the serious consideration of negotiated settlement. The effect of this dynamic on the overall societal framework is enormous. Activity within the security dimension, either positive or negative, has the greatest affect on dimensional convergence. This is especially true for the economic dimension.

Economic dimension. In the Mindanao, some economic costs are easily quantifiable, such as the lost productivity of those killed as a result of the fighting (approximately 120,000 since 1970) or sent fleeing—legally and illegally—to neighboring countries; the number of ghettos that exist; the percentage of the population living in poverty (71.3 percent in 2000); and the average income per family.²⁸ These quantifiable variables serve as scalable indicators for other dimensions of the societal framework, such as political and social programs and security efforts in the region.

What is more difficult to quantify, however, are the indirect costs of conflict. The perception of

instability and insecurity fostered by the strife has deflected investment in the entire Philippine archipelago. From an investment banking perspective, the country is simply not investor friendly. The resulting scarcity of capital has had adverse trickle-down effects, such as disintegration of agricultural capabilities due to a lack of funds for equipment replacement, irrigation improvement, and marketing mechanisms.²⁹ Sadly, this downward economic spiral feeds the instability and insecurity that have helped cause it: for military-aged males, joining a political cause or an armed militia has become the main alternative to legitimate, productive employment. Economic options for military-aged males have been a key node in which the political, economic, and security dimensions converge.

Transitioning to Enduring Peace

All conflicts are inherently different, from their root causes, to the actors involved, to the techniques employed. While there is no template or checklist for conflict resolution, conceptual constructs provide tools for the initiation and implementation of change and dialogue. One of these conceptual constructs is AR2. This construct provides conflicting parties with three tools for working at conflict resolution. These tools have distinct characteristics and, based on the context in which they are to be used, require unique consideration with regard to the order, timing, and methods used.

In breaking down AR2 into its constituent parts, we see that *amnesty* is an event; *reintegration* is a combination of the framework and processes required for the parties to become more mutually dependent and cohesive; and *reconciliation* is the desired outcome, goal, or aim of the entire process. In the end, the entire process of conflict resolution is a psychological one. How the problem is conceived, the demonization of opposing forces, and the belief in a limited number of options must all be changed. Successful application of AR2 identifies the true heart or source of the conflict, enables better understanding of the opposing parties, and develops options and paths that are acceptable to all parties and that lead to the conflict's peaceful resolution.

Amnesty. Often used as the first step in restoring or mending a fractured polity, amnesty serves as the gateway to inclusion and the invitation to

Often used as the first step in restoring or mending a fractured polity, amnesty serves as the gateway to inclusion and the invitation to rapprochement between conflicting groups.

rapprochement between conflicting groups. It encompasses more than a simple governmental pardon, which is its legalistic aspect. Amnesty is granted, and therefore the crimes are “forgotten” before prosecution occurs. (Conversely, pardons are typically granted after parties are prosecuted.) The concept of amnesty is broader and implies more a promise of societal amnesia about the crimes and offenses committed during a period of struggle, civil war, or social unrest. It completely exonerates former combatants who volunteer to participate in the restoration of civility and work towards the resumption of peace.

History is full of examples of amnesty used for political or diplomatic purposes. Some of the earliest were recorded by Thucydides (e.g., the Samians offered amnesty to members of an oligarchic coup and to the general Alcibiades during the Peloponnesian War).³⁰ More recently, as it transitioned to democracy, South Africa granted amnesty in return for truthful talk about political proscriptions and other crimes. In 1997, U.S. President Jimmy Carter offered amnesty to Vietnam War draft evaders as one of his first acts in office.³¹ Carter clarified that the grant was not intended to forgive the draft evaders, but rather to allow the nation to forget their transgressions and the discontent that stirred in their wake. It was his way of initiating the healing process at the national level, by removing a festering source of divisiveness.

Amnesty is a political tool intended to initiate healing and compromise. But while the practical purpose for granting it is to assuage both sides of a conflict and get them to the negotiating table, amnesty can stir up emotions and dissent in those victims who will be denied justice by its offering. Careful consideration must be given to the context in which it will be offered. Specifically, great consideration must be given to the nature of the offenses

that are to be “forgotten.” If the amnesty is being offered to perpetrators of victimless crimes, it will meet with less public opposition than if it is offered to offenders whose actions have created victims and circles of victims who still bear grudges. In the latter situation, amnesty can still work, but it will have to be conducted very judiciously and, perhaps, as part of a social record program, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.³²

Blanket amnesties have been offered in Chile, Zimbabwe, and Argentina, but the danger of such amnesties is that they can trivialize the crimes and marginalize the victims. Furthermore, blanket amnesties can create the perception that the government is incapable of dealing with offenders, therefore removing the government’s most important pillar of legitimacy—its role as arbiter of justice.

The other side of the coin is the important psychological impact amnesty has upon the rebel and criminal. Amnesty provides these offenders a reason to negotiate and an alternative to continued conflict. But there must also be an opportunity for the ex-combatant, or the combatant considering the amnesty proposal, to transform himself into a contributing member of the society. A successful amnesty program must consider the dignity of everyone involved in a conflict, both victim and offender. There must then be a next step by which those on both sides of a conflict can be included in society in a meaningful way. This involves a plan and program for reintegration.

Reintegration. Simply stated, reintegration describes the efforts made to bring the ex-combatants in a fractured polity and society back into the folds of that society as the society seeks to mend itself. Reintegration typically occurs after an offer of amnesty, although it must be enticing enough for the combatants to accept the amnesty in the first place. Reintegration can come in a variety of forms, but it essentially involves a plan for transitioning formerly armed and disenfranchised combatants into amenable, income-generating civilians.

According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), many different activities should be conducted during reintegration. The first step is to disarm and settle ex-combatants into demobilization camps. These reintegrating members can then participate in temporary work involving the construction of facilities and the repair of damaged

Reintegration typically occurs after an offer of amnesty, although it must be enticing enough for the combatants to accept the amnesty in the first place.

schools, clinics, and other infrastructure. But to be effective, a reintegration program needs to ensure that reintegrating members receive education and training that will facilitate their permanent transition to civilian life and peaceful pursuits. Training and education offer the reintegrating members hope and encourage a sense of trust in the government that will aid in achieving the follow-on goal of reconciliation.

It is important to note that simply paying ex-combatants as part of a reintegration plan is neither effective nor sustainable—although it might be a good idea to offer stipends to reintegrating members during their periods of education and formal training. Another caveat is that reintegration programs need to be offered to all members of the fractured society in order to “avoid creating a new class of privileged citizens and rewarding people who resorted to violence.”³³

In the Philippines, the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) worked with the government to develop and implement a plan to reintegrate the

MNLF from 1997 to 2000. The OTI contributed agricultural machinery, such as rice threshers and solar dryers, while the GRP and local communities provided labor, material, and training. By offering the opportunity to learn profitable skills while simultaneously providing for the welfare and needs of the community, this program strengthened communal bonds among the participants.³⁴ At its core, any reintegration program should focus not just on satisfying immediate needs, but also on providing hope for a more permanent transition. This is a critical component for successful reconciliation.

Reconciliation. Reconciliation is the process of restoring a civil relationship between parties in conflict, usually with the goal of achieving a peaceful, even amicable, relationship. The process is fundamentally a psychological one in which groups come to change their beliefs (which can be well-entrenched) about each other through dialogue and mutual cooperation and respect. Reconciliation can entail slow, drawn-out negotiations to reach needed compromises.

True reconciliation cannot be achieved without all parties acknowledging responsibility for past actions, as was the goal of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. According to Mari Fitzduff and Chris Stout, authors of *The Psychology of Resolving Global Conflicts: From War to Peace*, “Any attempt at restoration after a period of alienation that ignores questions of justice could not be considered true reconciliation and would not be sustainable.”³⁵ This direct link between reconciliation and a sense of justice tends to complicate the reconciliation process, mostly because the people on opposite sides of a conflict have different opinions about what constitutes justice.

Fitzduff and Stout describe five different kinds of justice:

- *Distributive* justice: justice distributed equally to every person regardless of rank, status, wealth, position, etc.
- *Political and social* justice: all have equal access to power and its benefits.
- *Procedural* justice: the particular legal process(es) by which justice is administered.
- *Historical* justice: the historical record is set straight; past injustices are acknowledged, perhaps apologized for; and compensation may be offered to victims.



A former combatant of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) uses his cell phone from a remote island in the southern Philippines to check on the market price for seaweed. He is one of 28,000 former MNLF fighters whom USAID helped to make the successful transition to productive enterprise.

- *Compensatory justice*: reparations are paid for historical injustices.³⁶

All of these must be taken fully into account to keep the reconciliation process moving forward.

Healing usually involves discomfort. The same is true in the reconciliation process. When seeking a justice commensurate with the goal of reconciliation, the parties involved will experience uneasiness and even pain in settling their differences and acknowledging the events that transpired during the conflict.

Tension and Opportunity

The Philippine government's enduring struggle with Islamic separatists has progressed through the fits and starts of unsatisfactory attempts to arrive at negotiated settlements. Regardless of how it happened, the fact remains that Christians occupy over 80 percent of the Mindanao.³⁷ For the Islamist autonomy movement to achieve any political credibility, it must account for the existing secular status quo. It would be near physically impossible, and certainly socially reckless, to grant independence to the southern Philippines. What remains, then, is how to incorporate the customary laws and practices that the Muslim population wants to retain and use as the basis of law without creating a double standard in the Philippine legislative and judicial systems. Furthermore, since many Muslim practices stem from religiously based Sharia law, there is the potential for fundamental disconnection from secular society. Democracy provides for religious freedom, but religion and religious-based edicts are not necessarily consistent with democratic freedoms. On the other hand, democratic constructs like the regional governments within the Autonomous Regions of Muslim Mindanao that do not provide real legislative autonomy or reasonable operating budgets are just hollow bureaucracies that widen the divide and deepen the distrust between the Bangsamoro people and the GRP. So, the AR2 process in the Philippines faces significant cultural challenges.

Nevertheless, the Philippine government has made great strides towards resolving this long struggle. It is arguably closer than it has ever been to achieving a real and lasting peace within its borders. While the process of reconciling its differences with the MNLF and MILF has been long and arduous, the GRP has learned valuable lessons about the delicate combinations of force, diplomacy,

Healing usually involves discomfort. The same is true in the reconciliation process.

and economic programs that are necessary to initiate and sustain peace. With Abu Sayyaf effectively leaderless and scattered, the GRP has an opportunity now to increase its military pressure on these quasi-insurgents while simultaneously attacking the criminal financial networks that sustain them. Most important, however, the GRP needs to provide a release valve, in the form of amnesty and eventual reintegration, from all of this pressure.

The Philippines will hold its next presidential election in 2010. As history has shown, the first few months of the new presidency will be critical because they will set the tone and pace for conflict resolution. The GRP, MNLF, and MILF, and external organizations such as USAID and the Organization of Islamic Conferences, should prepare now for that window of opportunity by drafting a new amnesty offering, developing a new reintegration program, and building a financial stockpile to fund it all. In addition, constitutional concessions and considerations must be given to the Bangsamoro population if the GRP is going to have any hope of achieving a lasting settlement with the MNLF and MILF while staving off the potential for future secessionist groups to emerge. Once the philosophical and cultural divisions are bridged and the armed combatants are effectively reintegrated into the social fabric, reconciliation will occur in the Philippines.

Conclusion

The first step toward resolving the enduring rivalry between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Bangsamoro people residing in the Mindanao is for the government to offer amnesty. The GRP must understand that through the sincerity of its actions and the rapid execution of its social programs of reintegration, it will in turn receive amnesty from those who feel disenfranchised from the GRP and distrust it. After all, reconciliation cannot be fully achieved until both sides in an argument forget the other's transgressions and move on.

While the elements of AR2 have been exercised in the Philippines, they have not been implemented as part of a cohesive construct. In two years, the GRP will have the opportunity to inject new energy and resources into solving the current dilemma. A new initiative for peace pursued within the framework of AR2 can succeed if it is undertaken with sincerity and energy.

There is no easy answer to the Mindanao problem, and responsibility lies on all sides of the negotiation table to ensure that words and deeds are matched. Overtures of amnesty are the necessary first step, but a wider net must be cast to avoid excluding potential future adversaries. Finally, the

reintegration and reconciliation efforts need to follow amnesty quickly, and they ought to be linked to economic incentives that can serve as tangible proof of the change that has taken place. Peace can only be achieved when the AR2 process is carried to its fruition. The Philippine government possesses a great administrative framework, a strong desire for peace, and the tools necessary to carry out its program of AR2. Proper application of AR2 can change the dynamic of Philippine society from one of enduring rivalry to one of enduring peace wherein spirited, sincere, structured negotiation replaces the kinetic dialogue of bullets. **MR**

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Title 10 Domestic Humanitarian Assistance: **NEW ORLEANS**

Major Michael C. Donahue, U.S. Army

ON THURSDAY, 1 September 2005, the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, was alerted to deploy to New Orleans to assist in humanitarian relief operations following Hurricane Katrina. Coming out of a year-long deployment in Iraq, the Black Jack Brigade had lost a significant percentage of its officers and enlisted Soldiers to post-deployment reassignments. Consequently, many staff members were new and unfamiliar with the brigade's standardized operating procedures. Moreover, the brigade was undergoing transition to modularity, which involved complete structural reorganization and the realignment of personnel and equipment. Nevertheless, the vanguard element of the brigade—1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry—deployed on 3 September. The remaining brigade elements deployed and closed on the Naval Support Activity, New Orleans, by 6 September 2005.

The brigade operated under the control of the 82d Airborne Division and was assigned the Algiers district of Orleans Parish as its area of responsibility (AOR). Although Algiers had suffered severe wind damage and the loss of essential services, the parish did not experience the flooding that devastated the northern areas of New Orleans.

Operational Construct

In Baghdad, the 1st Cavalry Division had developed a counterinsurgency strategy with five specific logical lines of operation: combat operations, Iraqi security forces, essential services, local governance, and economic recovery. All five were executed concurrently and in the context of a larger information operations program. The same operational construct served as the basis for the Black Jack Brigade's concept for Katrina relief operations, although the construct was modified to fit a semi-permissive, domestic environment and took into account the brigade's constitutional limitations under Title 10 of the *U.S. Code*. Title 10 prevents active component federal forces from conducting law enforcement operations within the United States unless the president has declared martial law and suspended the Posse Comitatus Act. Neither of these necessary prerequisites occurred; thus, the brigade adjusted its construct accordingly to include—

- Support operations.
- Civilian authorities and local governance.
- Essential services.

Again, all lines of operation functioned within the context of an overarching information operations campaign that facilitated the military mission and helped inform civic leaders of the brigade's capabilities. As in Iraq, the desired end state in New Orleans was a stable environment in which the local authorities could reassume control. Only then could the brigade redeploy to Fort Hood to complete modularity transformation.

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PHOTO: A door marking reveals that on September 13, the U.S. Army's 3-505 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) found zero persons and zero animals in this dwelling located in the Algiers district of New Orleans, LA. 3-505 PIR was deployed as part of Joint Task Force Katrina, whose mission was to support the Federal Emergency Management Agency's disaster-relief efforts in the Gulf Coast areas devastated by Hurricane Katrina. (U.S. Air Force, SSGT Jacob N. Bailey)

Envisioned Objectives and End States

To determine what would constitute “mission accomplished” in Algiers, Black Jack had to build consensus not only with higher military headquarters, in this case the 82d Airborne Division, but also with New Orleans officials. Critical in this regard was the brigade commander’s professional relationship with city officials such as Councilwoman Jackie Clarkson. The brigade staff conducted daily meetings with Clarkson and Captain David Kirsch, chief of the 4th District New Orleans Police Department (NOPD). These meetings enabled the brigade and civic leaders to determine overall objectives that satisfied both sets of authorities. Those objectives included—

- Law and order established with military assistance and, at end state, maintained by civil authorities.
- Primary searches for evacuees completed and, at end state, secondary searches within civil authorities’ capability.
- Power restored 100 percent to essential services and 75 percent to the general community.
- Potable water available throughout the district and, at end state, civil authorities capable of certifying water.
- All roads and critical infrastructure clear of major debris.
- Dumps open weekly and collection schedule in place.
- Emergency health care provided by civil authorities available to district residents.
- District daily operations managed by civic leaders.

These objectives served to focus the brigade’s operations. The staff assessed progress in eight critical areas: security, evacuee operations, local governance, and again drawing on the brigade’s OIF experience, essential life services as defined by the acronym SWETH—sewage, water, electricity, trash, and health care.

In developing metrics to measure the progress in Algiers, the brigade articulated green-amber-red levels

in each area, with multiple sub-levels of amber that recognized the incremental progress of restoration in the individual nine categories. Moreover, the brigade identified what it determined to be the achievable military end state in each area. Rather than require that conditions in Algiers be restored to pre-hurricane standards (represented by a green rating) across the board prior to redeployment of the brigade, the consensus was that, in some areas, amber ratings demonstrated sufficient progress to enable civil authorities to resume command and control, and civic leaders could restore services to “green” themselves. At that time, the brigade could redeploy to Fort Hood or be assigned a new area of the city in which to operate.

Support Operations

Given the limited water damage in the Algiers area, local and military authorities were concerned that residents, and nonresidents pushed to the area by storm flooding, would participate in or become victims of looting and violent crime. Consequently, the brigade divided Algiers into four battalion-sized AORs and directed that each subordinate unit provide a military presence 24-hours a day in its area. This presence included mounted and dismounted patrols and the establishment of company command posts throughout Algiers.



U.S. Air Force, SSGT Jacob N. Bailey

A U.S. Army T200 Bobcat clears debris caused by Hurricane Katrina from the streets of Algiers in New Orleans, 13 September 2005.

Despite the brigade's Title 10 limitations, the presence of more than one thousand Iraqi Freedom combat veterans patrolling the streets of Algiers proved decisive in dealing with local criminal activity.

Despite the brigade's Title 10 limitations, the presence of more than one thousand Iraqi Freedom combat veterans patrolling the streets of Algiers proved decisive in dealing with local criminal activity. Security success stemmed predominately from the ignorance of potential criminals. That is to say, would-be criminals did not understand the policing limitations on federal troops. They were dissuaded from committing crimes apparently by their misperception that the well-armed troops could and would easily detain them should they be caught looting (or perhaps even kill them should they commit a violent crime). While the 80 police officers of the NOPD's Fourth District concerned themselves predominantly with securing local sites from looters, including Wal-Mart, Walgreens, and local banks, The Black Jack Brigade conducted mounted and dismounted patrols, continuously interacting with Algiers residents throughout the operation. This interaction helped identify areas with historically high crime rates, like the Fischer Projects, and it brought to the fore emerging civic leaders like Pastor Brown of Greater Saint Mary's Fellowship.

During the course of the brigade's presence in Algiers, residents reported only 18 criminal acts, and of those only 3 were violent crimes or involved weapons. The vast majority were lootings that occurred prior to the brigade's arrival and were only discovered when electricity was restored and patrols began door-to-door searches for potential evacuees. Considering that Algiers was one of the most dangerous areas in one of the most violent American cities before the hurricane, one could conclude that the brigade's patrols were successful in preventing crime. Certainly this is partly true. However, even though Algiers was not flooded, the majority of residents did in fact leave the district prior to, or during, the hurricane. The introduction of thousands

of soldiers greatly altered the ratio of security forces per remaining resident in Algiers. The statistical comparison of pre- and post-hurricane crime rates became a function of this change.

In comparing and contrasting pre- and post-Katrina crime statistics in Algiers, the brigade determined that, after it had patrolled the streets for two weeks and secured a limited number of fixed sites, the crime rate had dropped precipitously and there were now more police per resident than ever before in Algiers. Moreover, the crime that did occur was overwhelmingly nonviolent (i.e., the looting of empty homes). Once local police resumed patrols or homeowners returned, most of this type of crime would quickly abate.

In the course of each subordinate unit's patrols, Soldiers were tasked to identify all residents who desired to be evacuated from New Orleans and transport those residents to designated evacuation sites. During the deployment, the brigade identified and evacuated 74 citizens from Algiers. This number would likely have been much higher had the brigade and the civil authorities not succeeded in reestablishing essential services. Once these basic life needs were restored, residents had little reason to leave, and those that had left found reason to return.

In light of the success of both the security and evacuee operations (regardless of how much or how little the military operations had to do with that success), on 14 September, the brigade made a collective determination, based on subordinate commanders' assessments, that the district was stable enough that civic authorities could maintain law and order without military assistance.

Civilian Authorities and Local Governance

Unlike in Iraq, where the coalition created the local and national authority structure in a vacuum devoid of Iraqi leadership, in New Orleans the brigade encountered seemingly endless numbers of New Orleans officials, federal law enforcement agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and governmental relief agencies, each with capabilities and limitations of their own and with autonomous plans for post-Katrina relief. There was no single entity coordinating relief efforts and no plan to create one.

There was no single entity coordinating relief efforts and no plan to create one.

In this regard, the brigade adapted military planning methods to help focus assistance efforts in Algiers. It identified informational and operational gaps, established liaisons with each external agency, and coordinated relief operations across the spectrum of NGOs and state and federal agencies. For example, in one of the poorest and most crime-ridden areas of New Orleans, 1-5 Cavalry was able to establish a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) point of distribution for food, water, and ice. At the same location, through close coordination with the 82d Airborne Division and the International Red Cross, the unit provided residents with inoculations and periodic medical care. And finally, the presence of cavalry troopers with direct communications to the NOPD, Louisiana State Police, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms provided not only a visible deterrent to crime but also a method to call for a quick reaction force from an agency not constrained by Title 10 limitations.

The most frustrating aspect of the brigade's attempt to develop synergy within its AOR proved to be the boundaries imposed on the various federal, state, and private agencies by their own higher headquarters. For example, Task Force Lifeline, a 50-person emergency medical technician (EMT) team from Maryland, was authorized in writing by the governor of Maryland to provide assistance to the citizens of Jefferson Parish, New Orleans. Although Jefferson Parish was only marginally damaged by Katrina, with no flooding and little power loss (compared to Algiers), these critical EMT assets were not

allowed to enter Algiers to provide medical support to hurricane victims. Consequently, doctors and EMTs from Maryland went unused in one area of New Orleans while hundreds of residents from neighboring Algiers were left to fend for themselves until the Black Jack Brigade intervened and coordinated for FEMA and Red Cross assistance.

As another example, FEMA received its logistical support through the Title 32 National Guard units assigned to Joint Task Force (JTF) Katrina. These units, the 33d Area Support Group (ASG) and the 213th ASG, were under a chain of command separate from Title 10 active component forces. No single chain of command was empowered to establish priorities and dictate where or how FEMA supplies and personnel would be assigned and employed. These units operated with different operational graphics than did the active component forces and, as was the case in Algiers, in many instances two ASGs were given the mission to support FEMA supply points in the same AOR. Because these ASGs were not co-located (the 33d



ILLARNG, MAJ Jim Robideau

Soldiers from the Illinois Army National Guard, 33d Area Support Group, drive down main supply route Longstreet in New Orleans in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.

ASG was at Belle Chase and the 213th ASG was at Zephyr Field), coordination between the two was essentially nonexistent. At one distribution point the ASG had not forecast for enough supplies. And there was no channel through which to coordinate transfer of surpluses from the subsequently established supply distribution point in the other ASG's area. To overcome this obstacle, the Black Jack Brigade determined that it would use brigade assets to unilaterally pull surplus FEMA supplies from the second point of distribution and transport them to the first one in the other ASG area. Because FEMA had abundant resources in theater, the brigade could easily compensate for internally shifting supplies between distribution points in Algiers. By acting, it facilitated FEMA's provision of necessities to all Algiers residents, including those at the previously established FEMA distribution points in short supply.

Essential Services

Recognizing that reestablishing essential life services was as important in New Orleans as it was in Iraq, the brigade prioritized its operations to focus on those tasks it could accomplish to facilitate the civic authority's restoration plans. Unlike in Iraq, city authorities and corporate service providers had the resources, plans, expertise, and manpower to do much of the restoration themselves. Black Jack's task was to facilitate and monitor progress.

Sewage and water. As mentioned earlier, Algiers was spared the flooding that devastated much of New Orleans. Adding to Algiers's good fortune, its water supplies were located in the southern area of the city, a region hit less hard by the storm. As a result, the parish suffered neither water contamination nor loss of sewage service. In fact, as early as 9 September, Councilwoman Clarkson declared Algiers's water potable. As a precaution, however, the brigade used water purification teams from the 15th Brigade Support Battalion to conduct random samplings throughout the AOR to confirm that the water was indeed safe for the residents. This near effortless measure assured residents that their water supply was safe and demonstrated the brigade's commitment to restoring the community's essential services. The battalions also secured water treatment plants and removed debris from critical facilities and drainage nodes. These actions

helped set the conditions for a timely resumption of services by civil authorities. Again, the brigade quickly achieved its defined end state with little actual operational effort.

Electricity. Electric power in New Orleans is provided by Entergy, a company that supplies gas and electricity to more than 2.7 million residents in Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Texas. Immediately following the storm, Entergy began implementing its power restoration program for the unflooded regions of New Orleans, including Algiers. As with sewage and water, the brigade found itself in the awkward (but fortunate) position of having to find ways to facilitate, rather than execute, an external agency's recovery plan.

The priority for both the brigade and Entergy was the restoration of grid-based electric power to essential life service providers—police, fire stations, and medical facilities. Black Jack's associated tasks were to remove major debris from



U.S. Navy, PH1 (AW) Brian Aho


Natural gas leaking from below the flooded streets of New Orleans burns out of control, presenting a threat to nearby homes and many agency employees working in the Hurricane Katrina relief effort, 7 September 2005.

power plants and routes as designated by Entergy. Although the brigade had established 100 percent power to essential services and 75 percent to the community as its desired military end state, Entergy restored power using its own restoration plan and internal prioritization.

The brigade monitored Entergy's progress daily through patrol reports collected by subordinate units and by continuously checking the corporate website, which provided daily updates on the number of customers without power, the number of broken poles, the number of pole-to-pole sections of wire down, and the number of transformers broken. Entergy also updated estimated times of completion for each area of the city. Tracking power restoration in Algiers was relatively easy as a result, and again the brigade was quickly able to declare its objective accomplished despite having contributed little to the process.

Trash. As residents moved back to Algiers and began to clean up their homes, they added trash and rubble to the large amount of hurricane-blown debris strewn across the district, creating a serious health hazard. New Orleans contracted with a private corporation to collect and remove the trash. To enable the company to do its job, the brigade focused on removing major debris from roadways. Then, in conjunction with units of the 82d Airborne Division, subordinate units collected and removed trash from the streets of Algiers to mitigate the potential health risks to residents until city services resumed. In Algiers, trash collection resumed on Monday, 12 September 2005, at which time the brigade determined that it had met its military end state in this area.

Health Care. The brigade's objective for health care was to ensure that civil authorities were capable of providing emergency medical care to citizens prior to Black Jack's withdrawal or reassignment to another area of New Orleans. Before Hurricane Katrina, Algiers had only one functioning medical facility, the Jo Ellen Smith Medical Center. Its staff had evacuated before the hurricane, and after the storm, the facility was without power and water. Consequently, the brigade focused its efforts on facilitating external agency medical support to Algiers while utilities were restored and local first responders—emergency medical technicians, firemen, and police officers—restored their internal



U.S. Army, SSG Ricky A. Mellon

1LT Jesse Smith from 1st Cavalry Division listens to a patient before administering treatment at a medical care assistance facility set up in the Landry High School during Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.

ability to meet the community's needs. The brigade staff worked with neighboring Jefferson Parish, FEMA, and the Red Cross to ensure that emergency medical care was available and to establish periodic medical assistance team visits at centralized FEMA points of distribution.

One such operation was at Mardi Gras World in 1-5 Cavalry's AOR, a designated FEMA point of distribution. Here the Black Jack Brigade made medical assistance visits on successive days (14 and 15 September) and provided care to more than 475 residents. Results were similar at Pastor Brown's Greater Saint Mary's Fellowship in the 3-82 Field Artillery Battalion's sector. Critical to the success of these and similar medical assistance missions was a detailed information operations plan coordinated at the brigade and battalion levels. This plan included passing out paper handbills at FEMA points of distribution days in advance of

the MEDCAP missions and using vehicle-mounted loudspeaker teams to announce the visits throughout the community. Residents of Algiers welcomed the medical assistance and credited the units for getting the word out in advance of the operation.

In the meantime, the utilities were restored, which meant that the Jo Ellen Medical Center could reopen once the staff returned. The brigade civil affairs officer and provost marshal confirmed that medical facilities in neighboring Jefferson Parish were open and receiving patients, and that 911 systems were functioning for emergency medical transport, police, and fire. With these restorations, the brigade concluded that it had met its military end state in health care.

Achieving End States

On 14 September 2005, Colonel Bryan Roberts, commander of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, briefed Major General William B. Caldwell IV, Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, and local New Orleans officials on the status of Algiers. After presenting the brigade's assessment, Roberts concluded that Algiers had progressed to the point where local law enforcement could maintain law and order without military assistance, and that essential services and infrastructure were restored to the point that local officials could resume pre-hurricane daily operations. He recommended that Algiers be considered an economy of force mission, be handed over to a smaller contingent of forces (active or reserve component), and that the brigade be assigned another mission or redeployed. Less than two weeks after arriving in New Orleans, and having done relatively little compared to external civilian agencies to alter conditions in the city, the Black Jack Brigade was ordered back to Fort Hood. The brigade received redeployment instructions on 15 September and began movement by ground convoy, commercial bus, and air on the 16th. It closed on Fort Hood on 18 September.

Katrina's Lessons

While the Black Jack Brigade was able to deploy quickly to New Orleans and establish a command and control structure that put almost 1,700 troops onto the streets of Algiers, Operation Cavalry Rescue highlighted a number of problems in the deployment of federal troops for domestic assistance missions.

Using Title 10 troops within the continental United States to assist in humanitarian relief operations or domestic disturbances is a politically complicated issue. As aforementioned, absent a declared state of emergency in which the president has suspended the Posse Commitatas Act, Title 10 troops are prohibited from conducting law enforcement operations. Published and disseminated "rules for the use of force" (RUF) clearly explain that federal Soldiers may use force only under the most stringent set of conditions and only when criminal acts directly interfere with the accomplishment of a specific military mission. The RUF for active-duty military thus precludes using force to prevent or stop crime. Consequently, criminals technically have immunity from arrest by Title 10 military forces. For example, an active-duty military unit on patrol in New Orleans that passes by a Wal-Mart being looted by locals cannot apprehend the looters. Nor can its Soldiers legally arrest a citizen to prevent a violent crime unless the conduct of that crime directly interferes with the stated military mission. In sum, absent a suspension of Posse Commitatus, Title 10 military forces are largely impotent in domestic security roles.

The success of Operation Cavalry Rescue from a security standpoint was, as previously mentioned, more a factor of potential criminals not understanding these constraints than of any positive action on the part of Soldiers.

Military leaders are usually aggressive decision makers. They are trained to use initiative and are conditioned to take positive action. Staffs and subordinate leaders in active military units are accustomed to working with this spirit. They have a natural inclination to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to succeed, and they possess enough imagination to work along the boundaries of constitutional constraints.

Such was the case in Algiers, where 2d Brigade minimized Title 10 limitations by establishing a quasi-official relationship with Task Force Lonestar, a military police Reserve battalion out of Texas. Task Force Lonestar's military policemen, who were law enforcement professionals mobilized under Title 32 of the *U.S. Code* (and therefore not under the same constraints as active component forces), were integrated into 2d Brigade's subordinate unit patrols as "advisors." They were neither



U.S. Air Force, TSgt Brian E. Christensen

SSG Janise Steward of Raleigh, NC, guards a Wal-Mart in Hammond, LA, 7 September 2005, to prevent looting. Steward and 300 other North Carolina National Guardsmen were called to active duty to support Joint Task Force Katrina.

in charge of, nor subordinate to, the federal troops. These advisors worked alongside Black Jack Soldiers and provided lawful policing capabilities. The relationship had to remain less than official, however; otherwise, by their subordination to the brigade, Task Force Lonestar advisors would have fallen under federal control and therefore would have had to operate under Title 10. One may question if this arrangement circumvented the intent of the U.S. federal law; however, the reserve battalion was deployed to assist in the Algiers district, not specifically to police it. The spirit of this work-around was therefore constructive, preserving both the letter and the intent of the Posse Comitatus Act. That is to say, it was not done cynically in some effort to override operational inconveniences imposed by the Constitution.

Additionally, the brigade was frustrated by the numerous overlapping areas of responsibility and autonomous chains of command of National Guard logistics and tactical units, federal aid and law enforcement agencies, and NGOs. Coordination across parish boundaries was difficult enough, but dual military chains of command separating Title 10 and Title 32 Soldiers complicated relief operations. Moreover, although FEMA proved willing to provide supplies, it was incapable of delivering or securing them on site. In the future,

some provision for establishing a single chain of command that subordinates active-component forces to Title 32 forces should be available. Such an arrangement would allow unity of command, and Title 32 units could maintain their law enforcement capabilities. The Title 10 troops could then more easily and efficiently coordinate and deliver relief supplies to those in need.

Finally, 2d Brigade's troops, and especially its leaders, were grossly unprepared for the civil government-law enforcement dynamics and culture of New Orleans. Even in the United States, most military troops live in isolated, almost exclusively military communities. In such communities, junior leaders and noncommissioned officers, who are often ostensibly in a middle or lower-middle socioeconomic class, enjoy a

typically low-crime work and home environment that is comparatively free of racial tensions. Army officers, noncommissioned officers, and junior enlisted Soldiers were ill prepared for the obvious socioeconomic and racial discrimination in post-Katrina New Orleans. Long after shotgun-toting NOPD officers turned back hurricane-displaced, and predominantly inner-city, minorities from the safer, drier areas of New Orleans's mostly white suburbs, Soldiers found local law enforcement and parish government leaders shockingly unwilling to help Algiers citizens. It was clear to Soldiers that these residents were discriminated against simply because of the color of their skin. Neighboring Jefferson Parish police blocked off roads connecting the mostly black Algiers area from the mostly white Jefferson Parish area. They refused Algiers residents access to still-open stores, hospitals, and aid stations in the suburb. Those in obvious need

***2d Brigade's troops...
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and seeking necessary goods and services were turned back, regardless of their situation. After frequent substantiated complaints to Soldiers from the people of Algiers, brigade troops began to transport those in need through the roadblocks in HMMWVs. And, despite Soldiers having alerted the 4th District NOPD to many crimes in progress, its officers often chose to ignore calls for help. This attitude was especially true when the crimes were occurring in the depressed Fischer Projects. Frequently, 2d Brigade Soldiers and leaders were stopped and thanked by residents who stated that they would not seek help from the NOPD because its officers were “worse than the criminals.” These people claimed that if they needed help, they would contact the nearest Soldier. Of the many law enforcement agencies 2d Brigade operated with in Algiers, only the local NOPD posed these challenges. In fact, the brigade operated closely with and developed a high regard for the professionalism of New Orleans SWAT, the Sheriff’s Department, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. These agencies worked tirelessly to establish security and respond to crises throughout the recovery effort.

Conclusion

On the surface, the use of Title 10 military forces seems like the ideal solution for conducting domestic disaster response and humanitarian relief operations. Active forces bring robust capabilities, including command and control, power generation, trained security forces in large numbers, and transportation support to move supplies in adverse conditions. These formidable abilities also come with Soldiers possessing indomitable attitudes.

From the time it arrived in New Orleans, the Black Jack Brigade focused on providing needed relief to the people of New Orleans. However, constitutional constraints on the employment of Title 10 forces raised serious questions about using them for

future domestic operations. While the presence of active-duty troops in New Orleans provided the American people with visual confirmation that the federal government was actively involved in hurricane relief operations, the truth of the matter is that the brigade had a very circumscribed impact. It was largely impotent to prevent crime. It could only facilitate already existing reconstruction and restoration plans of civilian agencies. And, other than evacuating refugees or searching for bodies after the storm, it was generally limited to presence patrols and debris removal. Black Jack Soldiers and leaders quickly became frustrated with their relative lack of value beyond these tasks and the idea that they were there just to “show the flag” in New Orleans. Residents, who to a person did not understand the brigade’s Title 10 limitations, increasingly felt the troops weren’t doing enough to secure their neighborhoods or restore their services.

In retrospect, federal forces in domestic relief operations offer little added value other than peace of mind for local residents and the wider American public. This morale boost comes at the expense of complicating already loosely defined command and control structures, logistics networks, and law enforcement systems. **MR**



U.S. Air Force, SSGT Jacob N. Bailey

U.S. military civil engineers walk through the Algiers district of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, 14 September 2005.



The Taliban

An Organizational Analysis

Major Shahid Afsar, Pakistan Army;
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The views reflected in this article are the authors' own. They do not reflect the official opinions or policy of either the U.S. Army or the Pakistan Army.

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PHOTO: The Taliban flag displays the Shahadah, the Islamic creed, which is the Muslim declaration of belief in the oneness of God and acceptance of Muhammad as his final prophet.

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

—Sun Tzu¹

ONE OF THE MOST WIDELY RECOGNIZED IMAGES of the present day is that of airplanes hitting the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. The terrorist organization Al-Qaeda and its host, the Taliban in Afghanistan, became household names all over the world on that fateful day. The media started churning out stories about the brutalities of the Taliban, and the world discovered a new monster.

The Taliban did not grow out of the dark overnight, nor was it unknown in the Middle East, the region of the world most severely affected after 9/11. Following its emergence in 1994 from madrassas, the Taliban achieved surprising victories over its enemies and assumed rule over much of Afghanistan.² Simultaneously hailed as saviors and feared as oppressors, the Taliban were an almost mythical phenomenon that seemed to embody the very essence of Afghan cultural beliefs, especially revenge for transgression, hospitality for enemies, and readiness to die for honor. The Taliban knew the Afghan people and their ways and embedded themselves in the complex Afghan web of tribalism, religion, and ethnicity.

Despite their quick overthrow in 2002 by a small coalition of U.S. forces and anti-Taliban groups, the Taliban has not gone away. In fact, today, in the face of thousands of NATO and U.S. troops, a growing Afghan National Army (ANA), and a popularly elected government, the movement's influence in Afghanistan is increasing. It continues to wage an insurgency that has prevented the new government from establishing legitimacy, and it has created massive unrest in Pakistan. Clearly, it behooves us to know something more about this archaic but formidable enemy.

History

Today's Taliban has been shaped by a host of influences and events:

- Afghanistan's ancient warrior culture.
- The 1979 Soviet invasion and the mujahideen who fought against it.
- The civil war and warlordism that followed the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989.

- Madrassa religious ideology.
- The Taliban's initial acceptance as the hope of peace for a war-weary people.
- The movement's downfall in 2002.
- The ongoing insurgency.³

The Taliban is comprised mostly of Sunni Muslim Pashtuns. Historically, this largest Afghan ethnic group occupied a great swath of land from central western Afghanistan through much of the south and up the country's eastern border. The region has a long history of invaders who tried, mostly in vain, to overpower the Pashtuns. Since Alexander in 326 B.C., many foreign military forces have entered Afghanistan, among them Persians, Scythians, Kushans, Sakas, Huns, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, British, Russians, and most recently, Americans and their NATO allies.⁴

Fiercely independent, the Pashtuns have always defended their homeland against foreign interlopers. No outside power has ever been able to subdue them completely.⁵ They defeated most of their would-be conquerors outright or absorbed them into their tribes through the centuries. The Pashtuns adapted to the military strategies of their invaders, and then utilized their new tactics and equipment to fight among themselves until confronted by another external threat. This military orientation has shaped the Pashtun—and Taliban—outlook: "*A Pashtun is never at peace, except when he is at war.*"⁶ The Pashtuns are inclined not to accept any form of strict authority, even at the cost of discord and insecurity.⁷

The "Great Game" in the 19th century helped shape the current political landscape of the Pashtun region.⁸ It also gave the Pashtuns their first encounters with a modern military power, during the three Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839, 1878, and 1919). After unsuccessful attempts to gain headway inside Afghanistan, Russia and Britain agreed to create a buffer between their zones of influence. Because of provisions for easement rights, the 1893 international boundary between British India and Afghanistan, the Durand Line, did not affect Afghans with strong ethnic and family connections to Pashtuns living across the border. The British gave semiautonomous status to the tribes on the British-India side of the border by creating the tribal agencies, which morphed into the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) after their independence.⁹

Pashtun areas generally remained quiet until the last quarter of the 20th century, when the relative stability that Afghanistan knew under Zahir Shah's four-decade rule ended (1973). The unsteadiness that ensued was the catalyst for the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to overthrow the government in 1978. Afghanistan's conservative religious elements, led by *mujahideen*, resisted the new regime's radical reform package, which brought about new taxes, drastic changes in land ownership, compulsory education for women, and female participation in nontraditional roles in society.¹⁰

The Soviet Union deployed troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 to aid its communist ally against Islamist militias and to counter the threat of radical Islamists gaining power in Muslim Central Asian republics along the Soviet Union's soft underbelly.¹¹ This action fueled the mujahideen resistance and calls for jihad. In response, the Soviet military waged a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. In nearly 10 years of occupation, Soviet forces and their Afghan communist allies reportedly killed 1.3 million Afghans, destroyed the infrastructure in urban and rural areas of the country, and caused 5.5 million Afghans to flee to refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan. (Most of them found their way to the tribal belt of Pakistan.)¹²

Despite heavy investments in men and materiel, the Soviets were never able to gain unopposed access to the countryside, especially in the Pashtun region, where urban areas and government centers, virtually under siege by the mujahideen, were only occasionally penetrated by the Soviets (and then only in massive operations).¹³ In February 1989, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. Six months before they left, the Soviets handed over huge caches of weapons and ammunition to government forces. They continued to provide materiel support for two years after their departure, but their withdrawal essentially left the government to fend for itself. A civil war followed, resulting in the communist government stepping down in April 1992. Differences among the mujahideen parties quickly revealed themselves. Each faction had a leader or warlord with aspirations for power. Fighting broke out, leading to widespread looting and rapine. Strife between the warlords and a war-weary population led to an environment that allowed the Taliban's radical ideas to take hold.¹⁴

The core of the Taliban grew from the Pashtun refugee camps, mostly in Pakistan, where a modified and selectively interpreted version of Wahhabist Islam influenced some madrassa students (*talib*) to adopt an ultraconservative approach to social issues and politics.¹⁵ Theological students fighting for professed rights and freedoms are not a new phenomenon in the region, and these talibs, now formally calling themselves the Taliban, presented themselves as righteous religious students on the march for peace.¹⁶ The Taliban's claims resonated with the Pashtun people, and their popularity spread rapidly.

In November 1994, the Taliban seized control of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. They gained de facto religious legitimacy among the rural Pashtuns when their leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, wore the sacred cloak of Prophet Muhammad in front of a public gathering and declared himself "Leader of the Faithful" (*Amir-ul-Momineen*).¹⁷ This event, arguably the most important milestone in the Taliban's history, allowed Omar to claim his right to "lead not just all Afghans, but all Muslims."¹⁸ It provided the movement with a charismatic leader who was thereafter able to draw upon the mysticism inherent in Pashtun culture.¹⁹

The Taliban made rapid military progress and by 1997 controlled 95 percent of the country.²⁰ Despite initial euphoria, the group gradually lost the support of the international community and the Afghan populace because it strictly enforced its extremist version of Islamic law. The Taliban banned television, music, and dancing; prohibited women from attending school and working outside the home; carried out atrocities against Afghanistan's non-Sunni population; and allegedly supported militant Sunni sectarian groups in Pakistan. Mullah Omar also interacted with Osama bin-Laden, and the Taliban hosted Al-Qaeda training camps and leaders in areas under their control.

Omar's refusal to extradite Bin-Laden after 9/11 triggered Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which



An Afghan man passes by a line of abandoned Soviet military vehicles near Asadabad, Afghanistan, 24 December 1989, 10 months after the Russian withdrawal from the country.

led to the rapid collapse of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Many Taliban fighters assimilated into Afghan society, while the leaders went underground to emerge later as the core of an insurgency. The war-ravaged population's unmet expectations and non-Pashtun dominance of the central government at Kabul gave the insurgency impetus.

In Pakistan's FATA and North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Pashtuns sympathetic to the Taliban have been at odds with Pakistan security forces. During the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the U.S. used the FATA as launching pads for sponsored mujahideen, making the tribal areas a hotbed for extremism. The sprouting of madrassas, an abundance of modern weaponry, and an influx of Afghan refugees radicalized the environment. After the Soviets departed, many foreign mujahideen (mostly Arabs) settled in the FATA and were absorbed into tribes through marriage. Due to ethnic, religious, ideological, and cultural affinities, the area's residents viewed the Taliban's rise favorably. After 9/11 and OEF, radical elements in the FATA mobilized some support for the Taliban and started targeting the Pakistani government because of its support to OEF. Pakistan has since deployed over 100,000 troops to different parts of the FATA to counter militants with similar operational signatures loosely aligned with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Recently, Taliban

sympathizers in Pakistan joined forces to form an umbrella organization called Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban Movement). They appointed Baitullah Mehsud as their leader.²¹

Culture

Culture is probably the most important factor in the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan. “Wars,” Michael Howard has opined, “are not tactical exercises writ large . . . They are . . . conflicts of societies, and they can be fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting them.”²² The Taliban presence is most evident in Pashtun areas. According to Thomas Johnson, director of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, “While it would be incorrect to refer to the Taliban insurrection or resurrection as merely a Pashtun affair, it would not be far from the mark.”²³

Pashtun culture depends greatly on the *Pashtunwali* code of honor, which predates Islam and is specific to the Pashtuns.²⁴ A Pashtun “must adhere [to] the code to maintain his honor [and] to retain his identity as a Pashtun.”²⁵ Those violating the code are subject to the verdict of a *jirga*.²⁶ Some of the more important facets of the code include—

- *Nang* (honor). A tribesman is obliged to employ every means possible to shield and protect his honor and the honor of his family. The honor of a Pashtun rests on a host of small rules and customs, which, if infringed, demand a restoration of honor even at the cost of one’s life.

- *Badal* (revenge). When someone kills a family member or violates the honor of a woman in the family, revenge is necessary to restore honor. It often leads to a killing. This revenge can occur immediately or generations later if the family whose honor has been violated is in a weak position when the infraction occurs. The Taliban has used *badal* to recruit new fighters after civilian deaths caused by coalition bombings and “hard-knock operations.”²⁷

- *Melmastia* (hospitality). Hospitality and protection must be offered to all visitors without expectation of remuneration or favor. Any Pashtun who can gain access to the house of another Pashtun can claim asylum there, regardless of the previous relationship between the two parties.²⁸ The Taliban use *melmastia* to obtain food and shelter when they travel within the Pashtun belt.

- *Nanawatay* (to seek forgiveness). To preempt *badal*, the code allows Pashtuns to seek forgiveness from those whom one has wronged. The offending party goes to the house of their enemy to beg forgiveness and make peace with him. *Nanawatay* is the only alternative to *badal*. The Taliban does not emphasize *nanawatay*; it exhorts aggrieved persons to join the insurgency to restore their honor or avenge the death of family members.

- *Hamsaya* (“one who shares the same shadow”). *Hamsaya* is servitude in return for protection from stronger tribes or provision of some goods. For example, it could entail an exchange of military service for land. This practice explains why tribes quickly follow whomever is strongest. It also explains how the Taliban consolidated power so quickly in the 1990s.²⁹

Although rivals, Pashtun tribes rally against outsiders if threatened. They are politically well informed and will use alliances and counter-alliances to their advantage—as in the present war. As the *Christian Science Monitor* has noted, “The rules of this war are a far cry from the easy slogans of ‘you’re either with us or against us.’ Indeed, Pashtun history is filled with heroes who played both sides for the benefit of tribe, family, and honor.”³⁰

Religion

The Taliban rely chiefly upon religion to sway the Afghan people, 99 percent of whom are Muslim (80 percent Sunni, 19 percent Shi’a).³¹ In the Afghan Islamic tradition, the core religion is combined with pre-Islamic beliefs and the tribal customs of *Pashtunwali*.³² The Taliban have further transformed the tradition with an ultraconservative interpretation of Islam.

The distinctiveness of their religious ideology arose from the madrassas founded during the Soviet-Afghan war. With Saudi Arabian support, many schools shifted to an orthodox brand of Islam, one that follows a Salafist egalitarian model and stringently enforces compliance.³³ In Ahmed Rashid’s words, “The Taliban represented nobody but themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own.”³⁴ The majority of Afghans did not want to follow this new version of Islam, but harsh enforcement by the Taliban gave them little choice.




Figure 1. Tribal areas, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Ethnicity

Afghanistan is 42 percent Pashtun, 27 percent Tajik, 9 percent Hazara, 9 percent Uzbek, 4 percent Aimaq, 3 percent Turkmen, 2 percent Balochi, and 4 percent other.³⁵

There are even more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan, and most live in the border

areas—the FATA and NWFP. Although obscure genealogies, myths and folklore, historical alliances, and conflicts make it extremely difficult to draw dividing lines, there are five major tribal groups: the Durrani, Ghilzai, Karlanri, Sarbani, and Ghurghusht. The Durrani and the Ghilzai are the two most influential.³⁶


Durrani. The Durrani tribal confederation, mostly concentrated in southeast Afghanistan, has traditionally provided leadership in the Pashtun areas since Ahmad Shah Durrani founded a monarchy in 1747. Afghans regard Ahmad Shah as the founder of modern Afghanistan because he united the factional tribes. The current president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, is a Durrani.

Ghilzais. The Ghilzai tribal group is concentrated mostly in eastern Afghanistan and has historically been an archrival of the Durrani. Some of the major Taliban leaders today, including Mullah Omar, are Ghilzais.³⁷ The Ghilzais are part of a relatively obscure tribal confederation known as the Bitanis.³⁸

Karlanris. The Karlanris, or “hill tribes,” are the third largest group of Pashtuns.³⁹ They straddle the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan in Waziristan, Kurram, Peshawar, Khost, Paktia, and Paktika.⁴⁰

Sarbanis. Although geographically separated, two major groups make up the Sarbani. The larger group, located north of Peshawar, includes tribes such as the Mohmands, Yusufzais, and Shinwaris, while the smaller segment consists of Sheranis and Tarins scattered in northern Balochistan.⁴¹ This faction comprises the traditional aristocracy of the Pashtun.

Ghurghushts. The last major tribal group is the Ghurghusht. They are found mostly in northern Balochistan and include tribes such as the Kakars, Mandokhels, Panars, and Musa Khel. Some of the groups’ sub-tribes, like the Gaduns and Safis, can also be found in the NWFP.⁴²



NOTE: Adapted from Johnson and Mason, *Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan*.

Figure 2. Location of major Pashtun tribal groups.

Resources

The Taliban can access a full range of resources, from labor to technology. The primary resources examined here include religious allies, human terrain, and the opium trade.⁴³

Religious allies. Amid a myriad of transcontinental terrorists, Al-Qaeda particularly gives the Taliban a religious cause and some legitimacy, assists the Taliban information-warfare effort, and provides the movement money, personnel (foreign fighters), technology (advanced improvised explosive devices—IEDs—and communications), and tactical training support. Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-shariat-i-Muhammadi, a group in the FATA and the NWFP's Swat regions, is another strong Taliban sympathizer. Also supporting or at least coordinating with the Taliban are the Central Asian Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and a number of other, smaller, militant bands.

Some of the madrassas in the Pashtun belt teach a violent version of Islamic ideology that mixes ethnic and religious sentiments. These schools are good recruiting grounds for the Taliban. Mohammed Ali Siddiqi, a madrasa expert, explains the phenomenon as “an accident of history”: “The leadership

of the Islamic movement has fallen to the Pashtuns as they had resisted the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan successfully. Then the Pashtun Taliban triumphed [in Afghanistan]. . . . Since the madrassas had played a prominent role in the anti-Soviet jihad, they acquired a reputation both as recruiting grounds for mujahideen and as centers of learning.”⁴⁴

Human terrain. This asset is crucial to the success or failure of the Taliban insurgency. Simply put, an uprising cannot maintain itself without the support of the people. The Pashtuns, rendered vulnerable by what they perceive to be a lack of influence in the Kabul government, have been more amenable to the Taliban lately. Moreover, “Pashtun suspicions and mistrust of the government were further heightened by the Afghan Transitional Authority's inability to protect Pashtuns from the wave of human rights abuses perpetrated by insurgents and warlords since the fall of the Taliban.”⁴⁵ Thus, the approximately 28 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan contribute recruits, support personnel, money, weapons, and an intelligence network to the Taliban insurgency.⁴⁶ They also provide superb real-time intelligence on most troop movements, allowing Taliban fighters to flee when outnumbered or to set-up ambushes and IEDs when the odds are better. With more than




Figure 3. Pashtun tribal groups and sub-tribes.

two generations of war-hardened inhabitants to draw from, the Taliban recruit experienced fighters who know the terrain and can survive in the harsh environment. An added bonus is the ordnance the mujahideen cached throughout the country during the Afghan-Soviet war, the subsequent civil war, and the Taliban's consolidation of power.

Drug revenue. The Taliban's last key resource is the illegal drug trade, which provides revenue and other benefits. With improved irrigation and more rain, Afghanistan has virtually become a narco-state.⁴⁷ The record 2006 opium harvest was worth over \$3 billion.⁴⁸ The 2007 estimates are even higher. Afghanistan currently produces 93 percent of the world's opium—almost one-half of Afghanistan's gross domestic product comes from this trade.⁴⁹ The exact amount the Taliban receives from it is unclear, but they tax farmers, landowners, and drug traffickers. While the group initially vowed to eliminate opium, they look to it now as a necessary evil to further their cause: not only does it generate funds for the insurgency, but it poisons the decadent West, especially Europe, which gets 90 percent of its heroin from Afghanistan. The drug traffickers and the Taliban help each other with weapons, personnel, and money, all to destabilize the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IROA).

Physical Terrain

The physical terrain on which the Taliban, their sympathizers, and coalition forces operate is harsh. Afghanistan and the FATA comprise over 250,000 square miles, more than 70 percent of which is a mountainous mix of arid plateaus, thickly forested mountains, and craggy valleys.⁵⁰ Only 12 percent of the land is arable.

Southern and western Afghanistan are mostly desert except for the Helmand River area.⁵¹ Lines of communication infrastructure are either underdeveloped or virtually nonexistent. Roads align with watersheds and valleys and pass through deep gorges that for centuries have been the sites of murderous ambushes by local warriors. Built on defendable vantage points, houses are generally well fortified. It is extremely difficult to control access routes to towns, villages, and the population in such a difficult landscape. Multiple pockets of inaccessible space governed through tribal law allow militants freedom of maneuver while making conventional military operations ineffective and

expensive in terms of troops and resources. In short, the terrain is conducive to insurgent activities.⁵² Like the region's culture, the rugged geography remains virtually unaffected by time. Afghanistan is "a place where the land fashions the people, rather than the people fashioning the land."⁵³

Strategy

According to Thomas H. Johnson, "What the Taliban wants is a return to its pre-9/11 status. . . . The Taliban are driven by two competing interests: the desire to re-conquer Afghanistan and the desire to reestablish a caliphate. The first is Pashtun-centric, the second more Al-Qaeda-inspired."⁵⁴

The Taliban's insurgency strategy is one of patience. They are conducting a classic "war of the flea," aimed at causing their enemy to suffer the "dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough[,]...the dog succumbs to exhaustion. . . ."⁵⁵ An often quoted Taliban axiom is "The Americans may have the watches, but we have the time."⁵⁶ Their plan has four aims, or phases:

- Mobilize the religious public in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- Rally the Pashtun tribes through the Pashtunwali code and religious ideology and by emphasizing the Pashtuns' subjugation by a predominantly non-Pashtun government in Kabul.
- Build up confidence in their organization while simultaneously attacking the legitimacy of the IROA, coalition forces, and the Government of Pakistan.⁵⁷
- Once the Western "crusaders" are expelled by military means or withdraw due to lack of political will, control eastern and southern Afghanistan and then push for influence in western Pakistan—establishing their version of an Islamic state.⁵⁸

Structure

The Taliban have different organizational structures at different tiers in their hierarchy. Before 9/11, the group operated in a conventional, centralized manner at its top and middle levels. However, during insurgent activities, the organization becomes flatter and gives local commanders more independence, so that they can adapt to the demands of a complex environment and benefit from dispersing their forces into small units.⁵⁹ (See figure 4.)




Figure 4. An organizational diagram of the Taliban.

Specialized departments at the Taliban's top and middle tiers include suicide squads, media outlets like Ummat Studios and Radio Shariat, and specialized training outfits imparting the technical skills to develop IEDs. Other departments provide a centralized pool of special skills.

The Taliban organization is a network of franchises, an arrangement that fits well with tribal traditions. A small militant group begins calling itself "the local Taliban." It gains some form of recognition from the central Taliban hierarchy in return for its support and cooperation. The new cell

supports Taliban grand strategy, but retains local freedom of action. This modus operandi preserves tribal loyalties and territorial boundaries.

A typical Taliban village cell has between 10 and 50 part-time fighters and a smattering of ideologically motivated persons and mercenaries from other areas. The cell runs its own intelligence collection, logistics, and population-control activities with coordination and support from other cells. Cell configurations vary with the environment. Essentially performing most tasks independently, the cell has a reciprocal relationship with other Taliban cells





Figure 5. Forms of interdependence in the Taliban.

for physical and intelligence support; sequential interdependence for passage of information and couriers, equipment, and sometimes finances; and pooled interdependence with the higher hierarchy for media operations, IED-making, technical intelligence collection, specialized training, and additional financial support.

Leadership. The Taliban acknowledge Mullah Omar as their leader. The charismatic Omar is assisted by the Supreme Taliban Shura, the Taliban's version of a board of governors.⁶⁰ Mullah Dadullah, for example, had military responsibilities in addition

to being a member of the *shura*. The original (2003) members of the shura reportedly included Jalaluddin Haqqani, Saifur Rahman Mansoor, Mullah Dadullah (replaced by Mullah Bakht),⁶¹ Akhtar Mohammad Osmani, Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, Mullah Obaidullah, Hafiz Abdul Majeed, Mullah Mohammad Rasul, Mullah Barodar, and Mullah Abdur Razzaq Akhundzada.⁶² Most of them are also regional military commanders or military advisors.

At regional and local levels, leadership roles can become ambiguous when different leaders struggle for influence. The Taliban has reportedly instituted



NOTE: This depiction of regional areas is for illustration only and does not represent the actual territorial boundaries of the supposed Taliban commanders.

Figure 6. Supposed regional Taliban leadership.

a process that designates a regional leader and provides him with an elaborate command structure to coordinate and control operations.⁶³ Designated regional commanders control sub-commands along territorial or tribal boundaries, as well as functional divisions. (See figure 6.)

Decision-making. The Taliban's top leaders behave in an authoritarian manner, outlining policy decisions, although Mullah Omar, once known for micromanagement, has been forced by the operational environment to adopt a less intrusive style of leadership. The Taliban's middle and lower tier leaders are more informal. They generally rely on consensus in a *jirga* to maintain their support. Clergy and tribal elders usually vet decisions to elicit the support of the populace.


Coordination and communication. On the ground, the Taliban insurgency is a decentralized, loosely run affair. The Supreme Shura carries out strategic planning, issues directives to regional commanders, and disseminates the directives to village cells as *fatwas*, or decrees. The village cell acts in a semi-independent manner with minimum control from above. While they follow the Supreme Shura's policies, cell leaders plan and conduct activities based on the regional situation and incentives or dangers for the group.

A regional or local Taliban leader's span of control depends on the nature of the tasks ahead. For routine tasks, links and reporting relationships

resemble a traditional hierarchical pyramid where information passes vertically (figure 7a). However, in a coordinated operation, network features come into play, and the Taliban passes information and support horizontally, vertically, or diagonally (figure 7b), with remarkable speed and efficiency—disrupting a few communication channels does not slow the passage. The Taliban has also successfully used network swarming tactics, in which small units converge on specific targets and then disperse.⁶⁴

To relay sensitive verbal or written messages, the Taliban use couriers.⁶⁵ The courier network relies on tribal links and loyalties for speed and security. The Taliban use short-range radios for tactical communications and employ an extensive code system. Some Taliban cells in Pakistan use the Internet for propaganda purposes and to communicate in settled areas. *Nameh-i-shab* (night letters), usually “declarations of intent” for population control, are another form of Taliban communication.⁶⁶

Recruitment and training. The Taliban do not have a formal recruitment process. They draw new recruits from among madrassa students and local tribal youths motivated by the appeal of glamour, feelings of revenge, financial incentives, and religious beliefs. The local cell is the recruiting hub. Recruitment exploits family and clan loyalties, tribal lineage, personal friendships, social networks, madrassa alumni circles, and shared interests.



A. Typical reporting and direction for policy decisions



B. Reporting and direction for conduct of coordinated operations

Figure 7. Taliban linkages, coordination, and reporting mechanisms.

After innocent Afghans suffer collateral damage in coalition operations, the desire for badal prompts an influx of recruits. To boost recruiting efforts, the Taliban often uses its fighters as bait to induce violent U.S. and NATO responses.⁶⁷

Because almost everyone in Pashtun tribal society is armed, recruits usually possess basic military skills. They receive significant on-the-job training and must prove their military ability in a peer-review system similar to those routinely employed in Pashtun tribes. Brave, pious, and politically sound recruits gain prominence within a cell. Soon, they either become its leader or depart to form a new cell of their own.

Motivation. The Taliban seek congruence among their members' personal motivations, the cell's interests, and the organization's objectives. Seth Jones has described the two main motivations behind the Taliban insurgency:

The top tier of the Taliban leadership structure and key commanders . . . are motivated by their interpretation [of] radical Islam, and see the insurgency as a fight with Western infidels, and the West's "puppet government" in Kabul.

The bottom tier includes thousands of local fighters and their support network. The Taliban pays young men from rural villages to set up roadside bombs, launch rockets and mortars at NATO and Afghan forces, or pick up a gun for a few days. Most are not ideologically committed to *jihad*. Rather, they are motivated because they are unemployed, disenchanted with the lack of change since 2001, or angry because a local villager was killed or wounded by Afghan, U.S., or NATO forces.⁶⁸

The Taliban persuade their recruits to act in accordance with the organization's wishes by offering monetary rewards to people driven by money, status to people seeking power, and a sense of glamour to the adventurous who seek glory in tribal society. They also punish those found wanting by withholding money, reducing their status in the organization, subjecting them or their kin to physical violence, and alienating them from the tribal community.

The Taliban also have a loosely defined code of conduct, which they expect their fighters and commanders to follow. In December 2007, the Taliban

issued a code of conduct (*layeha*) to communicate the organization's rules to its members.⁶⁹ The central leadership can disown a member or commander for any significant violation of the rules; for example, in January 2008 they sacked Mullah Mansoor Dadullah for failing to "obey the rules of the Islamic emirate."⁷⁰

The Taliban Securing its Future

The Taliban applies its resources and structures toward its strategic goals. It influences the environment to perpetuate growth in three categories:

- **Coercive capabilities**—activities in which the threat or direct application of force influences the environment in a way that feeds back into the resources of the Taliban.
- **Internal political influence**—nonviolent means of affecting the environment, such as developing shadow government structures.
- **External political influence**—efforts to isolate Afghanistan and its neighbors from external assistance and to spread the Taliban ideology to surrounding neighbor states, in particular Pakistan, in order to control a greater resource base and to continue to expand.

Coercive capabilities. The Taliban's use of war-of-the-flea guerrilla tactics has forced coalition units to spread themselves out over too large an area and to respond to Taliban actions with disproportionate amounts of force, thus causing more damage to the civilian population than to the insurgents.⁷¹

Today's guerrilla strategy reflects a change in Taliban operations. Afghans knew Mullah Omar for his Robin Hood-like actions as a protector of the people in the Taliban's early days.⁷² Now, the Taliban take advantage of the Pashtunwali code's tenet of nanawetey to obtain shelter within the population. The Taliban commander in Helmand province claims, "The people are with us. They give us food, they give us shelter."⁷³ Of course, the shelter may often be coerced rather than freely given, as a report from Ghanzi province suggests: "People wait to speak with their favorite deputy . . . One is a school teacher, the other a member of the municipal council. They don't even dare say their names out of fear of potential reprisals."⁷⁴ In Karabakh, "Taliban regime sympathizers rode through the streets of six Karabakh district villages with loud speakers, threatening any who cooperated with the Afghan government with

death. For three months, the Taliban have become emboldened, and now they make these ‘visits’ with their faces uncovered. Yet no one has denounced them. Why would they? The last time the villagers pointed out who was responsible for an attack, the perpetrators were released immediately after paying the district chief of police some money.”⁷⁵

Civilian casualties are increasing as the Taliban and coalition forces continue to struggle. According to Human Rights Watch, Taliban attacks caused 699 civilian casualties in 2006.⁷⁶ The data in Table 1 below, compiled by the Afghanistan NGO Security Office, shows the intentional versus collateral damage toll on the civil populace in the first six months of 2007.⁷⁷

The Taliban campaign has driven a wedge between coalition forces and the people, whom coalition forces see as *de facto* supporters of the Taliban. Conversely, the people believe that coalition forces are culturally insensitive, cause unnecessary civilian casualties, and fail to offer appropriate reparations for those casualties. The people then embrace *badal*, increasing passive support for the Taliban and creating a pool of potential new fighters.

The Taliban’s coercion campaign also fuels popular frustration with the IROA. The NGO Safety Office reported that the first six months of 2007

saw a 50 percent increase in contact between the populace and the Taliban and other armed opposition groups.⁷⁸ Most of these instances were nonlethal, but 60 percent were abductions or attempts to intimidate. Forty percent of the attacks involved direct-fire weapons (rocket-propelled grenades and small arms), assaults, IED attacks, or arson.⁷⁹

The Taliban’s constant gnawing prevents workers and material from reaching far-flung parts of Afghanistan. As one European security official said, “[The people] are concerned that the base level of their lives is not improved, and that’s the challenge that the insurgency provides—delaying the ability of the government to be able to deliver, by keeping certain areas unstable.”⁸⁰ The result of the Taliban’s depredations is disillusionment, anger toward those who promised a better life, and a desire to return to the Taliban to replace frustration with stability.

The Taliban have also stepped up the use of suicide bombers to fortify the movement: since 2006, the number of such attacks has increased remarkably.⁸¹ Produced through the interaction between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the new wave of suicide troops demonstrates the difference between the Taliban’s early Robin Hood tactics and its current disregard for civilians. These human weapons have produced more casualties among the civilian population than among the international security forces.⁸² As a

result, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has accused the Taliban of deliberately targeting civilians in order to undermine the IROA.⁸³ The tactic seems to be working: Afghans now minimize contact with coalition agencies because of the increased risk in going near coalition troops or bases. Of course, the Taliban’s propaganda machine attempts to avoid responsibility for civilian casualties, usually blaming them on the coalition, as a 2007 story run by Al-Jazeera shows:




Table 1. Causes of NGO reported casualties.




Figure 8. NGO and AOG contact.

“The Taliban have told us that a suicide... [attack was] carried out this morning ... [and] they killed four Italians and injured three others. Their version is that any civilians who were killed died in gunfire, which happened afterwards—they haven’t claimed responsibility for the deaths of the civilians.”⁸⁴ This tactic coerces default support for the Taliban by alienating the population from coalition forces and the Afghan government.

Coercive efforts to indoctrinate Afghan youth target the country’s education system. In 2006, Taliban militants killed 20 teachers and destroyed some 200 schools.⁸⁵ In 2007, they forced another 300 schools to close.⁸⁶ In January 2007, the Taliban said it had put aside one million dollars to establish schools in the six southern provinces of Afghanistan. “[The] Taliban are not against education,” they claimed; rather, “The Taliban want sharia (Islamic) education.”⁸⁷ The group hopes to build a controlled, madrassa-style educational system after destroying all other educational resources. The Taliban is securing a future resource, the people, for years to come.

Internal influences. The Taliban has proven to be a resilient organization. After being ousted from power, it was able to regroup and set up a parallel government. This “shadow government” seeks to expand its power by gaining control over territory and undermining the legitimacy of the IROA.⁸⁸ Former top-ranking Taliban general and current member of the IROA parliament Mullah Abdul Salam Rocketi noted its existence early on: “The whole General Staff of the Taliban resistance is . . . like a real shadow government.”⁸⁹

The Taliban also seem to be infiltrating the legitimate government. Coalition forces noticed this in 2005, when Afghan amnesty programs allowed

Taliban members to rejoin Afghan society and participate in the elections. As one operations officer said:

There were guys on the candidate list that we knew had loose affiliations with the [Taliban] or were facilitators or were in some other way soiled with the stain of the [Taliban] or were on our target list in some way, shape or form. . . . That dem-

onstrated to us that these guys will attempt to build some kind of shadow government through the legitimate elections so that they can have people in place to take over those positions of responsibility, if and when their way of life and their way of government is reinstitutionalized by collapsing the legitimate government.⁹⁰

While it may be difficult to confirm the true allegiances of returning Taliban members until they choose to reveal them, the perception of wolves in sheep’s clothing in government serves to further undermine the IROA.

Meanwhile, the Taliban is promoting the legitimacy of their shadow government, as proven by their drafting a new Constitution of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in December 2006.⁹¹ The Taliban is making a point of acting as a government in exile, so that their sympathizers in Arab states can more easily justify supporting them.

Regional and international influence. The July 2007 Red Mosque incident in Islamabad demonstrates the Taliban’s ability to influence politics in the region. The militants who imposed Taliban-style sharia law in their Islamabad community sparked an eight-day standoff with government forces, a stalemate that concluded with Pakistani troops storming the complex. In the ensuing melee, 10 soldiers and over 90 militants were killed.⁹² This police action caused a wave of civil unrest and sparked calls for President Musharraf to resign.

More recently, the assassination of former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto has shown the level of interest the Taliban takes in the future of Pakistan. Both the Pakistani government and the CIA have placed responsibility for the assassina-

tion on Baitulla Mehsud, commander of the Taliban Movement of Pakistan.⁹³ Mehsud is reported to have pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar, whose ideological beliefs he shares.⁹⁴ This extension of Taliban influence to Pakistan demonstrates the organization's successful attempt to expand regionally.


The Taliban's international influence was also evident in the July 2007 abduction and apparent execution of two German nationals involved in a dam project (along with five Afghans) and the kidnapping of a busload of South Korean missionaries. Taliban members claim they executed the Germans after Germany ignored a deadline to withdraw its 3,000 troops from Afghanistan. The Korean hostages faced a similar fate when the Taliban demanded Korea withdraw its 200 troops from the region. After the Taliban killed two of the Koreans, the South Korean government gave in to the Taliban's demand and agreed to pull its personnel out of Afghanistan. (The remaining hostages were released.)⁹⁵

These campaigns benefit the Taliban in several ways. In the wake of the Red Mosque incident and continued student protests, pressure on Pakistan to give in to demands for Taliban-style religious rule increased, producing more public support for the Taliban and a greater pool of potential recruits. With the hostage-taking and killings, the Taliban

exposed the government's inability to protect foreigners and showed it could dictate terms to national governments.

The influence the Taliban exerts can also be seen in the recent rift between the U.S. and its coalition partners over shared burdens in Afghanistan. With their patient tactics, the Taliban are testing the national wills of coalition states and the strength of the alliance as the mission in Afghanistan lengthens.

Recently, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized NATO's effort against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. Gates told the *Los Angeles Times* that coalition forces in the south do not know how to fight a counterinsurgency and may be contributing to the escalation of violence.⁹⁶ The Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Canada, whose troops have endured much of the fighting in southern Afghanistan, protested Gates' remarks.⁹⁷ Canada's National Democratic Party leader, Jack Layton, said that the remarks could be the tipping point that drives Canada out of Afghanistan. A NATO spokesman responded, "It's not helpful when there's media speculation about divisions between allies. It's even worse when there is division between allies" (although he added, "But I don't think there is").⁹⁸ Growing casualties, too, are taking a toll on the alliance members' willingness to supply troops.⁹⁹ (See Table 2.)



NOTE: The casualty figures shown here do not include the casualties of Pakistani forces which are believed to be over 1100 KIA to date.

Table 2. Coalition deaths by year.

Obviously, the Taliban understand that the insurgent “flea” need not defeat his adversary, but merely outlast his will to continue to scratch.

Pressed to address what the future might hold for the Taliban and Afghanistan, this much seems clear: the Taliban are becoming self-sustaining by producing effects that feed back into their resource base. Thus, the movement is capable of surviving and, in

the absence of a U.S. and NATO presence, eventually ruling the Pashtun-dominated region of Afghanistan and spreading its sphere of influence into the FATA and other regions of Pakistan. There is a clear need to address this problem in a more coherent manner. If we do not, the Taliban has the potential to unleash a new wave of terror—more attacks like 9/11, Barcelona, or London—across the world. **MR**

NOTES

1. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, <<http://maorinews.com/writings/poems/artofwar.htm>> (17 January 2008).
2. “Madrasa” (Arabic: مدرسة) is the Arabic word for any type of school, secular or religious (of any religion). In this article, “madrasa” will refer to Islamic religious seminaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
3. “Mujahideen” (Arabic: مجاهدين, literally, “strugglers”) is a term for Muslims fighting in any type of struggle. Mujahid and its plural, mujahideen, come from the same Arabic root as “jihad” (“struggle”). A warlord is a powerful person who commands an armed force loyal to him, not to the government; as a result, he enjoys de facto control of a sub-national area. Warlords and regional strongmen have been a constant characteristic of Afghan history.
4. Alison Behnke, *The Conquests of Alexander the Great* (Minneapolis, MN: Twenty-First Century Books, 2007), 99.
5. Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 145.
6. Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 5, no. 2 (2007): 118, <www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/May_2007/Johnson.pdf> (21 November 2007).
7. Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban* (Cambridge, MA: Eurospan, 2003), 134.
8. For a detailed history of the Great Game see Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia* (New York: Kodansha Globe, 1994).
9. For details of the administrative arrangements in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), see *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, <<http://www.pakistan.gov/pakistan/constitution/>> (27 February 2008), and Noor ul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan, and Maqsood ul Hasan Nuri, “Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” *Islamabad Policy Research Institute Papers*, vol. 10 (March 2005), <<http://ipripak.org/papers/federally.shtml>> (27 February 2008).
10. For details of the reforms that upset the countryside, see Radek Sikorski, *Dust of the Saints: A Journey to Herat in Time of War (Khak-i Avaliya)* (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1990), 180-87.
11. Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007).
12. Russian General Staff, *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, eds. and trans. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 255-56.
13. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *Afghanistan-the Bear Trap: the Defeat of a Superpower* (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2001), 159.
14. Katzman, 3. See also “The Taliban,” *Program for Culture and Conflict Studies*, <www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pubs/The%20Taliban.pdf> (27 November 2007).
15. “Wahhabism” (Arabic: الوهابية) is a branch of Islam practiced by those who follow the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, after whom the movement is named. The writings of such scholars as Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya influenced Ibn Abdul Wahhab, who reintroduced Sharia (Islamic) law to the Arabian Peninsula. The term “Wahhabi” (*Wahhabiyah*) is rarely used by the people it describes. The currently preferred term is “Salafism” from *Salaf as-Salih*, the “pious predecessors,” as propagated mainly by Ibn Taymiyya, his students Ibn Al Qayyim al-Jawziyya, and later by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab and his followers.
16. Peter Marsden, *The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan* (London and Karachi: Oxford University Press; New York: Zed Books Ltd., 1998), 22-35.
17. The cloak of the Prophet Mohammed was locked in a crypt in the royal mausoleum at Kandahar and, according to popular myth, could only be touched by a true *Amir-ul-Momineen* (Leader of the Faithful). For details of the event, see Johnson and Mason, 80, and Norimitsu Onishi, “A Tale of the Mullah and Muhammad’s Amazing Cloak,” *New York Times*, 19 December 2001, <query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F04EEDB123EF93AA25751C1A9679C8B63> (28 November 2007).
18. Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 42.
19. Joseph A. Raelin, “The Myth of Charismatic Leaders,” *T + D* (1 March 2003): 46, <www.proquest.com> (2 December 2007).
20. Katzman, 3-4.
21. Bill Roggio, “Pakistani Taliban Unites Under Baitullah Mehsud,” *The Long War Journal*, <www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/pakistani_taliban_un.php> (15 January 2008).
22. Michael Howard cited in B.C. Lindberg, “Culture: A Neglected Aspect in War,” *Urban Operations Journal*, Air War College, Maxwell-Gunter Airforce Base, Alabama, 1996, <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/lindberg.htm>> (18 March 2008).
23. Ibid., 122.
24. The term “tribe,” as used in this article, refers to “localized groups in which kinship is the dominant idiom of organization, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins) and have been politically unified at least for much of their history.” Antonio Giustozzi and Noor Ullah, “Tribes and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005,” *Crisis States Working Papers* 2, no. 7 (September 2006), 2, <www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp7.2.pdf>.
25. Johnson, *On the Edge of the Big Muddy*, 122.
26. A jirga (Urdu: جرگہ) is a tribal assembly of elders that makes decisions by consensus. They are most common in Afghanistan and among the Pashtun in Pakistan. For details of the jirga tradition, see Ali Wardak, *Jirga—A Traditional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan*, <unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN017434.pdf>; and Mumtaz Ali Bangash, “Jirga: Speedy Justice of Elders. What is Not Decided in the Jirga Will Never be Decided by Bloodshed,” *Khyber Gateway*, <www.khyber.org/culture/jirga/jirgas.shtml>.
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39. Ibid., 22.
40. Ibid., 21.
41. Ibid., 12.
42. Ibid., 19.
43. For the purpose of this paper, “human terrain” is defined as “people and their support/intelligence networks.”
44. International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism* (2007).
45. Johnson, *On the Edge of the Big Muddy*, 97.
46. CIA—the World Factbook 2007.
47. House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Afghanistan, “Afghanistan: The Rise of the Narco-Taliban: Testimony of Congressman Mark Kirk,” 2007, <[www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/kir021507.pdf](http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/kir021507.pdf)> (29 November 2007).
48. *Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007*, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007), <www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf> (1 October 2007).
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
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
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The Al-Qaeda Media Machine

Philip Seib, J.D.



صوت أسامة بن لادن
زعيم تنظيم القاعدة

LIKE AN AGING ROCK STAR who has dropped out of the public eye, Osama bin-Laden occasionally decides to remind people that he's still around. He makes video appearances that first appear on Arabic television channels but which the world quickly sees on television or on multiple Web sites. Bin-Laden's message is "Hey, they haven't caught me yet," which cheers up his fans, but his threats and pronouncements are mostly terrorist boilerplate. For all the parsing of his sentences and scrutinizing of the color of his beard, hardly anything in his videos helps us better understand and combat terrorism.

Meanwhile, significant Al-Qaeda media efforts go largely unnoticed by news organizations and the public. This myopia is characteristic of an approach to antiterrorism that focuses on Bin-Laden as terror-celebrity while ignoring the deep-rooted dynamism of a global enemy. Most jihadist media products make no mention of Bin-Laden, but they deserve attention because they are vital to Al-Qaeda's mission and to its efforts to extend its influence. Al-Qaeda has become a significant player in global politics largely because it has developed a sophisticated media strategy.

Lacking a tangible homeland—other than, perhaps, scattered outposts in the wilds of Waziristan—Al-Qaeda has established itself as a virtual state that communicates with its "citizens" and cultivates an even larger audience through masterful use of the media, with heavy reliance on the Internet. For every conventional video performance by Bin-Laden that appears on Al-Jazeera and other major television outlets, there are hundreds of online videos that proselytize, recruit, and train the Al-Qaeda constituency.

Growth of Media Machine

The Al-Qaeda media machine has grown steadily. Al-Qaeda and its jihadist brethren use more than 4,000 Web sites to encourage the faithful and threaten their enemies. The Al-Qaeda production company, As-Sahab, released 16 videos during 2005, 58 in 2006, and produced more than 90 in 2007. Like a Hollywood studio, As-Sahab has a carefully honed understanding of what will attract an audience and how to shape the Al-Qaeda message.

You won't get As-Sahab's videos from Netflix, but any Web user can easily find them, and the selection is wide. In 2006, the Global Islamic Media Front, an Al-Qaeda distribution arm, offered "Jihad Academy," which includes footage of attacks on U.S. troops, insurgents assembling

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PHOTO: This image grab of a photograph of Osama bin-Laden taken from Al-Jazeera television on 29 November 2007 accompanied a short audio message urging Europeans to end their involvement in Afghanistan and reiterating Bin-Laden's involvement in the September 11 attacks on the United States. (AFP PHOTO/AL-JAZEERA/DSK)

...Al-Qaeda...cultivates an even larger audience through masterful use of the media...

improvised explosive devices (IEDs), prospective suicide bombers reading their last testaments, and general exhortations to join the war against the United States, Israel, and other foes.

Another distributor with ties to Al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Sunnah's Media Podium, produced "Top 20," a selection of filmed IED attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq "in order to encourage the jihad and the competition between the mujahideen to battle and defeat their enemy." For this greatest hits video, criteria for selection included "the degree of security conditions while filming the operation's site" and "precision in hitting the target."¹

With the stirring music and graphic images of an action movie, the videos fortify the resolve of the Al-Qaeda faithful and, even more important, capture the attention of 15-year-olds in cyber cafes—the next generation of Al-Qaeda warriors. Al-Qaeda takes recruitment seriously, recognizing that potential martyrs require convincing that their sacrifice will be noble and worthwhile. Once inspired by the videos, the prospective jihadist might move on to a Web posting such as "How To Join Al-Qaeda," which tells him: "You feel that you want to carry a weapon, fight, and kill the occupiers . . . Set a goal; for example, assassinating the American ambassador—is it so difficult?"²

Spreading the Message

As-Sahab is part of the media department Bin-Laden established when Al-Qaeda formed in 1988. The first message to emerge was that Al-Qaeda was a brave underdog facing the monstrous Soviet Union. Soon thereafter,

Al-Qaeda announced its resolve to take on other purported enemies of Islam. In 1996, Bin-Laden issued his "Declaration of War on the United States" and used the Al-Qaeda media machinery to spread the call for jihad.

Before a U.S. air strike killed him in June 2006, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the self-proclaimed head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, took this kind of media work to a new level. He first displayed his grisly flair for using media when terrorists abducted American businessman Nicholas Berg and beheaded him in Iraq in 2004, with Zarqawi apparently the executioner. The terrorists videotaped the beheading and presented it on a Web site, from which it was copied to other sites and downloaded 500,000 times within 24 hours.³

The following year, Zarqawi began an online magazine, *Zurwat al-Sanam* (The Tip of the Camel's Hump, meaning ideal Islamic practice), which featured 43 pages of text, including stories about fallen jihadists, and photographs of Osama bin-Laden and George W. Bush.⁴ Later, Zarqawi's "information wing"—which included his own online press secretary—released "All Religion Will Be for Allah," a 46-minute video with scenes including a brigade of suicide bombers in training. As *The Washington Post* reported, the video was offered on a specially designed Web page with



An undated image from a videotape produced by Al-Qaeda's As-Sahab media wing depicting a prominent Taliban military commander holding a rocket-propelled grenade launcher in an undisclosed area of Afghanistan.

AP Photo/As-Sahab via APTN

many options for downloading, including Windows Media and RealPlayer versions for those with high-speed Internet connections, another version for those with dial-up, and one for downloading it to play on a cell phone.⁵ Production quality has become more sophisticated, with many videos now including subtitles in several languages and some featuring 3-D animation.⁶

Al-Qaeda-related operations outside the center of the Middle East have also copied the As-Sahab look, as we can see in the Al-Qaeda organization's video productions in the Islamic Maghreb. Videos of the December 2006 attack in Algeria on a convoy of employees of Halliburton subsidiary Brown & Root-Condor and the April 2007 attacks in Algiers featured the professional technical quality of As-Sahab productions. Terrorism experts speculated that an Al-Qaeda condition for its affiliating with the North African Salafist Group for Call and Combat was an upgrade of the local group's media competency.⁷

Even cartoons depicting children as suicide bombers are easily available on the Web, and Hamas's Al-Aqsa Television has featured children's programming that extols martyrdom. On one popular program on this channel, *Pioneers of Tomorrow*, a Mickey Mouse-like character becomes a martyr when he refuses to turn over his family's land to Israelis. In another episode, the child host of the show sings, "We can defeat the colonialist army. We have regained our freedom through bloodshed and the wrath of fire. If we receive good tidings, we will meet our death with no hesitation."⁸ It is hard to calculate the damage that the poisonous residue of such fare may cause over time.

Through news reports, satellite television provides Al-Qaeda and the public with graphic representations of Al-Qaeda's work and occasional glimpses of Bin-Laden himself. More significantly, the Internet supplies more detailed versions of what the news media have covered, all the while furthering operational connectivity and a sense of cohesion. Michael Scheuer observed that "the Internet today allows militant Muslims from every country to meet, talk, and get to know each other electronically, a familiarization and bonding process that in the 1980s and early 1990s required a trip to Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, or Pakistan."⁹ As author Gabriel Weimann noted, *Sawt al-Jihad* (*Voice of Jihad*), an Al-Qaeda online magazine,

reflects the multiple purposes of such ventures: "Orchestrating attacks against Western targets is important, but the main objective remains that of mobilizing public support and gaining grassroots legitimacy among Muslims."¹⁰

Training Opportunities

A further aspect of this effort to build a Web-based constituency is an online library of training materials explaining how to mix ricin poison, how to build a bomb using commercial chemicals, how to sneak through Syria and into Iraq, and other such advice. Experts who answer questions on message boards and chat rooms support some of these items.

Another Al-Qaeda online magazine, *Muaskar al-Battar* (Camp of the Sword), underscored the value of online instruction: "Oh Mujahid brother, in order to join the great training camps you don't have to travel to other lands. Alone in your home or with a group of your brothers, you too can begin to execute the training program."¹¹ To enhance cyber security for such connections, the online *Technical Mujahid Magazine* was begun in late 2006 to instruct its readers about electronic data security and other high-tech matters.

During the past few years, the online training curriculum has expanded to include small-unit infantry tactics and intelligence operations such as collecting data, recruiting members of state security services, and setting up phone taps. Readers have downloaded this material in places such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and Morocco, and it has turned up when law enforcement raided cells in those countries. Some intelligence experts argue that online training has its limits—that technical skills and tradecraft require more than Web-based instruction. But although Al-Qaeda's students might be able to glean only rudimentary knowledge from Internet sources, it is enough to make them dangerous.¹²

**...the online training curriculum
has expanded to include
small-unit infantry tactics and
intelligence operations...**

Information Operations

The Al-Qaeda leadership has stressed Internet use in directives to its citizens/followers, as was illustrated in this message carried on one of its Web sites:

Due to the advances of modern technology, it is easy to spread news, information, articles, and other information over the Internet. We strongly urge Muslim Internet professionals to spread and disseminate news and information about the Jihad through e-mail lists, discussion groups, and their own Web sites. If you fail to do this, and our site closes down before you have done this, we may hold you to account before Allah on the Day of Judgment . . . We expect our Web site to be opened and closed continuously. Therefore, we urgently recommend to any Muslims that are interested in our material to copy all the articles from our site and disseminate them through their own Web sites, discussion boards, and e-mail lists. This is something that any Muslim can participate in easily, including sisters. This way, even if our sites are closed down, the material will live on with the Grace of Allah.¹³

This appreciation of the value of the Internet is nothing new for Al-Qaeda. Even when under attack by U.S. forces in late 2001, Al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan clung to their high-tech tools. A Pakistani journalist who was on the scene wrote that while retreating, “every second Al-Qaeda member was carrying a laptop computer along with his Kalashnikov.”¹⁴

The Internet allows access to an almost infinite array of information providers and is attractive for other reasons, as well. For terrorist organizations, the Internet is preferable to satellite television because it provides unmatched opportunities to reach a global audience with video productions without having to rely on any particular television channels. In addition, using the Internet avoids problems associated with distribution of a physical product. Instead of establishing clearing houses to mail videos—a process that law enforcement agencies were able to disrupt—these groups now rely on pirated video-editing software and Web sites onto which material may be uploaded for their followers to access. These sites feature items such as the 118-page “Comprehensive Security

Encyclopedia,” which was posted in 2007 with detailed instructions about improving Internet and telephone security, purchasing weapons, handling explosives, transferring funds to jihadist groups, and other useful hints.¹⁵

One of the masters of this craft was Younis Tsouli, a young Moroccan whose *nom de cyber-guerre* was “Irhabi007.” Based in England, Tsouli provided technical skills needed by Al-Qaeda after it left Afghanistan and established an online headquarters. He assisted Zarqawi when he used the Internet as part of his war plan in Iraq. Tsouli was adroit at hacking into servers that he then used to distribute large video files. (One of his hacking victims was the computer system of the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department.)

Arrested in London in 2005 and sent to prison by a British court in 2007, Tsouli understood the effectiveness of the Internet in reaching potential recruits for Al-Qaeda’s cause. The 2006 U.S. *National Intelligence Estimate* acknowledged the importance of this: “The radicalization process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.”¹⁶

By mid-2007, some Al-Qaeda-related Web sites were broadening their agendas. “Media jihad” included entering online forums with large American audiences in order to influence “the views of the weak-minded American” who “is an idiot and does not know where Iraq is.” The “weak-minded” were to be targeted with videos showing U.S. troops under fire and with false messages purportedly from American Soldiers and their families lamenting their involvement in the Iraq war. At the same time, Web forums for Islamist audiences featured information gleaned from Western news reports, such as poll results showing lack of public support for the war and, occasionally, information about weapons systems that news stories published.

Worldwide Recruiting

Beyond the material directly addressing warfare, such Web sites devote some of their content to ideological and cultural issues that are at the heart of efforts to win the support of young Muslims. Because Al-Qaeda’s leaders believe this will be a long war, they see appealing to prospective jihadists

The number of English-language jihadist sites has been growing, with approximately 100 available as vehicles for militant Islamic views. Some of these operate overtly.

and enlarging their ranks as crucial to their eventual success. The number of English-language jihadist sites has been growing, with approximately 100 available as vehicles for militant Islamic views. Some of these operate overtly. In October 2007, the *New York Times* profiled a 21-year-old Saudi-born American living in North Carolina whose blog extols Bin-Laden's view of the world. He includes videos designed to appeal to North American and European Muslims who are angry about the Iraq war and are responsive to claims that Islam is under siege.

This blogger had apparently not violated any U.S. laws, so he continued his online efforts, reaching—he claimed—500 regular readers. Although some law enforcement officials want to shut down such sites and prosecute their proprietors, some terrorism experts propose that such sites be allowed to operate in public view because they may provide insights into terrorist thinking and operations.¹⁷

Al-Qaeda's recruiting efforts have targeted British and American Muslims, such as a 2006 video that described rapes and murders allegedly committed by U.S. Soldiers in Iraq. Released to mark the first anniversary of the 7/7 bombings in London, the video featured Bin-Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri; Shehzad Tanweer, one of the London bombers, who died during the attack; and Adam Gadahn, also known as "Azzam the American," who grew up in California.

Tanweer, delivering his final testament in English with a Yorkshire accent, said: "We are 100 percent committed to the cause of Islam. We love death the way you love life. . . . Oh, Muslims of Britain, you, day in and day out on your TV sets, watch and hear about the oppression of the Muslims, from the east to the west. But yet you turn a blind eye, and carry on with your lives as if you never heard anything,

or as if it does not concern you. . . . Oh, Muslims of Britain, stand up and be counted. . . . Fight against the disbelievers, for it is an obligation made on you by Allah." To this, Gadahn added, "It's crucial for Muslims to keep in mind that the American, the British, and the other members of the coalition of terror have intentionally targeted Muslim civilians."¹⁸

Among more recent videos aimed at a U.S. audience is "To Black Americans," which features Zawahiri criticizing Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice and introducing video clips of Malcolm X talking about the unfair treatment of African-Americans. (These video clips date back to the Vietnam War years.) This video resembles Cold War-era communist propaganda, and it does not appear to have caused much of a stir, but it gives some indication of where Al-Qaeda's propaganda efforts are heading.

Terrorist organizations see young Muslims in non-Islamic countries as likely prospects for recruitment, and so they use media tools to stoke anger about purported economic and political discrimination. Al-Qaeda is apparently trying to create an online community where members of the Muslim diaspora will feel at home. Once they are part of this "community," they can view a steady stream of jihadist messages of varying degrees of subtlety.

Al-Qaeda recognizes the value of developing online networks. Chris Zambelis wrote, "The Internet enables like-minded militants to associate and communicate anonymously in cyber social networks. This process reinforces their sense of purpose and duty and encourages solidarity with the greater cause."¹⁹ Extending such efforts beyond an Arabic-speaking core of support is a crucial part of Al-Qaeda's expansion.

YouTube and other such sites make videos like "To Black Americans" easily available, which differentiates today's propaganda from its antecedents during the Cold War and earlier. It can reach a

Terrorist organizations... use media tools to stoke anger about purported economic and political discrimination.

global audience instantly. Just how big that audience really is remains open to question, but as Al-Qaeda increases its video production output, it seems to be operating on the theory that at least some of its messages will reach their desired viewers.

During the second half of 2007, U.S. forces in Iraq shut down at least a half-dozen Al-Qaeda media outposts in that country. One house the U.S. raided in Samarra contained 12 computers, 65 hard drives, and a film studio. The American military effort to halt such media operations relied in part on the belief of General David Petraeus that “the war is not only being fought on the ground in Iraq but also in cyberspace.”²⁰ Petraeus’s concern relates to an issue raised in U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual, *Counterinsurgency*—insurgents attempt to shape the information environment to their advantage by using suicide attacks and other such tactics to “inflate perceptions of insurgent capabilities.”²¹

Cyberspace Warfare


Information dominance is a modern warfare tenet that is increasingly important, particularly if conventional military strength accompanies the effective exercise of soft power. Al-Qaeda understands the limitations of its own use of “hard power”—the

coercive force of terrorist attacks—and continues to expand its conceptual approach to information warfare. Recognizing the pervasiveness of the information delivered by satellite television and the Internet and the influence of news organizations ranging from the BBC to Al-Jazeera, Al-Qaeda is now offering, in the words of Michael Scheuer, “a reliable source of near real-time news coverage from the jihad fronts for Muslims.” From Iraq and Afghanistan, wrote Scheuer, Iraqi insurgents and Taliban forces produce, on an almost daily basis, combat videos, interviews with their commanders, and graphic footage of retaliatory measures against locals who cooperate with American or U.S.-backed forces.²²

This effort reflects Al-Qaeda’s dissatisfaction with Arab news organizations as vehicles for its media products. Zawahiri has criticized Al-Jazeera, in particular, because it refused to be a mere conveyor belt for Al-Qaeda videos, dared to edit Bin-Laden’s pronouncements rather than show them in their entirety, and gave airtime to Al-Qaeda’s critics. Because of As-Sahab’s video producers’ technical expertise, Al-Qaeda can now set itself up as a third force that provides a message different from Western media and the new generation of Arab news providers.

Zawahiri has said that what he calls “jihadi information media” have been “waging an extremely critical battle against the Crusader-Zionist enemy” and have “demolished this monopoly” by confronting conventional media organizations. Taking things a step further, in late 2007, Zawahiri offered to participate in an online interview in which he would take questions from individuals and news organizations.²³

To some extent, this might be mere gamesmanship on the part of Al-Qaeda. By making



This image from a video released by Al-Qaeda depicts Osama bin-Laden (center inset) urging Pakistani Muslims to rebel against the government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. The image was obtained from the SITE Intelligence Group, 20 September 2007.

By holding a “news conference,” the Al-Qaeda leadership positions itself on a plane comparable to that where “real” governments operate.

himself available for a cyberspace chat, Zawahiri taunts those who have been hunting him for years. By holding a “news conference,” the Al-Qaeda leadership positions itself on a plane comparable to that where “real” governments operate. By using new media to communicate with the rest of the world, Al-Qaeda stakes a claim to being an exponent of modernity.

One is tempted to dismiss these maneuvers as just another distracting ploy by murderous thugs, but for those who see Al-Qaeda’s cadres as heroic defenders of Islam—and their numbers are substantial—this exercise is evidence of legitimacy, despite Al-Qaeda’s vilification by much of the world.

The inadequate responses to Al-Qaeda’s media messages heighten the danger. Even a flawed argument has appeal when we allow it to stand in an

intellectual vacuum. Moderate Muslims and non-Muslims who do not accept the idea that prolonged conflict is inevitable must recognize this reality and act on it in a sophisticated, comprehensive way.

This means providing a steady stream of videos and other materials through the new media that many members of the Al-Qaeda audience use. This counter-programming should not feature defensive, pro-American content, but rather should concentrate on undermining Al-Qaeda’s purported nobility, such as by reminding the audience how many Muslims have died in the terrorist attacks and insurgent warfare Al-Qaeda instigated.

Osama bin-Laden will undoubtedly pop up in another video before long. Note what he says, but then look to the always expanding reservoir of jihadist media to see what Al-Qaeda is really up to. **MR**

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
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Transition Teams: ADAPT AND WIN

Captain William C. Taylor, U.S. Army



It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to suggest that, on their own, foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win it for them.

—John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*¹

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PHOTO: 3-2-3 MiTT staff members discuss logistics with IA soldiers from 3d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 3d Division, Forward Operating Base Sykes, Ninewah Province, Iraq, 4 September 2007.

All photos courtesy of the author

HAVING SERVED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER and operations officer of a battalion military transition team (MiTT) in Iraq from May 2007 to April 2008, I found that operations varied greatly from team to team. At first this surprised me, since the mission we'd been given before deploying seemed fairly clear-cut: "Provide advisory support and direct access to coalition effects to enhance the ability of Iraqi forces to operate independently . . . advise the Iraqi Army (IA) on tactics, military decision-making process, counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare, leadership, teamwork, communications, and urban combat . . . provide knowledge on combat arms management and organizational experience."² Some teams had taken this mission statement at its word and adhered strictly to their advisory tasks, disdaining any interaction with the local coalition unit. Other teams focused heavily on liaising between their IA and parent coalition unit, and did minimal advising. Even among the MiTTs that focused on training, there were differences. Few teams, for example, dared to wade into leadership, teamwork, and ethics with their IA unit's leaders. Internal MiTT leadership varied too: some team leaders were democratic, others more traditionally hierarchical. How, I began to wonder, given all these different examples and some obvious differences among Iraqi units, should we operate on our own team?

Based on observations made during my year on a MiTT in Iraq, this article offers 6 principles and 12 lessons learned that a team might consider as it prepares to deploy. Readers should keep in mind that the advice herein resulted from one Soldier's experience at a particular time (2007-2008) and in a particular place (with a certain IA unit). As always, good leaders will adapt to address the peculiarities of their own situations.

Principle #1: Be More Than Mere Advisors

Early in your MiTT deployment, you and your team members will debate what the parameters of your role should be. From our relief-in-place experience with an entire division's worth of MiTTs, I would submit that the most successful teams find a balance between advising their Iraqi counterparts and acting as a conduit between the Iraqis and coalition units. Both missions are

essential to winning the COIN fight. A MiTT can truly have a synergistic effect on the battlespace by not relegating itself solely to one role or the other. This is especially valid when their IA counterparts are fairly competent and not amenable to their suggestions. Successful MiTTs build strong relationships with their parent coalition unit and attached enablers. We coined our periodic trips around our forward operating base (FOB) to visit coalition forces “The FOB Run.”³ Personal contact is crucial to establish close relationships with the enablers that may be at your disposal (e.g., civil affairs, provincial reconstruction team, special forces, forward support battalion, military police transition teams, coalition force counterparts [staff officers & commanders], air assets, dog handlers, tactical handler team, tactical psychological team, and Kellogg, Brown and Root). Every time our team returned to the FOB, we conducted a quick linkup, depending on our operational needs, with several of these enablers. On numerous occasions they were able to provide valuable information on our battlespace. We would all share intelligence, summarize the results of our previous operations, and provide analyses of current trends in the area. Our coalition partners would also offer assistance during our periodic logistics imbroglios. In short, communicating with our enablers created a synergistic effect that increased everyone’s situational awareness and maximized operational assets.

Principle #2: Establish a Clear Chain of Command Early

To avoid problems that can result from disagreements among team members of similar rank and experience, team leaders and noncommissioned officers in charge (NCOIC) need to establish and enforce a clear chain of command immediately. Leading a group of peers is never easy, and leading them on a MiTT is even more complicated. Normally, a major commands a battalion transition team, with captains and E-6s through E-8s filling out most of the staff positions. One consequence of this top-heaviness is a marked familiarity. Unfortunately, such closeness, if unchecked, can and will breed competition and contempt, which erodes cohesion and limits the team’s effectiveness.

Inevitably, as time in theater progresses, personality conflicts, lapses in discipline, arguments,

and shirking and dodging behaviors will emerge. The situation is further complicated by having to deal with Iraqi counterparts sometimes reluctant to listen to your ideas. Team members can become frustrated. Preparation for these eventualities is the only way to maintain discipline and maximize organizational output. Everyone must understand early on that there are consequences for laziness, disobedience, insubordination, and the selfishness that manifests itself in uncharitable attitudes towards other team members. Individual team members should be reminded that such weakness of character is corrosive and that indulging in it will lead to alienation, ineffectiveness, and ultimately dismissal. Grasping this challenge quickly, communicating with team members clearly, and managing the situation closely takes good leadership. In the special circumstances that MiTTs face, a well-defined chain of command offers the best chance for clarity. There is no room for vagueness or ambiguity in the dangerous and extremely frustrating conditions ever present to MiTTs.

Timeliness is paramount to prevent disciplinary problems on a MiTT. Be clear from the start. In conjunction with laying down a clear chain of command, the team leader and NCOIC should immediately establish an atmosphere that promotes goal setting and cooperative brainstorming and that encourages team members to support each other. The natural human tendency to question and criticize authority can be harnessed for constructive purposes through effective communication and respect. Clichéd as it seems, experience teaches that an effective team leader strives to find the right balance between promoting conditions that will engender camaraderie, loyalty, and dedication to the mission, and maintaining respect for the chain of command. Managing or avoiding the frictions that can corrode mission focus demands such a balance, particularly in the stressful conditions a MiTT faces in Iraq.

Principle #3: Clarify Roles and Responsibilities

In general, Army and IA staff models are similar. However, frequent leaves and severe officer and NCO shortages on the IA’s side result in an awkward matchup with the MiTT staff structure. Since one-third of the IA officer and NCO corps are absent at

any given time due to leaves (discussed below), the remaining personnel on duty have to take on additional staff responsibilities. Such temporary coverage makes the IA staff model functionally porous.

The current MiTT model has a commander (MiTTs refer to him as a team leader, not a commander), NCOIC, FSO (fire support officer), S2 (intelligence), S2 NCO, S3 (operations), S3 NCO, S4 (logistics), S6 (communications), medic, and headquarters service company (HSC) officer. An incoming MiTT team leader should contact the outgoing MiTT team leader before assigning roles and responsibilities to his team. At a minimum, the team leader should assign someone to be the S1 (admin), someone to be the CMO (civil-military officer), and someone to be the maintenance officer. He should also decide if he needs a team executive officer. The team NCOIC should determine which NCOs on the team will fill the S1 NCOIC, S4 NCOIC, and maintenance NCOIC roles. Both the team leader and team NCOIC should make these decisions based upon team members' past experience, maturity, and rank.

Advisors must also recognize, accept, and work around differences in military policies, customs, and traditions. As a case in point, the Iraqi leave

system, called *jaza*, complicates the already porous staff boundaries between staff sections. Iraqis will typically take 11 days of *jaza* each month. When they are absent, the IA commander or executive officer redirects responsibilities to staff members who remain on duty. For instance, when our battalion S4 was on *jaza*, the S3 and command sergeant major assisted with maintenance and supply issues. As they typically are, these moves were based upon officer reliability and loyalty, not staff propriety.

Lastly, the MiTT leader will need to clarify the responsibilities of his HSC officer. The Iraqi headquarters company is comprised of maintenance, signal, supply, medical, transportation, and headquarters staff sections, as well as the commander's personal security detachment. The transition team medic, communications NCO, S4, S2, and NCOIC will all play major roles within this company. To help ensure continuity of operations and support of training, the team leader, NCOIC, and HSC officer should develop a plan that clarifies each of the aforementioned team members' roles and responsibilities within the IA headquarters company. They will also need to develop a way to share information on a continuous basis.



Military transition team members and an interpreter instruct IA soldiers from the 3d Battalion on basic rifle marksmanship, 19 September 2007, Fort Tal Afar, Ninewah Province, Iraq.

Principle #4: Conduct Initial Assessments

Before you can effectively advise your IA counterparts and liaise with coalition units, you have to understand the Iraqi unit's strengths and weaknesses as well as the nuances of their battlespace. After brainstorming, our brigade's MiTTs isolated the following essential elements of information needed about an IA unit in order to make a good initial assessment:⁴

- Current mission set and enduring missions.
- Locations of combat outposts and other subordinate unit dispositions.
- Boundaries and the flexibility or rigidity of those boundaries.
- Long-term (greater than one year) and short-term (less than one year) goals.
- Infrastructure assessment of unit's area of operations and area of interest.
- Evaluation of areas addressed in the operational readiness assessment (monthly report submitted through Iraqi Assistance Group).
- Mission essential task list (METL).
- Assessment of the unit's ability to sustain itself, particularly in the areas of logistics and personnel (pay, promotions, retention, and recruiting).
- Assessment of the unit's intelligence-gathering capability and targeting methodology.
- Assessment of NCO development and utilization.
- Assessment of management and execution of training.
- Careful assessment of the suitability and functionality of the unit's facility.

Principle #5: Seize the Initiative

Once you make a thorough assessment, you will be on firmer ground to advise your IA counterpart intelligently and to process information from your coalition unit and enablers. Officers in our brigade came up with these concrete ways to seize the initiative:

- Conduct Iraqi Army, police, and local government joint targeting of anti-Iraqi forces. This builds trust and focuses the COIN fight in your area.
- Clarify the roles of the Iraqi Army, police, and local government in consequence management (e.g., specific actions to be taken, and by whom, in response to an insurgent attack or other crisis).⁵
- Patrol actively. As U.S. units were at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, IA units

are naturally inclined to stay within their walled compounds and wait for enemy strikes instead of proactively engaging with and securing the populace. This is a trend we broke by encouraging and supporting active patrolling and by leading the way to set the example.

- Establish local development projects. The use of Commander's Emergency Response Program funds and civil affairs programs to rebuild infrastructure earns immediate goodwill and credibility.⁶

- Ensure battalion and company training plans are METL-focused. It is very difficult to convince the Iraqis to plan for the future. Sidestep the "*inshallah*" (God willing) cliché and demonstrate the importance of concurrent training in the midst of COIN operations.

- Isolate insurgents in their area of operations. Deny safe havens.

- Decentralize your operations. A commander must empower his subordinate leaders to conduct operations with minimal guidance.

- Push NCO professional development. A weak NCO corps is one of the IA's major limitations. Consequently, we constantly encouraged our IA units to plan and hold weekly NCO classes on substantive, relevant subjects.

Principle #6: Create a Team Training Calendar

Members of teams that do not continue to train themselves while in theater will discover a sharp deterioration in their own combat proficiency. The team's main focus should be advising and supporting Iraqi counterparts, but MiTT leaders cannot neglect training their teams and maintaining basic Soldier skills. Under the guidance of the team leader and NCOIC, the team S3 should assemble a monthly training calendar that covers, at a minimum, the following items:

- Monthly: weapons range, METL training, and inventories of equipment.
- Weekly: maintenance of equipment and blue force tracker; classes on radio use, language (led by interpreters), and first aid. Leaders should also schedule regular physical fitness training and time off.

Twelve Lessons Learned

1. Have a task and purpose each time you visit your Iraqi counterparts. Seize every opportunity to



The 3-2-3 MiTT medic instructs two IA soldiers from 3d Battalion on how to apply an emergency bandage, 19 September 2007, Fort Tal Afar, Ninewah Province, Iraq.

visit, since jaza is difficult to predict and will take your counterpart away for two weeks at a time.

2. To work around jaza interruptions, identify the second person in charge of each staff section.

3. Go with other MiTT members to visit their counterparts. Knowledge and personal contacts are power. The more you know and the more people you know, the more effective you will be.

4. The S1 advisor is key to developing IA units because of his (or her) expertise in crucial administrative skills. The S1 should accompany his counterpart during IA monthly pay operations to assess the effectiveness of this key function, which is so vital to the morale, loyalty, and welfare of the individual Iraqi soldier. Additionally, the S1 advisor should get a feel for his counterpart's record-keeping system. MiTTs should consider creating a special certificate of achievement or similar award to signal progress in this area. Also, consider assigning your S1 the additional duty of civil-military officer to promote a strong civil-military engagement in your IA's area of operation. Have him create a website account to request school, medical, and clothing supplies for the IA to hand out to local Iraqis.

5. Stress NCO training. As noted above, the IA NCO corps is relatively weak and currently faces developmental challenges. That said, NCO professional development classes should be handled through the IA command sergeant major (CSM). Our experience in encouraging this initiative through CSMs had excellent results. Classes should

focus on basic and applicable skills (such as equipment and vehicle maintenance, weapon handling, combat lifesaver skills, patrolling, crater analysis, etc.). Prevent Iraqi officers from attending this training. This will show the *jundeeds* (Iraqi soldiers) that their NCOs, not just their officers, can be experts in combat skills.

6. Help the Iraqi CSM get a handle on NCO promotion issues, and persuade him to hold NCO functions to build esprit de corps.

7. Put your own NCOs on display. MiTT commanders should take their NCOICs to every meeting with the IA commander. This demonstrates how important the NCO corps is to a unit's success.

8. S2: Intelligence capabilities are another crucial component of unit operations. Work with your counterpart on mission analysis, targeting, area analysis, site exploitation, record keeping, and tactical questioning. Coordinate with coalition air assets for aerial photographs of your unit's area if imagery is not available. Label all houses and key infrastructure sites to form a common operating picture. Check on detainees daily. Send out periodic intelligence summaries to other MiTTs and coalition intelligence officers.

9. S3: After you persuade your counterpart to plan and conduct METL training, suggest that he create a training cycle that rotates a platoon or squad from the companies to a three-day battalion training academy focused on individual, squad, and platoon tasks.⁷ Encourage him to be proactive in operational planning. Convince him that instead of merely reacting to enemy movements, he should be looking to deny enemy safe havens.

10. S4/HSC officer: Use the Iraqi Assistance Group website. It will help you identify the proper logistics paperwork and channels for requests. Have the IA logistics officer make a copy for you of every request he sends forward, so you can check on it through your chain of command. Ensure that the logistics officer has an organized and efficient system of processing and filing logistical requests. Persuade him to forecast needs instead of waiting for requests.

11. Medics: Focus on combat lifesaver training, daily scheduled sick call, medical supply shortages, and field sanitation. An effective way to teach Iraqi medics is to give them a handout to read the day prior to training. The following day, the team medic should give them a class based on the handout, and

he should end with a practical exercise. Once several tasks are trained over a period of time, the medic should administer a final hands-on test of all topics covered.

12. Brainstorm counterinsurgency ideas with the IA commander. Convince your IA commander to conduct town hall meetings with village sheiks and to create an assessment template for each village. The assessment should consider sewer, water, electricity, trash, schools, roads, unemployment, business diversification, the population, and its relationship with the IA and Iraqi Police (IP). Leverage civil affairs, provincial reconstruction teams, and resources from the U.S. Agency for International Development through your coalition-force parent unit to address civilian needs through the IA and IP. For example, our MiTT coordinated with civil affairs to renovate a local village clinic and build a soccer field. We ensured that the contract was awarded to a local man who employed citizens of that village. Upon completion of the clinic renovation, we conducted a medical screening program with IA combat lifesavers and clinic nurses to treat the villagers. In both of these COIN initiatives, we coordinated for Iraqi media to be present. We also had Iraqi soldiers and policemen distribute information-operations pamphlets discouraging support for the insurgents, and the people were urged to use their most effective weapon to combat the enemy—their cell phone.



MAJ Whitfield (team leader) observes as the 3d Battalion's commander conducts a town hall meeting with sheiks representing villages in the IA's area of responsibility, Fort Tal Afar, Ninewah Province, Iraq, January 2008.



The author, 3d Battalion's executive officer, and a local schoolmaster discuss the needs of the primary school, March 2008.

Conclusion

The MiTT mission can either aid or inhibit the counterinsurgency fight. A hallmark of the American military's past success has been its Soldiers' ingenuity and adaptability on the battlefield. You will need to demonstrate these same qualities. Study your situation and then find the right balance between advising Iraqis and liaising with coalition forces. Rather than get frustrated over what the Iraqis won't do or don't have, adapt—find the best way to make a function or system work. Take advice; take notes; make a positive difference.

The fruits of a successful MiTT may not be evident for years to come, but to the professional Soldier, that is all the more reason to get it right, now. Do so, and you will be personally and professionally satisfied with your work, even though in the short term there might appear to be little chance for progress.⁸ **MR**

NOTES

1. Epigraph: John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
2. OIF Transition Team Mission, Fort Riley website, <<http://www.riley.army.mil/view/article.aspx?articleId=583-2007-02-21-33387-72>>.
3. Idea taken from Team Hammer, 3-2-3 IA Transition Team, June 2006—June 2007.
4. Participants in the brainstorming session were Major Clinton Conzemius (brigade S3), Captain Aaron Berger (1st Battalion S3), Captain Yanis Cox (2nd Battalion S3), and the author (3rd Battalion S3).
5. Nagl, xiii. One of the most frustrating aspects of the war on the ground in Iraq is responding to the scene of an attack.
6. Ibid. The Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) allots money to coalition force commanders for emergency projects. CERP funds are invaluable for repairing local infrastructure and employing local citizens. The amount of money varies from battalion to corps level.
7. A common excuse you will hear from IA officers on why they do not conduct METL training is that they need all of their soldiers conducting security and sustainment operations. Rotating a squad or platoon through a three-day battalion training academy should be feasible given the current operational constraints.
8. Don M. Snider, professor of political science in the Social Sciences Department, United States Military Academy, assisted the author with the closing paragraph.



CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT: A Proven Method for Conducting Stability and Support Operations

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*The following is a reprint of Landpower Essay No. 07-1,
February 2007, an Institute of Land Warfare publication.*

IN THE IRAQI THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ITO), successful conduct of stability and support operations (SASO) requires an imaginative combination of lethal and nonlethal methods. For the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division, the combination is known as constructive engagement (CE) and is conducted in battalion sectors throughout Baghdad.¹ Constructive engagement combines the full spectrum of military operations with diplomacy at the tactical level, a strategy described by top commanders in Iraq in a 2004 *New York Times* article as "a mix of military tactics, political maneuvering, media management and a generous dollop of cash for quickly rebuilding war-ravaged cities—a formula that, if it survives the test of time, could become a model for future fighting against the persistent insurrections plaguing Iraq."²

During full-spectrum operations in a SASO environment, a commander must balance the application of military (lethal and civil-military) operations with diplomatic engagement to achieve the desired end state. CE describes the methods commanders use to reach this balance, and in Baghdad the goal is the creation of a safe and secure environment in which the seeds of a republic will flourish. The mix of military and diplomatic tactics required very much depends on the environment within each unit sector and the personality of the battalion commander; a commander's skill as a Soldier and diplomat often determine the unit's level of success. Many small-unit leaders and commanders in Baghdad found diplomatic methods are often the most efficient means of reducing the insurgent base. Operations research analysts measured the effects of this approach through analysis of the changes in the types and number of enemy attacks in sectors across Baghdad. Statistical comparison of attacks before and after engagement operations began demonstrated the *decisive* operation type in Baghdad's SASO environment is nonlethal. Commanders used military operations to *shape* the environment but used CE to achieve success.

During constructive engagement, the commander assumes the role of top "tribal leader" in his/her area of operations (AO). The linchpin in this technique is that an Army battalion is the most powerful force in the sector. Local tribal and religious leaders must be made to understand this fact through discussion and justifiable use of force. CE centers on the fact that the U.S. Army and local leaders have common goals, such as the improvement of living and economic conditions, security, and the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces. However, CE works only if small-unit leaders keep their promises, respect the local populace, and display results in improving their

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PHOTO: SGM Rodriguez with Iraqi leaders in Baghdad, 1 February 2005. Building trust with local religious leaders is key. (Courtesy of the author)



courtesy of author

U.S. and Iraqi Soldiers train on constructive engagement techniques, Baghdad, 2004.

lives. In addition, commanders must increase the prestige and influence of the tribal and religious leaders in the AO. Once empowered, these leaders marginalize and deny support to insurgent forces and causes.

This strategy has measurable impact at the tactical level. Attacks are reduced when insurgents in a particular area are isolated, marginalized, and defeated through constructive engagement. However, understandably, CE does not cease all attacks in the AO. For example, mortar attacks originating outside the sector often continue after engagement takes root; therefore, commanders must still conduct lethal operations to target and destroy extremists. CE requires trust, respect, commitment, and expectation and consequence management. In addition, local leaders must know that coalition forces will back up what they say in both military operations and kinetic operations.

Real-life Application 1

In the vicinity of Baghdad International Airport, the commander of 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division (2-12 CAV), instituted several CE methods in his battalion's urban sector. These techniques utilized extensive civil-military operations (CMO) to underlie a "white page," or clean slate, truce—a contract with local tribal leaders that established a new start to relations marred in the past by mistakes and distrust on both sides. The white-page agreement codified mutual reconciliation and the cessation of violence for the purpose of building a peaceful, representative, and prosperous future for the people of Iraq.

The battalion commander used local media to advertise his engagement actions such as prisoner releases, because in public engagement activities, media coverage increases the prestige of the local leader and displays coalition forces improving the lives of average Iraqis. The battalion commander made tribal leaders vouch for, or "guarantee," individuals in their tribe who were suspected of anti-coalition activities. Human intelligence often provided them sufficient details to justify the coalition's detention of tribe members. Tribe leaders then pressured those individuals to reform. Often, if the individuals were jobless, they could seek employment through coalition forces. Those anti-coalition tribe members who wouldn't be marginalized left the AO. The commander also supervised implementation of prisoner releases from Abu Ghraib prison. This program provided enormous prestige to local leaders by involving tribe leaders and family members in the release "ceremony." Pan-Arabian media, including *Al-Jazeera*, covered these events, adding information operations benefits to engagement.

A comparison of daily attacks using statistical hypothesis tests before and after the "adjustment" period for engagement revealed noticeable effects. Results showed the impact of CE on daily attacks before and after the adjustment period was significant. Constructive engagement correlated with a 50-percent reduction in improvised explosive devices (IEDs), a 35-percent reduction in overall attacks, and a 90-percent reduction in casualties in the AO. Another effect of CE was that the *type* of IED changed drastically. IEDs in the 2-12 CAVAO were no longer elaborately emplaced lethal ambushes, but were what are commonly known as "pop-and-drops," hastily emplaced IEDs usually thrown from a slow-moving vehicle onto the side of the road. The enemy no longer had the luxury of emplacing, marking, and targeting IEDs, which resulted in a far less lethal explosion. In addition, the battalion commander cited an increased ability to get contractors working, increased incidents of "red on red" attacks (when two enemy forces fight each other, e.g., al-Qaeda versus Sunni insurgents), and anonymous hotline tips.

Of course there are other factors that potentially affect these results. For example, the battalion commander cited a concerted effort to clean the streets of his AO during the same time as the adjustment

period. This certainly affected insurgents' ability to hide IEDs and may have caused similar results in another area not using CE. It also showed that the community that coalition forces were interested in improvement—thereby supporting CE. This example demonstrates how the application of military and diplomatic operations in concert can yield positive results. In summary, methods for engaging local leaders include—

- Establishing a white-page agreement with top tribal leaders.
- Paying *solatia* (insurance) payments for any death that warrants it. Don't deliberate—it's the best \$2,500 information operations tool one can buy.
- Releasing prisoners to tribal leaders.
- Assisting in the payment of pensions to dissatisfied retired Iraqi Army officers.
- Using local and Pan-Arab media to highlight success (Al-Jazeera, Arabia, etc.).
- Requesting a list of Iraqi demands on his tribe (the battalion is the head tribe in the area).

Methods for engaging the local populace include:

- Enforcing humane treatment of Iraqis by U.S. military personnel during searches.
- Raids.
- Respecting their culture, especially during raids.
- Taking an interpreter during raids and patrols.
- Enforcing a policy that Soldiers must learn basic Arabic.

The commander must be prepared to conduct diplomatic and nonlethal military operations that

go beyond conventional training. As the top tribal leader in the area, the commander is required to conduct humanitarian and diplomatic activities, such as daily meetings with imams and sheiks. Therefore, leaders in the asymmetric fight must have more than a basic knowledge of history, international relations, and the customs and culture of Iraq. "Fence-sitters" decide their militant actions based on prevailing opinion, tribal and religious leadership, and coalition actions. Coalition leaders and Soldiers must always respect local customs and traditions, but residents and their leaders must understand that anti-coalition activities cause swift violence of action. Commanders also must understand the role of respect in Iraqi culture. While respect in any culture earns trust, disrespect demands a vendetta in Iraq. Fortunately, respect and cultural interest pay tremendous dividends at virtually no cost to the commander except his sincerity and his time. The importance of nonlethal methods such as these caused one commander to comment that operations in Iraq are more "Sun Tzu" than "Clausewitz." Sun Tzu wrote, "Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."³ Thus, commanders use lethal force only when absolutely necessary, and diplomacy and CMO allow commanders to accomplish the higher commander's intent of creating local and regional stability. These methods seek to reduce the insurgent base by removing grievances that fuel

them. Sun Tsu also said, "Fighting guerilla warfare is like trying to *block* the flow of water; it's futile since the water simply redirects its flow."⁴ In constructive engagement, the key is *reducing* the flow of water.

That is not to say CE is easy or without risk. Keeping the attention and loyalty of tribal leaders is a full-time job. Cultural loyalty in many areas of Iraq is dependent on relevance; if the tribal leader cannot provide jobs, water, or protection to the local populace, he will not be followed. Therefore, if coalition forces don't provide tribal leaders with prominence, resources, and



U.S. Army, SSG Kevin P. Bell

Brigadier General John Kern, commander of the 352d Civil Affairs Command, speaks with tribal leaders from all of Iraq at the Civil/Military Coordination Center in Baghdad, Iraq, on 12 May 2003.

respect, the whole tribe may develop anti-coalition tendencies. If tribal leaders cannot control their tribe or attacks in their area, the coalition forces will not provide respect or resources. This “marriage of convenience” often follows an unstated *quid pro quo* format. Indeed, local leaders don’t expect everything, so just listening to complaints or socializing is often enough for small-unit leaders to maintain engagement. Conversely, broken promises, disrespect, and collateral damage are remembered long after CMO projects are completed. Furthermore, bribery does not facilitate meaningful dialogue.

Real-life Application 2

The commander of 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery (4-5 ADA) began a deliberate CE operation that significantly reduced the insurgent base in his battalion’s rural area of operations. This operation followed the premise that the local populace must stop terrorists from endangering their homes and families. The battalion used focused information operations to portray the difference in actions between coalition forces and the enemy in the area. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) developed under that framework as engagement took root.

In 4-5 ADA’s sector, the greatest need was water. If resources permitted, the unit built water purification stations for local villages. This was a powerful card to play as it helped the community and increased the tribe leaders’ status in the rural area south and west of Baghdad International Airport. Medical team visits to villages further bolstered coalition beneficence in the area. These projects were prioritized by security concern and the need to more effectively leverage money against other scarce resources to rebuild Iraqi society. Alternatively, a biweekly trip to the local village with a “water buffalo” (water trailer) got coalition Soldiers talking with the local populace while fulfilling the tribe’s greatest need, building tactical awareness and trust at the grass-roots political level. Indeed, the battalion staff cited their primary intelligence source as Soldier involvement and local leader visits to the battalion civil-military operations center (CMOC) after the engagement operation began.

Battalion targeting meetings included the CMO officer, who has the ability to recommend a cancellation of a lethal mission due to the severity

of second- and third-order effects that can negate months of successful constructive engagement. This unit cited backing up what they say and do as being the most important elements of CE. In addition, by working with local religious and tribal leaders to elicit the local tribe’s needs, coalition forces could affect engagement and reduce the insurgent support base in the AO. The battalion commander also has a strict “no extortion” policy—if local leaders offer less violence in their AO for some gain it must be quickly turned into an opportunity to marginalize the tribe leader for knowing about attacks but failing to prevent them.

The battalion cited word of mouth as the most effective information operations tool they had. Local Iraqis in the battalion sector quickly reported all coalition activities to their tribe members and leaders. When coalition units did something positive for the community, word spread. When coalition Soldiers detained a tribe member, they had to have hard evidence to support it because the tribe leaders visited the CMOC within hours of the detention. Fulfilling promises and judicious use of military force present a balanced “carrot and stick” approach to reducing the insurgent support base. The battalion commander cited two instances of locals failing to support attacks in progress or even being planned due to his CE efforts.

Using another tack, 4-5ADA’s CMO officer told local religious leaders that their peaceful religion, Islam, had been stolen and perverted by zealous fanatics, and that it is up to local religious leaders to take the Islamic faith back and convince Westerners that not all Muslims are violent. Debating religious philosophy is a very powerful engagement tool and requires an in-depth knowledge of the *Qur’an*. As a result of these CE efforts, there was a 60-percent reduction in average daily attacks and a 76-percent reduction in average daily IEDs. In addition, the battalion commander cited incidents of the local populace denying support to insurgent forces.

In summary, the 4-5 ADA commander’s methods for engaging local leaders included—

- Telling them if they helped to get rid of the enemy, the U.S. would help them and they could then begin to rebuild.
- Beginning infrastructure projects that have an immediate effect to show the commander is keeping his word.

- Informing them of any acts that could cause a harsh U.S. reaction and following through if such an act takes place.

- Informing local leaders that if they are not powerful enough to control their area they are of no use to the tribe (the battalion).

- Informing local leaders that if attacks continue, the security environment will not permit the water project (political power is very useful leverage with local leaders).

Methods for engaging the local populace include—

- Enforcing humane treatment of Iraqis by U.S. military personnel during searches and raids.

- Respecting their culture, especially during raids.

- Taking an interpreter during raids and patrols.

- Showing interest and action in making the community better. (Talk is cheap.)

- Knowing the ethnic and tribal background of the sector—engaging tribal and religious (even Wahabbist) leaders.

- Making sure they know that coalition leaders will not be extorted (e.g., local leaders told them, “If you buy this, attacks will decrease”).

- Being prepared to conduct kinetic operations when absolutely necessary.

- Taking a water buffalo to the village and talking to people as they come to use it.

Conclusion

Constructive engagement is the synchronization of diplomatic and military operations at the tactical level. CE includes raid operations, checkpoint establishment, use of news media through public affairs, CMO to rebuild infrastructure, training security forces, and empowering local tribal and religious leaders. It requires lethal and nonlethal targeting and supporting efforts at the operational level of warfare to ensure maximum effects. For example, a hasty neighborhood search to net illegal weapons can do more harm than good by destroying months of relationship-building with the local leaders and inhabitants, and even overwhelming military force cannot destroy all enemies in the battalion sector. As a result of CE, units develop TTP that respect the local populace, guidelines that are imperative when security concerns require searches of tribe members' persons or property. The results of CE also show that spending hundreds of thousands

of dollars in a neighborhood does not guarantee a reduction of enemy activities. There are cases where sheiks have said that they have plenty of money; they only need help with jobs and projects in their neighborhood. Sheiks also have refused a reward for bringing in an anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) element because their honor requires that they turn him in. CE benefits the leader who spends a sufficient amount of time with local leaders on a daily basis learning their customs. Many commanders consider the time spent with local leaders, media operations, and CMOs the most effective way to influence the battle. Constructive engagement has proven effective in reducing the insurgent base in these unit zones and others by applying a proper mix of diplomatic means and military operations consistent with the area of operations, the enemy, and civilian factors.

This study of constructive engagement validates this approach through statistical analysis. Moreover, nonlethal operations proved to be an effective means of significantly reducing the effects and frequency of enemy attacks in a tactical environment. When using CE methods, success is not measured in the number of bullets spent, but rather in time spent with local leaders and dollars spent in stability and security. In this report, 2-12 CAV and 4-5 ADA were emphasized for demonstration purposes, but other units (1-5 Cavalry Division and 91st Engineering Battalion) were also interviewed, and all of their methods were variations of CE in one form or another. There was unanimous agreement that using nonlethal means was the *most effective* method to defeat the enemy. These battalion commanders agreed that civil-military officers, information operations, public affairs officers, psychological operations, and other nonlethal means had more of an effect than conventional military operations in an asymmetric insurgency. **MR**

NOTES

1. The experiences cited in this article took place during the 1st Cavalry Division's first rotation to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom II—elements of the division were also involved in OIF-I—from April 2004 (when the division assumed command and control of Task Force Baghdad) until February 2005 (when the 1st Cav transferred authority for TF Baghdad to the 3d Infantry Division and began to redeploy). The 1st Cavalry Division has since returned to Iraq, assuming authority for Multinational Division Baghdad in November 2006.

2. Thom Shenker and Eric Schmitt, “Army Used Speed and Might, Plus Cash, Against Shiite Rebel,” *The New York Times*, 26 June 2004.

3. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, available at <www.gutenberg.org/etext/132>.

4. Ibid.



Will the Army Ever Learn Good Media Relations Techniques? Walter Reed as a Case Study

Colonel James T. Currie, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired, Ph.D.

The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

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PHOTO: Army MSG Allan Blaydes walks down the second floor hallway of Building 18 of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., 15 March 2007. (AP Photo, Charles Dharapak)

IF YOU EVER wanted a near-perfect case study of how not to deal with the press, the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) controversy would be a great place to start. Of course, the Walter Reed episode also offers lessons in leadership and accountability. Some of those lessons manifest themselves in this article, but the focus here is on the Army's bungled interaction with the news media and on how to avoid a repeat of the nightmarish fiasco.

On Sunday, 18 February 2007, the *Washington Post Magazine*—with a circulation of just over 900,000—carried a major story by Dana Priest and Anne Hull, two of the newspaper's staff reporters. Titled "Soldiers Face Neglect, Frustration At Army's Top Medical Facility," the story ignited a firestorm in the Congress and the Defense Department. The opening paragraph of the story was an eye-catcher: "Behind the door of Army Spec. Jeremy Duncan's room, part of the wall is torn and hangs in the air, weighted down with black mold. When the wounded combat engineer stands in his shower and looks up, he can see the bathtub on the floor above through a rotted hole. The entire building, constructed between the world wars, often smells like greasy carryout. Signs of neglect are everywhere: mouse droppings, belly-up cockroaches, stained carpets, cheap mattresses."¹ Duncan had suffered a broken back in Iraq, lost an ear there, and had been brought to Walter Reed to be treated for his injuries and to recuperate.

The *Post* story went on to describe how the two reporters had spent four months visiting WRAMC, talking with patients and their families, and seeing for themselves the conditions at what they dubbed "the Other Walter Reed."² The reporters had interviewed the WRAMC commander, Army Major General George W. Weightman, and included his comments and explanations as part of the story.³

The story was a nightmare for the Army, and the *Post* reprised it the following day with a lengthy piece about the WRAMC's Mologne House and the Soldiers housed there. A facility originally designed for housing families of Walter Reed patients, Mologne House now accommodates recuperating Soldiers and their families. Although the story describes Mologne House's wingback chairs and fine chandeliers in its first paragraph, the story's emphasis was not on the physical surroundings, but on the bureaucratic intransigence convalescing Soldiers and their families encountered: "Mostly what the Soldiers do together is wait, for appointments, evaluations, signatures,



Building 18 of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, which was used to house recovering wounded soldiers, Washington, D.C., 15 March 2007.

AP Photo, Charles Dharapak

is aware, said Weightman, of complaints from some of the patients at Walter Reed. “From our internal reviews of these perceptions,” he was quoted as saying, “we have been modifying our policies and procedures as necessary to address these perceptions.”⁹ The AP story did not mention conditions in Building 18, apparently because the Army did not know that the conditions there would be part of the *Post* story and therefore

and lost paperwork to be found.” The reporters quoted the wife of one Soldier as saying, “If Iraq don’t kill you, Walter Reed will.”⁴

The Army’s handling of this public relations disaster began before the *Post* even printed the initial story. The *Post* sent a long list of questions to the Army six days before publication of the Priest/Hull article.⁵ According to the Army, none of these questions dealt specifically with the conditions patients experienced at Walter Reed. The questions related solely to the process and paperwork of medical disability claims and how the Army handled them. None of the questions alerted the Army to issues that would be the focus of the *Post*’s story: the condition of the facility in which it housed patients. Colonel Daniel Baggio, the chief of media relations for Army public affairs at the time, noted that, “Building 18 was not even mentioned in the questions from the *Post*.”⁶

The Army took advantage of its receipt of the list of questions from the *Post* to stage what the newspaper’s media critic, Howard Kurtz, labeled a “preemptive news briefing.”⁷ Calling in six rival news organizations, the Army offered them what it knew about the forthcoming *Post* story and the Army’s response to it, asking them not to publish anything—“embargo the story” is the term used in the news business—until the early Sunday edition of the newspaper hit local grocery and convenience stores on Saturday afternoon.⁸

The preemptive briefing succeeded in part. The Associated Press (AP) ran a story on Saturday that cited General Weightman several times. The Army

did not brief the other news organizations on the subject.¹⁰ The AP story did not receive much play, however, because there was not much news in it. Problems with bureaucracies, after all, are nothing new in Washington.

Of the six news organizations the Army alerted, only the *Los Angeles Times* was problematic. On the positive side, the *Times* quoted Weightman acknowledging many of the problems at Walter Reed and noted that he was increasing the number of personnel assigned to care for wounded veterans, a detail the AP story omitted. From the Army’s perspective, this was a good revelation. It demonstrated the first rule in dealing with a negative story: *admit when you have made a mistake and tell the world what you are doing to correct it*.

On the other hand, the *Times* quoted extensively from the *Post* story, giving the *Post*’s effort a presence on the West Coast that might not otherwise have been there. The *Times* also advanced the *Post*’s account by reporting Paul Reickhoff, the head of Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, as saying that he had a “friend who had suffered ‘catastrophic injuries’ in Iraq and was forced to

...the first rule in dealing with a negative story: admit when you have made a mistake and tell the world what you are doing to correct it.

'carry his paperwork through the snow' when he became an outpatient."¹¹ Reickhoff's comments did not appear in the *Post* story, so this new detail added to the Army's public relations problems, rather than reducing them.

To make matters worse, the Army's preemptive briefing spurred the publication of yet more investigative reporting on Walter Reed. One of the newspapers invited to the briefing was the *Army Times*, which declined to attend. Instead, the *Army Times* decided to release its own story on Walter Reed, which it had been working on for several months. According to the *Columbia Journalism Review Daily*, *Army Times* had intended to publish its story several weeks later, but the timing of the Army's briefing caused this Gannett-owned weekly to post its story online immediately, with the print version coming out on Monday, 19 February, doubling the Army's media troubles.¹²

The Army's attempt at media manipulation through the "preemptive news briefing" thus assumed a problematic life of its own. Colonel Baggio insisted, however, that the Army had done nothing wrong in calling in the outside reporters. "I wish I had invited in more of them," he related when asked about the matter.¹³ His take on the episode was that the briefing allowed the Army to get its message out simultaneously with publication of the *Post* story, rather than waiting for the next news cycle. That view is one way of looking at the situation, but sharing the *Post* story with rival news organizations, even with the embargo provision, caused distress in press circles that led to unpleasant ramifications.

Peter Spiegel, who wrote the *Los Angeles Times* story, told Kurtz, author of the *Columbia* story cited above, "It made us feel very uncomfortable that we were being set up to be the Army's public affairs arm."¹⁴ The briefing also drew a negative reaction from the lead reporter on the *Post* story. "How do you think this is going to affect our relationship?" Priest asked an Army public affairs officer. "Do you think I'm going to be willing to give you that much time to respond, if you're going to turn around and tell my competitors?"¹⁵ One can also assume that various editors at the *Post* will now be wary about dealing with Army public affairs officers in the future, as will other journalists. They will think to themselves, "If the Army did this to as powerful a newspaper as

the *Post*, what will they do with me and my story? Maybe I shouldn't give them a preview of it." This, of course, is pure speculation, but it is realistic to assume a normal person would react that way.

So, what should the Army have done when it received at least a partial heads-up from the newspaper, conditions in Building 18 not included? When given such a preview, most organizations would use the time to alert higher-ups as to what was coming, prepare counter-points to the story, and prepare to point out any factual mistakes. Waiting until the publication of the story before calling in other news organizations is not only the right thing to do, but also the pragmatically prudent thing to do. Not engaging in manipulative, preemptive briefings might mean never having to address a story at all. At the very least such forbearance avoids the potential for unintentionally spawning tangent stories that can compound the difficulties.

Three days after the *Post*'s initial story, the news got worse for the Army. On Wednesday, 21 February, the *Post* ran an editorial addressing problems at Walter Reed. Titled "Rotten Homecoming," the editorial skewered the Army for the "bureaucratic contempt and physical squalor that too often await badly injured outpatient Soldiers" at Walter Reed. It also cited Weightman's pledge that "conditions on the post will improve rapidly," calling the Walter Reed commander's response "commendable."¹⁶

I should interject here that, of all the high-level Army officials involved in this story, only Weightman seems to have understood how to deal with the press on a series of negative stories like these. Unfortunately, he became the first designated fall guy for the problems at Walter Reed—even though he had apparently begun to clean up the mess he found when he took over the command in August 2006.¹⁷

The same two reporters who wrote the initial story and its Monday follow-up (Priest and Hull) had another piece in the newspaper that same day. "Top Army officials yesterday visited Building 18..." the reporters wrote. "Army Secretary Francis Harvey and Vice Chief of Staff Richard Cody toured the building and spoke to Soldiers as workers in protective masks stripped mold from the walls and tore up soiled carpets." Weightman was quoted as saying that "all of the staff increases he had requested would be met." Army Secretary Harvey was also quoted on the causes of the problems at Walter Reed: "It's

a failure...in the garrison leadership...that should have never happened, and we are quickly going to rectify that situation.”¹⁸ It was clear that the search for a scapegoat had begun, but at least people at high levels in the Army were beginning to acknowledge that there were problems at WRAMC.

By Thursday, Army Surgeon General Kevin Kiley felt that the situation at Walter Reed was under control. In what was clearly the beginning of his problems in dealing with the public relations disaster, Kiley offered his thoughts at a news conference on the grounds of the medical facility. Referring to the building the *Post* had identified as filled with “mouse droppings, belly-up cockroaches, and stained carpets,” he told assembled reporters, “I do not consider Building 18 to be substandard.” Minimizing the conditions at Walter Reed and ignoring the systemic problems identified in the *Post*’s stories and addressed by his subordinate, Weightman, Kiley reported, “We frankly fixed all of those problems.”¹⁹ In making such statements, Kiley violated another of the key rules in addressing a public relations disaster: *don’t try to deny the obvious*. If high-ranking officials did not see mouse droppings and mold-encrusted walls as a problem at a medical facility, then, the Army is in worse shape than anyone thought.

Kiley then offered a theme of detachment that proved all too revealing and eventually led to his downfall. In doing so, he provided another example of how not to address real problems. Referring to the *Post*’s stories as “one-sided representation,”



Army Surgeon General Kevin Kiley speaks to the press during a news conference at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center complex in Washington, D.C., 22 February 2007.

AP Photo, Manuel Balce Ceneta

he defended the conditions in Building 18, saying, “This is not a horrific, catastrophic failure at Walter Reed.”²⁰ The “one-sided representation” comment is what stands out. One wonders what he thought the other side of the story was. Was he thinking it would excuse the situation if some rooms in the building did not have mold, or rodents, or dead cockroaches? This theme would surface again.

The Walter Reed episode clearly damaged the Army’s credibility. The best approach would have been for Army leaders to understand and accept the reality that WRAMC had issues with its physical plant, with the conditions in which some recuperating Soldiers and Marines were living, and with DOD bureaucratic procedures for designating levels of disability. The *Post*’s accounts never made clear, however, that the Army’s medical department was not responsible for these bureaucratic inconveniences. Had the principals involved responded more deliberately, addressing such inaccuracies would have ameliorated the cumulative impact. Instead, their defiance born of dismissive arrogance prevented constructive engagement of the problems themselves. Kiley evinced an attitude that the story was the problem, not the conditions at WRAMC.

On 1 March, the *Post* reported that the Army had “relieved of duty several low-ranking Soldiers who managed outpatients”—presumably shortly after the initial story had come out. But there was no leadership *mea culpa* from the Army’s medical

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don’t try to deny the obvious.**

department.²¹ That same day, the higher-level scapegoating began. Weightman was removed as WRAMC commander. However, his firing again compounded the Army's problems because his replacement, Kiley, had been in charge at Walter Reed before becoming Surgeon General in 2004.²²

The *Post's* story pointed out that Weightman had only been in command at Walter Reed since August 2006 and had attempted to correct some of the deficiencies he found there. The *Post* noted that Kiley's appointment "surprised some Defense Department officials because Soldiers, their families, and veterans' advocates have complained that he had long been aware of problems at Walter Reed and did nothing to improve its outpatient care." In an ominous portent, the *Post* report also observed that Defense Secretary Robert Gates "was not involved in the appointment of Kiley."²³

By the next day, Army Secretary Harvey was also gone, presumably because of his role in naming Kiley as interim commander at Walter Reed. Secretary Gates was quoted as saying, "The problems at Walter Reed appear to be problems of leadership." Gates seems to have understood intuitively that heaping all of the blame on Weightman, while placing Kiley back in charge of Walter Reed, was simply not going to wash.

Kiley, meanwhile, continued to dig in with greater defiance. "I want to defend myself," he said. "It was... yellow journalism at its worst..."²⁴ Almost immediately, Kiley was replaced at Walter Reed by Major General Eric B. Schoomaker, younger brother of the Army's Chief of Staff.²⁵ However, the damage had been done. The Army had already lost a major general and a service secretary, plus various lower-ranking Soldiers, and the bleeding still had not been stopped.

Secretary Harvey violated a key principle of leadership: *find out who is actually responsible before you start firing people*. Taking action for its own sake is rarely appropriate, although it seems common enough in Washington. As Secretary of the Army, Harvey should have been more deliberate, realizing that the problems at WRAMC had to have developed over a period of years. Kiley had recently served an entire tour of stewardship, and there had not been enough time since then for those conditions to fester out of nothing.

At this point in the story, two things stand out clearly: Secretary of Defense Gates "got it"; he

understood the problems, and much of the Army's leadership did not. For example, the same day that he fired Harvey, Gates was quoted as saying, "I am disappointed that some in the Army have not adequately appreciated the seriousness of the situation pertaining to outpatient care at Walter Reed. Some have shown too much defensiveness and have not shown enough focus on digging into and addressing the problems."²⁶

Long before matters had reached this point, however, President Bush's office weighed in. He was "deeply concerned," said Press Secretary Tony Snow. Members of Congress also expressed concern. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi asked the Armed Services Committee to investigate the matter and several presidential contenders decried conditions at the facility.²⁷ But some folks in the Army—or recently part of the Army—still didn't seem to understand.

As if he were not listening and had not heard the statements of concern from the country's political leaders, former Secretary Harvey—perhaps understandably, given his fate—continued to place the blame on the news media, and not on those running Walter Reed or on himself for his poor choice of Weightman's successor. The *Post's* stories lacked balance, said Harvey. He then mirrored Kiley's fateful and incomprehensible detachment by asking, "Where's the other side of the story?"²⁸

At a hearing before a congressional committee, Kiley issued a convoluted admission of responsibility of sorts: "I'm trying not to say that I'm not accountable," said the Surgeon General. Then a reporter asked him how he could have failed to know about problems that existed directly across the street from his quarters. In one of those four-second sound bites that so often become the emblematic video clips that make the evening news, Kiley's ironic detachment sealed his fate. "I don't do barracks inspections at Walter Reed," said the general.²⁹ While there might

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DOD: Helene C. Stikkel

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Edmund Giambastiani tour Walter Reed Army Medical Center, 23 February 2007. The two leaders held a press conference following their meeting with some wounded troops being treated at the center.

have been some hope for Kiley's survival before that moment, those eight words—featured with his photo on the front page of the next day's *Post*—signaled his demise. He uttered the words on Monday, 5 March 2007, and handicappers were betting that he would not last a week. They were right. On Monday, 13 March, Kiley announced he was retiring, having submitted his request to do so to acting Army Secretary Pete Geren the previous day.³⁰

According to the *Post*, Geren, a former Democratic Congressman from Texas, “had sought Kiley's removal in recent days.”³¹ Major General Gale S. Pollock, Kiley's deputy, was quickly named interim Surgeon General. Unfortunately, she, too, immediately had her problems with the press.³²

At no time over the several weeks that this debacle took place did anyone representing the Army ever point out a factual error in the reporting. There were accusations of exaggeration, but never any concrete examples demonstrating that any reporter had written anything misleading or inaccurate—for instance, the fact that the byzantine

bureaucracy has nothing to do with Army medicine. The profound inference that emerges from this and other aspects of the debacle is that the Army must be doing a terrible job of preparing its general officers to work with the press.

The “press-as-enemy” syndrome, so common during and after Vietnam, is still alive and well among general officers in today's Army. This is true despite the fact that not one of them served while the Vietnam War was going on.³³ This inherited fear of the press betrays an untoward fear of transparency. One wonders if it stems from a corrosive lack of confidence in the rightness of one's aims and the

The “press-as-enemy” syndrome, so common during and after Vietnam, is still alive and well among general officers in today's Army.

strength of one's abilities. It certainly reveals a skewed attitude toward public service. Following are some lessons Army leadership can take away from this fiasco.

- *When confronted with allegations of malfeasance, misconduct, or just plain negligence, admit them if they are true.* How many times in your Army career have you responded to a personal failure by offering a lame explanation or excuse to a superior? Not many, I'd bet. I realize it's a bit simplistic, but a more sophisticated version of the old, "Yes, sir," "No, sir," and "No excuse, sir" should still be the basis of your answers. Offer the mitigating circumstances if there are any, but then explain what you are doing to correct the problem. In this case, there really was no excuse for mouse droppings and dead cockroaches in rooms where our wounded were recuperating.

- *Do not blame the messenger.* Claiming "yellow journalism" or lamenting that the press never writes about the good will never suffice. There have been plenty of stories, for example, about how good the care is at Walter Reed, and Bethesda, and the Brooke Army Medical Center (San Antonio) burn facility.³⁴ It is the job of the fourth estate to report on the foibles and the follies of government officials.

- *Realize that reporters are human, too.* If you double-deal them, they will resent it and you. Trying to scoop them by alerting their rivals ahead of publication is not acceptable.³⁵ The karmic blowback from such tricks can be bracing. These reporters will not be apt to forget or forgive, and the next time you go to them with a request, they are probably going to respond immoderately and question your lineage.

- *It really doesn't matter if you don't like the press.* The Constitution you swore to defend protects them; they are going to do their jobs; and your career—as some of our Army officials have learned to their dismay—may depend upon how you interact with them. You don't have to like them, but you need to learn to work with them in a reasonable, civilized fashion.

- *Cultivate the reporters who cover your area of responsibility.* If they know you personally, they are much less likely to write something without getting a full and fair understanding. Such familiarity could well persuade them that there is no story.

- *Remember that in most situations you only need to survive one day's news cycle.* Unless your

fiasco is truly monumental—and WRAMC was in that category, as few others are—you will be bumped from the front page by someone else's. Walter Reed was eventually bounced from the front pages by stories about Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez and the fired federal prosecutors, but its aftermath remains highly visible. Of course, you can, if you wish, keep the coverage going by attacking or trying to manipulate the press.

In the final analysis, if senior leaders can see what went wrong in the Army's handling of this abysmal series of revelations, and then draw the right conclusions, perhaps some good will have come out of this episode, painful as it was. For example, will Army officers continue to whine about press coverage, or will we realize that the press is always going to be there, doing a necessary job for a free republic? It has a right to be there, and the sooner we embrace it, the better off we will be. We have to accept that having the press watching what we do and reporting on it will make us more accountable to our citizens and to Soldiers under our stewardship. Failing to accept that fact is the zenith of hypocrisy.

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The upshot of this entire mess is that it was, indeed, a mess, and the Army is now doing what it should have done years ago: cleaning up. Would the Army have done so without the press revelations? Would commanders support the Army Wounded Warrior program with garrison budgets the way they do now had the WRAMC situation not surfaced? One would hope so, but the *Post's* stories certainly accelerated the process. Former DOD Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Torie Clarke wrote a book on this subject titled *Lipstick on a Pig*.³⁶ If what you have is swinishly dirty, as Clarke says, putting a shine on it will not fool anyone in an open society. Even states without a free press don't always get away with that. **MR**

NOTES

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3. Ibid., A03.
4. Anne Hull and Dana Priest, "The Hotel Aftermath," *The Washington Post*, 19 February 2007, A01.
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8. Telephonic interview, James T. Currie with COL Daniel Baggio, Chief of Media Relations, Army Public Affairs Office, 28 March 2007.
9. The Associated Press, "Head of Army's Walter Reed hospital acknowledges outpatient complaints," 17 February 2007.
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13. Telephonic interview, James T. Currie with COL Daniel Baggio, Chief of Media Relations, Army Public Affairs Office, 28 March 2007.
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16. "Rotten Homecoming: This is no way to treat a veteran," *The Washington Post*, 21 February 2007, A14.
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19. Dana Milbank, "Painting Over the Problems at Walter Reed's Building 18," *The Washington Post*, 23 February 2007, A02.
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24. Thomas E. Ricks and Ann Scott Tyson, "Defense Secretary Sends Stern message About Accountability," *The Washington Post*, 3 March 2007, A08.
25. Ibid.
26. Michael Abramowitz and Steve Vogel, "Army Secretary Ousted," *The Washington Post*, 3 March 2007, A01.
27. Dana Priest and Anne Hull, "Swift Action Promised at Walter Reed," *The Washington Post*, 21 February 2007, A08.
28. Ibid.
29. Dana Milbank, "Two Generals Provide A Contrast in Accountability," *The Washington Post*, 6 March 2007, A01.
30. Josh White, "Surgeon General of Army Steps Down," *The Washington Post*, 13 March 2007, A01.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Said General William Tecumseh Sherman: "I regard all these newspaper harpies as spies and think they could be punished as such." James M. Perry, *A Bohemian Brigade: The Civil War Correspondents, Mostly Rough, Sometimes Ready* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000), 176.
34. I found the following stories, for example, with just a few minutes of effort with Google and a troll through *The Washington Post* archives: "A Resource Too Valuable to Close," *The Washington Post* Editorial, 14 June 2005, A20; Aci Connolly, "U.S. Combat Fatality Rate Lowest Ever," *The Washington Post*, 9 December 2004, A24; "Taking Care of Our Own" *The Washington Post* Editorial, 13 October 2004, A20; Steve Vogel, "Wartime's Lifesaving Technological Advances Given Their Due," *The Washington Post*, 20 November 2003, T05; Stephen Barr, "On Memorial Day, a 12-Hour Shift and an Extra Dose of Respect," *The Washington Post*, 26 May 2003, B02; Clarence Williams and Martin Weil, "Wounded Servicemen at Area Hospitals," *The Washington Post*, 29 March 2003, A28; "Center for Amputees Opens," *The Washington Post*, 30 January 2007, A09; National Public Radio, 15 March 2007, "Army Burn Center Sees Some of the Worst War Wounds"; Associated Press, 9 March 2007, "Brooke Army Medical Center Addresses Soldier Care."
35. Howard Kurtz does relate a similar occurrence involving a 2006 exchange among the Treasury Department, the *New York Times*, and the *Wall Street Journal*. See, Kurtz, "The Army's Preemptive News Briefing," *The Washington Post*, 24 February 2007, C1.
36. Torie Clark, *Lipstick on a Pig* (New York: Free Press, 2006).

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






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Through an ARAB Cultural Lens

Helen Altman Klein, Ph.D., and Gilbert Kuperman

RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL Robert H. Scales has described how in today's world, military victory "will be defined more in terms of capturing the psych-cultural rather than the geographical high ground."¹ It is in this spirit that we look at the Arab Middle East.

U.S. military and civilian personnel are increasingly sensitive to customs, social organization, leadership, and religion as aspects of Arab culture. It is clear that, with international events as they are, America and its allies need to appreciate how Arabs think. When we misunderstand the Arab perspective and fail to see events through Arab eyes, we can make costly mistakes. To this end, the U.S. Air Force commissioned a study of the Arab mind to identify key differences between Arab and Western thinking.² Study members reviewed research literature, religious texts, and even business and travel guides. The United Nation's report on Arab culture proved particularly valuable.³ The group conducted in-depth interviews with 16 Arabs from Egypt, Israel's West Bank, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and with 6 Westerners with extensive experience in dealing with Arabs from Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Based on their research, the study group identified differences that can fuel misunderstanding and hostility during Arab-Western interactions. Knowing these differences will help us cultivate an appreciation for Arab thinking and improve negotiation, coordination, and planning with Arab nations.⁴

Several caveats should be noted. In every region, some people are bound to be atypical, so we can't expect every Middle Easterner to show the features we describe below, particularly those who have interacted extensively with Westerners or the Internet. Further, the region is not culturally homogeneous, so thinking patterns may vary somewhat across and even within nations. This article is really just a starting point for observing and learning about the way Arabs think. It should sensitize readers to features they might otherwise not notice.

We found that Arabs and Westerners define their roles in society in very different ways. This is particularly true in regard to personal identity, social behavior, and the manner in which they reason.

Personal Identity

Three perspectives that demonstrate contrasting ways of viewing personal identity are pertinent to this study: independent versus interdependent, honor and the concept of self, and fatalism versus mastery.

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Independent versus interdependent. Westerners typically believe that they have unique traits and values, and so we attend to our own needs and interest.⁵ In contrast, Arabs value interdependence and collectivism, identifying themselves in relation to their family and tribe rather than to individual traits and experiences.⁶ These connections offer the social support that secular institutions and government provide in the West. The people we interviewed noted, “Retirement villages were unheard of in the Arab world where families take care of the elderly and infirm.” Another interviewee captured this sense of community: “AAA [American Automobile Association] would go out of business in the Middle East. If your car dies, people stop and help you fix it.” Interdependence provides social support and nurture. Arabs are often repelled by the sense of isolation and lack of caring they perceive in Westerners.

The downside of interdependence is that it can make people reluctant to show initiative; it can constrain the flow of ideas and stifle debate. Arabs, and indeed any interdependent people, may not strive for new discoveries and knowledge because their group identity is more important to them than technological growth.⁷ Raphael Patai, a noted ethnographer and anthropologist, speculated that the weakness of the Arab military stems from stifled thinking rather than from a lack of courage or intelligence.⁸ When we Westerners interact with Arabs, we should remember that families and tribes factor into every decision. If we believe we are just dealing with an individual, we will not appreciate the dynamics and power of the social network surrounding decision making and leadership.

Honor and the concept of self. A sense of honor permeates Arab self-concept and motivation.⁹ A man’s honor reflects on his kin and is a measure of his worth. For example, one man we interviewed explained how his friend wanted to marry a neighbor but his family persuaded him to marry his cousin instead. Marrying kin is more important than

personal choice. In the Arab mind, such a marriage brings harmony and protects property, power, and honor. Similarly, another interviewee explained that a person who disgraces his family might be excluded from the family or even killed. Honor can compel families to protect kin at great cost and to retaliate for harm inflicted.¹⁰

Honor drives many life choices. An interviewee told us, “When I came to the United States to study it is [sic] a source of pride for my family.” Another reported, “My sister married a high status man. This brings honor to my family.” A third said, “What kind of car I drive and how big my house [sic] are all important. They make my family higher.” Providing hospitality, either to benign strangers or potential adversaries, brings honor, as well. Influential Arabs consider manual labor shameful; thus, Westerners lose respect when they engage in physical work.¹¹

Because honor is critical for high self-esteem, disapproval can be excruciating. People compromise or endure harm to conceal errors.¹² A Western contractor explained, “We needed employees to clean a building. I described the requirements and they said, ‘Yes, we understand.’ But when I checked, they hadn’t done it because they didn’t understand. They’ll say ‘Yes’ because it’s dishonorable to admit limitations.” Arabs avoid directly criticizing each other and may postpone decisions to save face for those involved.¹³ They can harbor anger at constructive criticism, which they see as insulting and demeaning. Westerners may interpret this anger as an inability to learn from others and see postponement as indecisiveness or incompetence. To be more effective, Westerners should offer indirect feedback and respect face-saving gestures.

Fatalism versus mastery. In the Middle East, planning discussions are regularly punctuated by *Inshallah*—“if Allah wills it.” The status of a person’s health, wealth, and safety are believed to be inevitable.¹⁴ Arabs tend to invoke luck and conspiracy theories instead of expecting human actions to make a difference. Interviewees reported, “We don’t plan ahead,” “We only act when a catastrophe happens,” and “If it’s going to come, then it will come.” While educated Arabs show less fatalism, they are still typically more fatalistic than Westerners.¹⁵ Westerners generally believe that they can master most barriers with adequate resources and hard work.¹⁶

Arabs are often repelled by the sense of isolation and lack of caring they perceive in Westerners.

One implication of fatalism is a disdain for detailed planning. To the Arab mind, planning implies a lack of trust in the divine; thus, their planning may not encompass the time and resources needed to get a job done. Many Arabs were inclined to doubt that the 9/11 attacks were the handiwork of Arabs because the acts were so precisely executed. Fatalistic people may act with incomplete information, believing that things will work out if they are destined to. One Arab interviewee reported, “We say ‘I’ll do my best, and the rest is in God’s hands.’” Arabs may see agreements as hopes, not realities; they often view life as too unpredictable for long-term planning. Because Westerners expect others to live up to agreements, they may see this view as shortsighted or lazy. Arabs may consider Westerners arrogant or stupid when they work to change things that supposedly are beyond their control.

Social Behavior

Differences in social behavior are relevant to this discussion as well. They include focusing on achievements versus relationships, concepts of time, and power-distance relationships.

Achievement versus relationship. Westerners tend to be achievement-oriented while Arabs focus more on relationships and social connections. Arabs try to avoid doing business with strangers.¹⁷ Because developing relationships is more important to them than the pressure of deadlines, they are disturbed when Westerners disregard relationships to save time. An American interviewee explained, “You can’t say ‘we’ve got to resettle the displaced persons; that’s the task, now how are we going to do it?’ You have to let people get to know the others—their roles and power status. Once you’ve established relationships, they can work on the problem.” Decisiveness, a virtue in the West, may seem rude to Arabs. For them, a decision’s value increases with the time spent making it, so the pace is slow. Arabs cultivate long-term relationships that lead to reciprocal concessions. One interviewee told us, “Because relationships are important, we will pay a higher price at a friend’s business. My uncle had a taxi office that all his friends go to. If all the taxis are out, they will walk or take a bus rather than call another taxi service. A Westerner might take another taxi, but not my uncle’s friends!” Decisions are personal as well as pragmatic.

Decisiveness, a virtue in the West, may seem rude to Arabs...a decision’s value increases with the time spent making it...

Westerners typically work to reach goals and define themselves by their accomplishments.¹⁸ The Arab emphasis on relationships can be frustrating. We may see it as wasteful and unprofessional to depend on “old boy” networks rather than on competence and outcome. Arabs view Westerners as impersonal and disrespectful. Many Arabs told the study group that “All [Westerners] care about is the work,” and “they don’t care about us as people.” This can cause ill will during collaborations. If we want cooperation with Arabs, we need to acknowledge relationships as we also work to accomplish goals.

The concept of time. Westerners typically view time as a tangible, valuable commodity that should be preserved or “spent” wisely.¹⁹ We emphasize schedules, deadlines, and promptness.²⁰ In contrast, Arabs view time as fluid, schedules as flexible, and multi-tasking as comfortable.²¹ Time is about arranging relationships, not crossing items off lists. Arab interviewees explained, “People get busy, and then something comes up and they drop what they’re doing and go onto whatever came up”; and “A lunch could easily stretch into 3-4 hours.” For Arabs, work and personal time are blurred.²² A Western interviewee explained his interaction with an Arab friend: “When we had meetings I’d show up to his office. He’d be in a meeting and he’d come out and greet me.” Others said that “Someone would show up late and say ‘Oh, I met this person and we chatted’”; and “If their phone rang in a meeting, they’d pick it up and start talking.”

While Westerners may consider such behavior unprofessional and disrespectful, Arabs see schedules

Time is about arranging relationships, not crossing items off lists.

and agendas as hostile and counterproductive. Phrases such as *time is money* and *don't waste time* are used to ridicule Westerners. The Arabs' flexible approach to time values interpersonal obligations over the tyranny of the appointment book or PDA. In short, each side may see the other as rude.

Power distance. People differ in the extent to which they accept and expect uneven distribution of power.²³ Westerners are more egalitarian in their social and work practices. Leadership is generally based on merit, and leaders often consider the input of subordinates. In contrast, groups in Arab culture observe high power distance: they accept inequality between subordinates and superiors; those in power make decisions, with intermediaries facilitating and implementing. This saves face if a request or idea is rejected. Westerners often confuse these functionaries with the actual leader. High power distance speeds decision making. When coordination fails, however, intermediaries may be reluctant to act and progress can stop.

In the Middle East, power generally comes from family and tribal membership, and it increases with education, professional attainment, and age. Our research uncovered a variation on power distance described as "first among equals."²⁴ Here, in a way that is familiar to Westerners, power in politics, commerce, and the military comes from personal strength. People jockey for power through strategic manipulation—voice tone, body language, and shows of generosity. As one interviewee described the dynamics of generosity: "It brings you status to pick up the check. It shows that you have power. But you must do it with great humbleness. Otherwise, the others might reject you."

Powerful people assume privileges, but also responsibility for subordinates. Because leaders must provide services to maintain their position, leadership is unstable. A second-in-command does not necessarily replace the leader. Westerners can be surprised when alliances, formed for mutual interests, disappear as interests and power change. During joint operations, Arabs watch how Western leaders assert power or defer to others before they decide who is strong and worthy of respect.

Forms of Reasoning

Three relevant ways of examining forms of reasoning are important to understanding cognitive differences between Arab and Western cultures: direct versus

contextual language, analytic versus holistic thinking, and concrete versus hypothetical reasoning.

Direct versus contextual language. Westerners equate accurate, direct communication with honesty. People are expected to say what they mean. In the Middle East, meaning and intent are judged by the speaker's words, but also by status and non-verbal cues such as tone, gesture, and circumstance. An interviewee reported, "Rumors become truth without having to be confirmed if they come from someone that is trusted and respected—in a position of authority." Arabs sometimes use exaggeration to voice emotional reactions. One Arab interviewee explained, "If an Arab says, 'My uncle has a dog that is as big as a donkey,' what he means is that his uncle has a big dog. If he says 'The Palestinians have no food to eat and no water to drink,' he means that there is some poverty in the community. People understand and don't see it as a lie." Westerners can hear exaggerations as lies because they tend to take words more literally.

Arabs can hear public directness as rude and threatening to their honor and social cohesiveness.²⁵ For example, several Arab TV producers were working on an Arab-language version of *The Apprentice*.²⁶ They decided to replace the show's hallmark phrase of humiliation "You're fired!" with a more characteristic Arabic phrase roughly translated as "May Allah be kind to you." Arab viewers, who expect respectful subtlety and indirectness, would understand this to mean "You're fired." When Westerners ignore context, they misread meaning; when they speak or respond directly, they can create embarrassment and anger.

Westerners and Arabs also differ in how closely they expect words and actions to correspond.²⁷ For an Arab, an enthusiastic statement of intention may serve as a symbolic substitution for action. A desired goal may be stated as an accomplishment. Because it is impolite to directly deny a request, a person might

When Westerners ignore context, they misread meaning; when they speak or respond directly, they can create embarrassment and anger.

say “Inshallah” instead of “No.” One interviewee explained, “If you mean ‘no,’ you wouldn’t exactly say it. There are nice ways to say ‘no.’ You soften it by not being completely honest.” Showing respect and saving face are valued over accuracy. Unfortunately, Westerners who are insensitive to the nuanced ways of the Middle East often assume Arabs are dishonest when they renege on agreements.

Analytic versus holistic thinking. Westerners, typically analytic, use Aristotelian logic to categorize attributes of objects, people, or events.²⁸ We connect causes to specific attributes. Arabs, typically holistic, also attribute cause to attributes, but they consider other features of the situation, such as personal relationships, too.²⁹ Arabs are more sensitive to secondary variables and relationships than are Westerners.

Arabs are troubled when Westerners limit consideration to specific attributes. They think we are naïve when we ignore wider issues such as the emotions and dynamics of the situation. Westerners, on the other hand, report frustration when Arabs bring up seemingly extraneous details. For example, an American interviewee who works with international students in the United States complained, “When Arab students are doing poorly, they often explain the complexities that make it impossible to improve—a bad landlord, trouble back home, a nagging cold. They just don’t look for the problem and try to solve it. They’re looking for excuses!” Military personnel also report frustration with the myriad of seemingly irrelevant details that Arabs deem important. Westerners focus narrowly on the problem. When Arabs define a problem broadly, they seek more complex solutions. Solutions deemed appropriate by analytic Westerners appear shortsighted and insufficient to Arabs; those proposed by Arabs may seem poorly focused and unjustified to Westerners. These differences can derail negotiations and strain collaborations.

Concrete versus hypothetical reasoning. Arabs rely on concrete reasoning; they tend to base planning and decision making on past experience. In contrast, Westerners reason hypothetically, using mental simulations to generate plans, envision outcomes, and sharpen details. Western childrearing practices cultivate hypothetical reasoning, while Arab practices stress memorization, instilling respect for content knowledge. For Arabs, hypothetical reasoning is neither expected nor rewarded.³⁰

Solutions deemed appropriate by analytic Westerners appear shortsighted and insufficient to Arabs;... These differences can derail negotiations...

Our interviews provided unexpected evidence about differences in reasoning. After eliciting information about an incident, we routinely asked how hypothetical changes to the incident might have played out. For example, when Arab interviewees described a planning session, we asked what would have happened if they had suggested a different approach. Typical answers were, “I didn’t,” “They had a good approach,” and, “It wasn’t my place to make suggestions.” If the interviewee reported an incident of hypothetical reasoning in a U.S. classroom, we might ask, What would have happened if this had occurred at home? A typical response was, “It wouldn’t ever happen there. We repeated and rephrased these “what if” questions to no avail. Interviewees didn’t understand the questions.

Faced with challenges, Westerners often speculate about possible consequences of potential actions. Arabs typically borrow from similar past cases and wonder why Westerners want to reinvent the wheel. Arabs may misunderstand speculation as reality, creating fear and consternation. They reason with precision while Westerners are more flexible (but often at the expense of precision). Thus, multinational planning can leave both sides dissatisfied.

Implications and Conclusions

Combined military and peacekeeping operations can bring legitimacy and attract international support; however, Westerners in the Arab Middle East face many cultural differences:

- Arabs make decisions as members of families and tribes and place a high value on honor.
- Fatalism can threaten collaborations: in cases where Westerners are confident about the possibility of change, Arabs may see the limitations of human power.
- Arabs see relationship building as a prerequisite for joint action and take time to cultivate relationships.

- Differences in power distance can create conflict and confusion.
- Arabs use and respect nonverbal information while Westerners stress direct communication.
- When analytic and holistic thinkers define problems differently, they generate different types of plans. Because accurate prediction and anticipation are prerequisites for effective coordination, we need to appreciate how Arabs think.
- Hypothetical and concrete reasoning lead to different courses of action.

The bottom line is that Westerners who dismiss the actions of Arabs as inappropriate, dishonest, or childish appear arrogant and disrespectful. When Westerners fail to accommodate cultural differences, cooperation and effectiveness suffer.

To date, the cultural training provided by the military has emphasized the customs and behaviors needed to create positive impressions, build relationships, and avoid giving offense. These skills are necessary but not sufficient. Military personnel also need an appreciation of the self-concept, social, and cognitive differences that plague collaboration and war combat operations. Westerners must be able to decode, anticipate, and accommodate the words and actions of Arab counterparts and opponents. One way to provide needed familiarization and sensitization is through interactive computer or Web-based simulations that help Westerners take the Arab perspective. Scenarios can provide guided experience for cross-national collaboration, negotiation, and accommodation. Such training holds promise for preparing military personnel for multinational settings, not least because it can allow mistakes without negative consequences.³¹

The countries of the Arab Middle East will remain important to the West for the foreseeable future, whether as allies or adversaries. The Western-Arab differences presented here can hamper

exchanges. Describing differences is a first step towards capturing the psych-cultural high ground. Training must go beyond rules and procedures so that military personnel can see events through an Arab cultural lens. As U.S. personnel gain fluency in reading intent and predicting reactions, we can expect improved communication, prediction, teamwork, and ultimately effectiveness. **MR**

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One way to provide needed familiarization and sensitization is through interactive computer or Web-based simulations that help Westerners take the Arab perspective.



Islam and Symbolism

First Sergeant António Rodrigues, Portuguese Army

ISLAMIC CULTURE is resplendent with symbols containing historical, religious, and mystical elements. Persons working in the Middle East are advised to become familiar with them.

Symbols resonate throughout Islamic cultures, from high art and literature to popular culture. They can be found everywhere in everyday social life. It is fair to say that an understanding of Islamic culture is incomplete without an appreciation for the rich panoply of symbols that tie ancient history and tradition to modern cultures and societies that have embraced or largely embraced Islam.

Islamic symbols come from diverse sources. Most share a common nexus with the life and mission of the Prophet Mohammed and the genesis of Islam, but others are legacies of ancient sources that date from before the emergence of Islam.

Angels

Among the more purely religious symbols are heavenly messengers or angels (*al-‘ilm al-malaika*) associated with the Prophet Mohammed’s life and mission. Angels are staples of Islamic literature and artistic expression. Especially prominent are the guardian angels—Jibrail (Gabriel, the angel of life), Mika’il (the angel of rain and nature), Israfil (who will blow the trumpet on Judgment Day), ‘Isra’il, ‘Azrail, or ‘Ozrin (the angel who announces death, cited only once in the Qur’an, and a rival of Gabriel).

Other religious and mystical characters associated with Mohammed, his followers (*al-muhagirun*), and the covered figure of Mohammed himself (Muslims refuse to give a face to the Prophet) have great symbolic importance. Muslims use such symbols with care to avoid offending religious authorities and popular sentiment.

Geometric Figures

Geometric figures and calligraphy taken from Islamic sacred texts have become mainstays of Islamic art. They substitute for human figures, which Islamic religious teachings believe encourage idolatry. Fortuitously, Arabic script lends itself to incorporation into physical art. Certain numerals and passages from the Qur’an have acquired special significance through repetitive use as decoration. Especially prominent are the following scripts:

- The “ninety-nine sublime attributes and beautiful names of God” (*Al-Asma Allah al-Husna*).
- The affirmation of the Muslim faith (*ash-shahada*): “*La ilah illallah Muhammad-ur Rasulul Allah*”—“There is no God but God and Mohammed is his messenger.”

Editor’s Note: This article was originally published in the Portuguese Army magazine Jornal do Exército, in November 2006. Changes were made to the original document during translation.

- The summary of the Muslim faith: “*Bismillah Ar-Rahman Ar-Rahim*”—“In the name of God, the Charitable, the Merciful.”

Nature


In large measure because of exhortations in the Qur'an, many prominent symbols come from nature. An evocative poetic verse exemplifies this: “If you wish to see the glory of God, contemplate a red rose.” So, too, does an exalted Muslim proverb: “*Allah jamil yhibu al-jamal*”—“God is beautiful, and He loves beauty.” Such natural phenomena as light, water, plants, animals, and heavenly bodies are popular symbols in Islamic imagery. Some of the more noteworthy of these symbols are discussed below.

Light. A symbol of the Islamic faith's splendor, light (*an-nur*; *ad-dau'*) appears numerous times in the Qur'an as a metaphor for the revelation that gave the world Islam and that continues to “enlighten” believers. Muslim architectural stratagems empha-

size luminosity in sacred buildings and mosques. Builders have used a plentitude of arches (*rauq*), arcades (*riuqs*), and ornamental stalactite-like prisms under domes and on prominent surfaces (*muqarna*) to reflect and refract light. Tiles and mirrors amplify this effect.

Water. Water is a significant symbol with multiple meanings, most of them derived from the experiences and traditions of the Arab peoples of the desert. Not unexpectedly, they highlight its scarcity and its importance for sustaining life. The Qur'an and lifetime accounts of the Prophet Mohammed state that everyone has the right to use water as long as they do not monopolize, usurp, or waste it. The extravagant use of water, either privately or publicly, is prohibited, even if water is abundant.

Water represents fertility, creation, and growth in various contexts of life and is depicted in many forms, for example, as *an-nufta ma*, “a drop of water”; *ma hlu*, “fresh water”; *ma alah*, “salt water”; and *ma samat*, “insipid water.” Water also has



“Dome of the Rock” on the Temple Mount.



People washing before prayer at the Badshahi Mosque in Lahore, Pakistan.

acquired the socio-religious meaning or function of purifier and curative.

In mosques, water represents purification during the passage from the profane to the sacred and from the real world to the transcendent world. In an open patio (*sahn*) in front of the worship space (*haram*), there is always a source of running water (*sabil*), such as a tank or a pool (*al-bi'r*), for obligatory ritual washings. There, the faithful wash their faces, hands, forearms, and feet.

Water in its pure state is crucial to life. ("God created all living things from water," Qur'an, XXIV, 45). Thus, Muslims use water in many social practices, such as decoration, renovation, and hygienic rituals. The journey (*sa'y*) by foot between the two columns, al-Safa and al-Marwah, in Mecca during the pilgrimage (*hajj*) is associated with water. Water is a constant motif in Islamic architecture and construction, too, where a "profound enthusiasm for novel creations" is likened to "thirst."

Water also can have sexual connotations. It is sometimes used as a metaphor for semen (*al-ma*).

Gardens. With decorative flowers, trees styled into columns, and streams and springs, the garden (*riyadh*) symbolizes *firdaus*, or paradise, the supreme garden. For many Muslims, the garden is an authentic ethereal utopia, a mathematically harmonious ensemble illuminated by the sun with

fresh, pure water trickling in rose-colored streams and the muezzin singing alliterative verses from the Qur'an in the background.

The rainbow. As a symbol of spring and rebirth, the rainbow represents the union of human and cosmological dualisms: masculine-feminine, earth-sky, fire-water, hot-cold, matter-light. In the Maghrib (Northern Africa), the rainbow is known as the "wife of rain" (*al-'arussat ash-shta*) or the "arc of the prophet" (*al-qaus an-nabi*). An ancient Arabic legend appreciates it as the "belt of Fatima, the resplendent" (606–632 A.D.), the fourth daughter of Mohammed.

The Earth. The Qur'an alludes to the Earth (*al-ardh*, *ad-dunia* or *al-kura ardhiya*), the terrestrial globe, as an offering God granted to humanity so that humankind could enjoy its beauty and find sustenance and comfort on it. The Qur'an is lavish in verses about the stages that preceded Earth's creation, how the Earth should be taken care of, its vital importance for all living beings, and its variety of divine creations and cycles of life: the mountains, seas, and oceans; the clouds, rain, lightning, and thunderstorms; the atmosphere; the rivers; earthquakes, floods, storms, and other cataclysms.

Trees. Trees are extraordinarily potent symbols in Middle Eastern culture. The tree (*ash-shajra*), the "Tree of the World" (*ash-shajarat al-kawn*),

and the “Tree of Eternity” (*ash-shajrati al-khuld*) all represent growth and unity. The tree’s deep roots run into the earth and its branches spread and extend into the sky, appealing to heaven and affirming the Muslim’s search for a better destiny and purification from all sins by dedicating his being (*al-kulliyya*) and willingly submitting his identity (*al-mithliyya*) to the will of God.

The traditions of Mohammed and some verses of the Qur’an discuss trees in parables and rank them in a theological pattern on a scale of reverence. The tree symbolizes magnificence, transcendence, and divine beauty. It is frequently crowned with a two-headed eagle flanked by a dragon and a lion facing each other. Just such a mythical tree, Aussaj, is held to be the first tree to have grown on Earth.

Prominent Symbols with Pre-Islamic Roots

Some Islamic symbols come from the great civilizations that preceded Islam, including those of central Africa, among the richest sources of telluric and cosmic symbols, and ancient Egypt, with its vast mythological bestiary, divine symbols of immortality, and religious rites and offerings.

The sun. In the Middle East, the sun’s zenith (*samt al-rass*) is known as the “torch of hastiness” (*sirajan uahajan*), the spirit that illuminates the world and regulates the times of prayer. The sun itself (*ash-shams*) is an ancient symbol long associated with divine glory, sustenance of life, enthusiasm, and innocence.

The dragon. Although the dragon (*at-tinnin*) is not derived from the Qur’an, Muslims have incorporated it into their architecture, heraldry, and decoration. Islamic use of the dragon as a symbol probably stems from ancient associations with other cultures, both East and West, in which dragon symbology was particularly important and extensively used. However, the dragon symbol has some Middle Eastern roots as well. For example, owing to a mythological fable dating from the Sino-Iranian Sassanid dynasty (226-651 A.D.), the dragon evokes the mythological Hydra, the guardian of a treasure said to be hidden somewhere in the south of Yemen.

Eagle. The eagle (*an-nasr*, *al-uqab*, and *ar-rakhma*), a solar symbol, also predates the emergence of Islam. It appears prominently on national

pendants, either by itself or joined with another eagle (the bicephalous or two-headed eagle), to suggest warlike ferocity, nobility, and dominion. A common figure in Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and Turk-Mongol mythology, the eagle is widely used in many Middle Eastern nations today. Similarly, the large desert hawk or goshawk (*al-ibra*) connotes heroic virtues, especially in Tlemcen, to the west of Algeria, where it is nicknamed *al-mfitha*, literally “little key.”

First used by the Hittites and the Sassanids, the wing (*al-janah*) is another symbol that holds a prominent place in the Islamic mythological-religious universe. Wings are depicted on angels, who move about with extraordinary facility, and Muslims remember the legend of Jafar, son of Abu Talib and standardbearer of the Muslim army, who lost his arms in 629 A.D. during a battle against the Byzantines. As compensation for his bravery, Mohammed told Jafar, “God substituted wings for your arms, the blessing which will take you towards Paradise.” After this, Jafar was known as At-Tayyar (“the ethereal,” “he that flies”) or “the man with two wings” (*dul-janahain*).

Crescent moon and star. Depicted in diverse ways on Islamic banners, standards, diplomatic seals, and government stamps, and adorning the national flags of many current Arab states, the quarter-crescent moon and star (*an-najma*) is the symbol of Islam. It is also synonymous with the commencement of Ramadan.

How the quarter-crescent moon came to symbolize Islam is uncertain. Many explanations with varying degrees of plausibility have been offered. Among the most popular is the assertion that the symbol signifies the position of the moon and the planet Venus at dawn on 23 July 610 A.D., when the Prophet Mohammed received his initial revelation from God.

In pre-Islamic times, the Middle East and the Aegean regions believed the star and crescent were symbols of authority, nobility, openness, victory, divine approbation, and worldly sovereignty. In ancient times, the star and the crescent were monograms of Tanit, a goddess of the Semite sector of the Roman Empire. The symbol was absorbed into Islam via the conquest of Byzantium and reinterpreted and recast by those practicing the new faith. (The Byzantines started to use the crescent around 610 A.D., on the birthday of Heraclius.) In Constantinople,

the ancient capital of Byzantium, Christian religious authority saw the star and crescent as a symbol of the Virgin Mary and other Christian figures. According to the memorials of the epoch, in 339 B.C. a bright moon saved Byzantium (Istanbul) from an attack by Philip of Macedon. To show their gratitude, the city's pagan citizenry adopted the crescent of Diana as the emblem of the city.

According to tradition, while Sultan Osman was in the process of conquering Turkey, including Constantinople, in 1299, he had a vision of a crescent moon hanging over the world. When Constantinople capitulated to Mohammed II in 1453, the crescent moon was adopted to symbolize the Turkish empire. From that point on, it became an emblem of the Ottoman Dynasty—and gradually, by association, of the Muslim world. Muslims from all around the world started to make use of the crescent and moon. In 1793, Sultan Selim III added a star, and its five points were inserted later in 1844.

Islamic emblems feature different types of crescents, designed to reflect the moon's phases. When the moon is in the waning quarter, the crescent faces left and represents longevity, aptitude, and ability. The moon is also represented in the ascending horizontal position, with a crescent raising its points upward (the Pakistani flag), and in the descending horizontal position, with the crescent pointing downward (Malaysia).

To Arabs, the changing appearance of the moon represents a cycle of divine interest and intervention

in earthly affairs. They believe the cycle regulates earthly reckoning and represents isolation, change, transformation, and passage to a new world. The cycle connotes subtle growth toward a transformed, rejuvenated, and cured world followed by a period that permits earthly affairs to recede back into decadence and spiritual darkness.

In Arabic poetry, the moon is a symbol of beauty par excellence. One consequence of this is that many names given to Arab women come from the moon: Kmar (Full Moon); Kamriya (Little Moon); Bedra or Badriya (Full Moon); Badr An-Nur (Moonlight); and Munira (Luminous).

The temple of Kaaba in Mecca, the spiritual center of Islam, is precisely aligned with two celestial phenomena: the lunar cycle and the rise of Canopus, the brightest star in the sky after Sirius.

Stars. Other stars also have potent symbolic meaning. According to their positions in the constellations, stars are fixed (*falak al-kauakib* or *falak al-manazil*); virtual (*maqadir*); stationary (*manazil*); head (*rass*); shoulder-blade (*mankib*); umbilical (*surra*); tail (*danab*); lion's tail (*danab al-'assad*); wing; and falling (*shahab thaquib*). The Qur'an declares that falling stars are thrown down by God to pursue indiscreet demons who come too close to heaven (*as-sama*) trying to listen to divine whispers.

The Colors of Islam

Color symbolism in Islam follows a pattern that reputedly goes back to the time of Mohammed. All colors (*al-lauun*; plural *al-aluuan*) are respected and, in some cases, feared or privileged. However, Muslims exalt the color green (*al-akhdar*), which has acquired special significance.

Green. Today, green is widely recognized as a symbol of Islam and of Muslim dignitaries. The color's figurative importance comes from the belief that Mohammed frequently wore a green cloak. (Green was his favorite color.)

A sign of renovation and vigor, green conveys the happiness and success that are said to come from living as a devout Muslim. It denotes devotion to Islamic dogma and symbolizes the hope for peace won by doing God's will. Green is a prominent color in Arab-Islamic heraldry; royal, tribal, and family emblems; and the flags of Arabic countries. Muslims frequently adorn mosques and interiors of houses with this color.



The national flag of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The right (shaded) field is green, the traditional color of Islam and a symbol of prosperity. The left (white) field represents Pakistan's non-Muslim minorities. The rising quarter-crescent moon (white) stands for progress, and the five-pointed star (also white) symbolizes light and knowledge. (infopak.gov.pk)

Some Muslims display such pious regard for the color green that they decline to use it for pedestrian purposes, including in the coloration of their carpets, because doing so might allow the color of Islam to be stepped on by human feet, an act of disrespect.

An extensive Arabic vocabulary is associated with green and its various tones. Green appears in theological language, popular literature, and classical Arab poetry. For example, in Syria, a person who has made a pilgrimage to Mecca is said to have a “green hand” or to have received a blessing or hereditary privilege of holiness (*baraka*).

Other colors with special significance in Islamic culture are white, black, yellow, red, blue, and indigo.

White. White (*al-abiadh*) is a positive color in Islam. A passage from a hadith attributed to Mohammed reads, “God loves white raiment, and He created paradise white.” White is the color of angels, the color of the shroud used to cover the bodies of the deceased, the color of a sheik’s gaudouira, or gown, and a student’s long tunic (*qamis*). White is also a metaphor for beauty and femininity. For example, some Muslims believe that “the whiter and stronger a woman is, the higher hypothesis that she will find a husband.”

Black. In contrast, black (*al-akhal, assuud*) is a symbolically complex color for Muslims. On one hand, it is the color of the wool tunic that Mohammed wore on the day he conquered Mecca. On the other hand, black is regarded as a bad omen and is associated with the black-feathered raven (*al-gurab*), which has a pernicious reputation in the Arab world and the memorable nickname “son of misfortune” (*ibn al-barah*). In the Sunni tradition, black also symbolizes rage. In the Maghrib and Algeria, black is seen as malignant.

The Shi’a regard black as a “cursed color,” hue of the devil and morbidity. Nevertheless, since the assassination of Imam Hussain in 680 A.D., black, the sign of sadness and sorrow, has been adopted as the color of Shi’ite spiritual guides. The black veil (*shador*) of the Iranians borrows from that context.

Red. To Muslims, red (*al-ahmar*) symbolizes the life force. It appears prominently in the flags of many Muslim countries, including Tunisia, Indonesia, the Kingdom of Morocco, Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. Along with other colors (most commonly white, black, or green), it expresses pan-Arabism.

During the Arab occupation of Andalusia, Muslims associated red and purple (*al-urjuuanii*)—“colors of fascination” thought to inspire poets and writers—with roses, fire, and blood. The garish red colors worn by women flamenco dancers come from Arabic culture, and reflect the fire and passion in the dance. Today, Muslims frequently use red in common apparel and in decorations. For ancient Zoroastrians, red symbolized war; for example, the jellaba of the war-like natives of the Riff in northeastern Morocco is red.

Blue. In Islamic tradition, blue (*al-azraq*) often signifies the impenetrable depths of the universe, and turquoise blue is thought to have mystical qualities. As a result, Muslims imagine that a person with blue eyes has divinely endowed qualities. Similarly, indigo or dark violet-blue (*an-nili*) has mystical qualities in certain regions of the Sahel.

Natural colors. In the Maghrib and Egypt, the natural colors associated with the Earth symbolize noble, abstract sentiments. Colors linked to geographical areas include the chestnut-colored kachabia cloaks of the great plains of Algeria and the dun-colored costumes of the Berbers. In the Suss region, the Berbers wear a color similar to that of the eternal snow of the Atlas Mountains.

Paradise colors. Muslims imagine paradise as having a white aura, but they also envision it as an exceedingly fertile place with features that display a thousand and one colors. According to the Qur’an, the Paradise of the Chosen is a place where believers “will attain the Garden of Eden (*al-‘and*), beneath which the rivers run, where they will use bracelets of gold, wear green clothes of smooth and lustrous fabric and brocade, and repose on elevated thrones. What an optimal compensation and what a happy repose!” (XVIII: 31). A passage in chapter LXXVI: 21, adds: “They will be dressed up in bracelets of silver and our Father will satiate their thirst with a pure drink.” Some believe this paradise will be graced by delightful nights of poetry, delicious nectars, fresh fruit, streams of honey, large shaded areas, running water, and beautiful women with green eyes whose virginity is constantly renewed.

Islam and Animal Symbolism

Animal symbols abound in Arab-Islamic imagery. Hunting and the study of horses and fish have been practiced since ancient times, but the Qur’an and the

traditions of Mohammed added new precepts to an extant pre-Islamic pantheon of animal symbols.

By custom, the pagan inhabitants of pre-Islamic Arabia named their sons after animals as protective talismans to defend the children against magical attacks or misfortunes provoked by the evil eye. Some common names were Kalb (Dog), Hurira (Kitten), Himar (Burro), Gu'l (Scarab), and Qird (Monkey).

Each animal has a history, a parable about it, and certain qualities or characteristics that could be imparted by emulation. The noble species were, and still are, the horse (*al-hissan*); the lion (*al-assad*), a symbol of strength, bravery, courage, and force; and the falcon (*al-ibaz*), a noble, proud, faithful bird and a preeminent hunter.

Other favored species include the eagle (as aforementioned), the serpent (*al-azrim*), and the wolf (*ad-dib*), all suggesting astute awareness and resourcefulness; the partridge (*at-tasikkurt*), symbolizing loveliness; the nightingale (*al-bulbul*), signifying an eloquent and melodious maker of music; and the pigeon (*al-ahman*), connoting tenderness.

Species of a lower reputation include the hedgehog (*al-ganfud* or *al-mudijij*), literally "totally covered with armor"; the vulture (*an-nassar*); the hyena (*ad-dhabu*), symbol of imbecility, occupying the lowest place in the Islamic bestiary; the rat (*al-far*); the raven (*al-ghurab*, *al-khaliq*, *al-qaq* or *an-na'ab*—from the verb *na'aba*: "to caw"); the rabid dog; and the pig (*al-khanzir*), symbol of impurity and defilement. (The Qur'an prohibits the consumption of pork.)


Another animal with high symbolic significance is the stork (*al-laqlaq*). Protected by tacit Arabian laws and blessed with an appearance that gives the impression of power, the stork is an esteemed animal especially revered by rural dwellers. The bird is a good omen, as suggested by the nickname given to it by ancient Jordanians: "that which brings happiness" (*al-abu sa'd*).

The camel is preeminent

among animal symbols. The Bedouins call the camel "Gift from God" (*ata' Allah*). "God," they say, "has 100 Beautiful Names, or Attributes. Of these, Man knows only 99. The camel knows the 100th, but doesn't reveal it—which helps to explain his arrogant appearance."

Domesticated around 2500 B.C., camels can transport loads weighing nearly 200 kg (441 pounds), travel distances of 300 km (186 miles) a day, and go 6 weeks without drinking water in the winter (or several days in the height of summer heat). For the nomadic peoples of the Middle East, the single-humped camel (an animal given numerous names according to its numerous uses) is synonymous with life itself. Entire desert cultures depend on the animal. The camel is not only an incomparable beast of burden; it provides the desert peoples an array of products: meat and milk; leather, waterskins, and sandals made from its skin; blankets, clothing, twine, and tents woven from its hair, wool, and tendons; fuel from its dung; and cleansers and even an anti-septic to treat wounds from its urine.

Despite its volatile temper and the irritating noises it makes, the camel is an integral part of the Arab economy, lifestyle, and folklore throughout the Middle East. At night around campfires, Muslims sometimes perform reverential dances for camels.



Iraqi Shi'ites arrive with camels, "gifts from God," in Karbala, Iraq, 28 March 2005, in advance of Al-Arbaeen ceremonies.

AP, Hadi Mizban

The spider (*al-ankabut*) is highly regarded by Muslims in large part due to a story in which a spider plays a prominent role in saving the life of Mohammed. The Prophet and his companion Abu Bakr Ibn Quhafa were being pursued by the Quraishitas. To elude their pursuers, the two hid in a cave for three days. A group of armed horsemen pursuing Mohammed approached the cave, but were unable to see it because a spider had spun a compact web that completely camouflaged its entrance. Some Muslims believe this was a miraculous act of providence, God using a spider to save the lives of Mohammed and his friend.

Muslims favor other animals such as the dragon, the lanky Saluki hunting dog, the tiger, the hare, and waterbirds (the crane, the royal heron, and the duck). These animals occupy preferred places in the architecture and decoration of palaces; in fables and legends such as *A Thousand and One Nights*; in classic texts such as *The Marvels of Creation*, by Abu Yahya al-Qazwini; and in literary-theological stories by Attar, Jahiz, Damiri, Mas'udi, and Ibn al-Muqaffa, where they appear in ordinary scenes, assuming roles usually played by humans.

A popular legend also makes the black (*aqrab akhal*) or yellow (*aqrab asfar*) scorpion a symbol of treachery. The expression “like a scorpion” (“*matl al-‘aqrab*”) describes a person of bad temperament, uncertain and vengeful.

Numerology and Arab Mysticism

Besides beasts and other natural phenomena, numbers and numerical patterns are thought to have mystical significance. Ancient Arabian alchemists, who believed that numbers can reveal concealed supernatural wisdom or are the materialization of ideas or emotions, created numerology (*ilm al-huruf*), the study of numbers and their influence. Practitioners of numerology believe they can interpret algorisms and discover patterns of numbers that link the metaphysical, the eternal, and the divine with the human and the temporal.

One. For numerologists, everything begins with algorism one (*uahid*), which corresponds to God, “The Unique/The Without Equal” (*Al-Fard*). One also represents singleness, righteousness (*al-qauan*), valor (*al-qaim*), virility (*al-muntasiban*), equilibrium (*al-mu'adilan*), the unknowable (*al-malakut*) and the knowable, as well as destiny and time.

Three. Algorism three symbolizes the soul (*talata*), which Muslims associate with the three levels of knowledge (*al-‘aqil ua al-ma’qul ua al-‘aql*): the expert, what is known, and the knowledge. The number three also represents the physical universe (head, body, and members).

Four. The number four (*arba’a*) represents matter and the balance between things created and the four elements (earth, air, fire, and water). It also signifies the seasons of the year (*fusul*): winter (*fasl ash-shita*); spring (*fasl ar-rabi*’); summer (*saif*); fall (*kharif*).

Five. The fifth algorism (*khamis*) can stand for the five senses and the five canonic obligations, or pillars (*al-arkan al-khams*), of the Islamic faith, which are—

- Profession of the faith and belief in God, the prophets, the sacred writings, angels, predestination, the resurrection (*al-quiyama*), and the final judgment.

- Orations (*salat*).
- Fasting (*siiam*).
- Charity/alms (*zakat*).
- The hajj.

Islam prescribes five daily prayers: dawn (*al-fajr*’ or *as-subh*), mid-day (*az-zuhr*), afternoon (*al-‘asr*), sunset (*al-maghrib*), and night (*al-‘isha*). The five fingers of each hand are also represented by this algorism—each finger associated phonetically with the name Allah: the pinky (*khansar*), the ring-finger (*bansar*), the middle-finger (*al-ustani*), the index finger (*sabbaba*), and the thumb (*abham*).

The Qur’an describes five natural products of the Earth, which have therapeutic as well as mystical properties: vegetables (*al-bakliha*), cucumbers (*al-qittaiha*), garlic (*al-fumiha*), lentils (*al-‘adassih*), and onions (*al-bassaliha*).

Seven. Muslims can attach deep significance to the number seven (*sab*’). They swear divine fealty (*uujud mutlaq*) in patterns of seven. This algorism is of ancient Babylonian origin, but the Qur’an uses the number seven in repeating patterns such as—

- The seven heavens (*sab ‘samauati*).
- The seven lands.
- The seven seas.
- The seven divisions of Hell, each one known by a compelling epitaph and each with doors as gateways unbelievers must pass through enroute to their final damnations of torture (*adab*), fire (*nar*), forge (*jahim*), and conflagration (*hariq*).

The number seven also connotes the seven days of the week, known as “the seven days of God” (*al-ayyam Allah*): Friday (*al-jumu’a*), the Islamic sacred day; Saturday (*as-sabt*); Sunday (*al-ahad*); Monday (*al-itnain*); Tuesday (*at-tulata*); Wednesday (*al-’arbi’a*); and Thursday (*al-khamis*).

Elsewhere, the chronicles of Mohammed relate that he had seven sabers and seven horses—Sakh, Murtadjiz, Lizaz, La’hif, Zharib, Ward, and Ya’sub.

Eight. Muslims associate the number eight (*taman*) with the eight cardinal directions of the wind (*ar-rih*), known in the Western Sahara and Mauritania as *sulaiman*.

Twelve. There are 12 months in the Muslim religious calendar: *Muharram* (literally “the Sacred”); *Safar* (“Felicity”); *Rabi al-auual*; *Rabi at-thani*; *Jamad’at-thani*; *Rajab*; *Shaaban*; *Ramadan* (“Fire from Heaven,” mentioned in the Qur’an as the “Night of Destiny,” or the “Night of Glory,” the Friday night that preceded the day Mohammed received his first great revelation; *Shauul*; *Zu-al*; *Qadah*; and *Ru-alhijjah*. In addition, Mohammed betrothed 12 women: Khadija, Sudiah, ‘Aisha, Hafsa, Zaynab, Umm Salamih, Zaynab, Juayriah, Safiab, Umm Habibah, Maria, and Maymunah.

Other numbers. For devotees of Sufism, the number 28 (*tamania ‘ishrun*) corresponds to the 28 houses of the moon and the 28 vertebrae of the human body; 70 (*sab’un*) is dedicated to the source of intellect; 90 (*tis’un*) connotes sincerity and truth; 300 (*talat mi’a*) represents mystical knowledge and understanding; 400 (*arba’mi’a*) relates to bliss and the discovery of God (*thauba*); and 500 (*khamis mi’a*) suggests the consolidation (*thubut*) of man with his Creator. For all Muslims, the number 600 (*sitt mi’a*), associated with the letter *kha*, symbolizes the “Eternal Good” (*khayer da’im*). The number 700 (*sab’mi’a*—equivalent to the letter *zal* of the alphabet) represents the mystic

value of noble ideas. Finally, the number 1,000 (*alf*, letter *ghain*) is said to hold the absolute and unfathomable secret.

Conclusion

The significance attributed to symbols and numbers is similar among Muslim communities in the four corners of the world. However, there is also great diversity and novelty in regional beliefs, customs, art, literature, and religious practices.

The Druz of the Syrian and Lebanese mountains, the Kurds, the Shi’ites of the Elburz Mountains, the Muslims of Russia and Mongolia, the Turks of Istanbul and Konya, the nomads of the Anatolian Steppes, the Albanians of Tirana, the Muslims of Central Europe, Asia Minor, the Indian Ocean, and East Africa’s Swahili Coast—these groups all have distinct cosmographies.

Islamic culture has a high regard for the skillful and artistic use of language, especially the effective, evocative use of poetry. As a result, poetic language often appears in everyday venues in Islamic countries, considerably more so than it does in the West. This predilection sometimes puzzles and even frustrates Westerners attempting to understand Muslim culture.

In many settings, Muslims use poetry to extol the beauty of gardens, fields, flowers, and such natural events as the setting of the sun. By praising the nature God created, poets or those who recite their poems obliquely praise God.


Each people, each ethnic group, and each cultural community has a repository of symbols it relies on to a certain extent for its identity. Owing to its history and age, Islamic culture contains an unusually rich supply of such symbols. Only a few of them have been discussed here, but unless one understands Islamic symbols, understanding modern Islamic civilizations will be difficult. **MR**

ANNOUNCING the 2008 James Lawton Collins Jr.
Special Topics Writing Competition

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The U.S. Army Center of Military History invites Army officers in the rank of major or below, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers to submit an original unclassified essay about a small U.S. Army unit or team, no larger than a company, engaged in the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan. Submissions must be received by 1 August 2008. Competition enrollment forms and further information about the competition will be posted at <<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/2008Contest.htm>>. Questions about the contest should be directed to Jon Hoffman at the Center of Military History (202) 685-2360 or DSN 325-2360 or by email at hoffmanjt@hqda.army.mil.

MR Classics Revisited



THE SWORDBEARERS: Supreme Command in the First World War

Officers in positions of high-level command have often found their responsibilities to be a heavy and lonesome burden. Dwight Eisenhower, who knew a few

things about such command, once told a newly commissioned officer, "Let me give you some good advice. Don't become a general. Don't ever become a general. If you become a general you just plain have too much to worry about." During the Second World War, Eisenhower had discovered from first-hand experience that the scope and intensity of those worries increase dramatically when a commander must lead the military forces of his country (and others) in a major war in which the survival of the nation is at stake.

When the character and duration of that war evolves in a totally unexpected way, as in the First World War, then the load must become nearly unbearable. In *The Swordbearers* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1963), British author Correlli Barnett considers four men—two Germans, a Frenchman, and a Briton; three generals and an admiral—who bore such a burden during the Great War. The first is Helmuth von Moltke, the unhappy general charged with executing Schlieffen's flawed concept for winning a two-front war against great odds. The second is John Jellicoe, the man responsible for leading the British Grand Fleet at Jutland in the last great duel of battleships. According to Winston Churchill, Jellicoe was "the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon." Barnett's third subject, the dour general Henri Pétain, led French troops through the furnace of Verdun and took command of the

entire army as mutiny threatened to bring its dissolution. The final study is of Erich Ludendorff, who became First Quartermaster General of the German Army and virtual dictator in the last two years of the war.

Barnett shows that, along with the challenge of leading a national war effort, each man wrestled with almost crippling personal demons. In Moltke's case, it was a sense of self-doubt magnified by the knowledge that he owed his position as much or more to his family name than to any personal merit. Suffering from an ailing heart and shaky nerves, Moltke knew he lacked the steady decisiveness of his famous uncle, Moltke the Elder.

Jellicoe, by contrast, demonstrated an impressive coolness at Jutland, even when the fate of nations might have been determined in a period of hours. Yet, as Barnett recounts, the British commander agonized over the structural deficiencies of his warships and their vulnerability to the asymmetric weapons of naval warfare, submarines and floating mines. As the fleet's preeminent technocrat, Jellicoe knew better than anyone else that the Germans had been building a fleet that was superior, if not in numbers, then in such crucial factors as armor protection, fire direction, and damage control.

A year after Jellicoe's trial at Jutland, Henri Pétain took command of the French Army when it appeared that mutinies at the front would leave the road to Paris open to the Germans. Although the new commander mastered the crisis, a year later, when German armies ripped open the Allied front in three consecutive offensives, Pétain's deep-seated pessimism led him to announce the war was lost.

Finally, despite consuming ambition and an inexhaustible appetite for micromanagement, Ludendorff was blind to the fragility of the German army he led into the last year of

the war. When his great offensives failed and a series of stunning Allied counteroffensives revealed the rot in Germany's fighting forces, the overstressed Ludendorff suffered a nervous breakdown.

The burden of command led to tragedy in the lives of each of the four men. Moltke died a year after leaving his command, broken in spirit by his failure to lead Germany to a quick victory. In the months after Jutland, critics hounded Jellicoe for failing to trap and destroy the German fleet. They accused the admiral of a timidity that betrayed the bold, Nelsonian spirit that was supposedly embodied in the Royal Navy. He was kicked upstairs and his fleet given to his more dashing and less reflective subordinate, David Beatty. Pétain's brooding pessimism in the last year of the war cost him the confidence of France's prime minister, Georges Clemenceau. During the spring crisis of 1918, the Allied leaders jumped General Ferdinand Foch over Pétain as chief of the Allied armies on the Western Front, and it was Foch who received the lion's share of the credit for final victory. Twenty years later, Pétain disgraced a noble career by becoming Hitler's apparent puppet as the head of the Vichy government. During the last weeks of the war, Ludendorff threatened to resign when he did not get his way. The Kaiser called his bluff and accepted the resignation, prompting Ludendorff to flee to Sweden in order to avoid the approaching revolution. After the war, the embittered general further sullied his reputation by establishing close relations with Hitler and the Nazis.

Barnett, however, is interested in more than individual failings and personal tragedies. He argues that failure in command reflected failings in societies as well. Thus, Moltke's inept handling of the opening campaigns reflected a German

nation that deployed the power of a modern, industrialized state, but directed that power with medieval political institutions. The flaws in Jellicoe's ships were, in part, a consequence of the Victorian class system, which slighted technical education in favor of more aristocratic pursuits. France found itself on the verge of collapse in 1917 because demographic, social, and economic stagnation had made it a second-rate nation compelled by pride into trying to play the role of a first-rate power. Finally, Ludendorff was the product of a Prussian military culture that abandoned

Clausewitz's most fundamental teachings by divorcing the goal of military victory from attainable political goals.

The relevance and value of Barnett's analysis have held up well over time. Scholars tend to view any historical work over eight or nine years old as dated and therefore suspect. Yet, while almost a half century old and written for a popular audience, *The Swordbearers* remains worthy of a new generation of readers. We can be thankful that this fine old classic is still in print. The book is magnificently readable. New interpretations in more

recent works have revised or refined Barnett's judgments, but those interested in the problems of supreme command or seeking an introduction to the baffling military problems of the First World War would do well to begin with *The Swordbearers*.

Scott Stephenson is a retired armor lieutenant colonel with 25 years active service. A 1976 graduate of the United States Military Academy, he has an M.A. in European history from Syracuse University and a Ph.D in European and military history from the University of Kansas. LTC Stephenson is currently serving as an assistant professor of military history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

MR Book Reviews

DYING TO KILL: The Allure of Suicide Terror, Mia Bloom, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007, 280 pages, \$17.95.

In *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*, Mia Bloom lays out a theory of suicide bombing as a modern, non-Islamic phenomenon used by groups "when other military tactics fail, and when they are in competition with other terrorist groups for popular or financial support."

Bloom is sure of a few things. Military overreaction is bad if we want to stop terrorists or suicide bombers. Also, suicide bombing should not be associated with Islam. Other than these hackneyed insights, Bloom never articulates an argument on how to address the phenomenon. "Suicide terror will either be sanctioned or prohibited by the civilian population. The use of violence will either resonate effectively with the rank and file or will be rejected and, eventually, abandoned by the groups." Angry men will either strap bombs to their chests and explode themselves, or they won't.

Bloom covers suicide bombing in the Palestinian territories, Turkey, and Sri Lanka. She also explores the phenomenon of female suicide bombers. Astonishingly, the book lacks information about the origina-

tion of modern suicide bombing by Hezbollah. By ignoring Hezbollah's politicization of martyrdom within the context of a revitalized Shi'ism, Bloom ignores the Islamic context within which modern suicide bombing was born.

This shortcoming is painfully apparent in a chapter on the Tamil Tigers. For those with little background on the bloody eruptions of Sri Lanka, the chapter provides a good overview. Yet, for the study of suicide bombing, the Black Tigers are most notable because, unlike the majority of suicide bombers, they are not Muslims. "Thus," Bloom tells us of the Tigers, "it is not unreasonable to have expected terrorist organizations engaged in conflict after 1983 to use suicide bombings as part of their arsenal of terror after it had been so successful in expelling the Americans and French from Lebanon." How did a tactic developed by Muslims (justified within Islamic law through Islamic arguments) come to be adopted by a non-Muslim group? That would be an important concern, but it's one Bloom never addresses.

Bloom also illogically and naively concludes that suicide bombing caused increased support for a Palestinian group in 2001. All she cites is a coin-

cidental occurrence of the employment of suicide bombing and the increased popularity of the group; she does not show real causal connections.

On some points, Bloom's conclusions are more plausible. For instance, "Heavy-handed counter-terror strategies" do "inculcate a greater sense of outrage and anger, making a formerly inhospitable environment accepting and approving of mounting violence against civilians." In *Dying to Kill*, however, a book that is about suicide terrorism, the author fails to deal with suicide bombing as a unique phenomenon. Are there specific means of addressing suicide bombing that are different from simply addressing the underlying political causes of conflict? Those interested in the answer will need to wait for another attempt at the subject.

**CPT Dan Helmer, USA,
Afghanistan**

WHAT MAKES A TERRORIST: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, Alan B. Krueger, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2007, 180 pages, \$24.95.

As a company commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom, I was responsible for the security of a small

but well-to-do neighborhood in the Iraqi city of Kirkuk. My neighborhood had few security problems compared to less-advantaged areas of the city, and I wondered at the time whether the area's economic stability played a role in its security situation. Princeton economist Alan B. Krueger asks a similar question, although in greater scale and scope, in his recent book *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism*.

Krueger's book is based on a series of lectures he gave at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2006, in which he presented and interpreted his statistical analyses of the causes and effects of terrorism. These studies examine data on terrorism at both the individual and state scales in an effort to determine what variables are most highly correlated with terrorist attacks. Krueger finds that two of the most popular explanations for terrorism, poverty and a lack of education, do not positively correlate with terrorist attacks; in fact, in some cases he shows that material wealth and higher education levels may actually contribute to terrorism. Krueger does find that countries that suppress civil liberties and political rights tend to spawn more terrorists; therefore he argues that feelings of political impotency, coupled with a variety of geopolitical grievances (whether real or imagined), are the root causes of terrorism.

As a noted scholar and former chief economist for the U.S. Department of Labor, Krueger is well qualified to perform the types of sophisticated statistical analyses presented here. Despite his weighty academic credentials, however, his book is happily succinct and eminently readable. If the mere mention of negative binomial regressions sends a shiver up your spine, you may blithely ignore Krueger's carefully selected charts and graphs without detracting from his analysis. If, on the other hand, *p*- and *t*-values really get your blood pumping, there is enough statistical data here to satisfy your numerical cravings. As a result, *What Makes a Terrorist* is

a quick and pleasurable read while remaining highly informative.

Although the book seems aimed at policy makers, it has military implications all the way down to the tactical level. In today's conflicts, leaders need to be as well versed in economic and social issues as in room-clearing techniques, and military officers must clearly understand the factors that cause the different threats of crime, insurgency, and terrorism before they can devise solutions. Krueger's book, with its focus on data and analysis, is an excellent contribution to understanding the last of these.

**MAJ Jason Ridgeway, USA,
West Point, New York**

HOG PILOTS, BLUE WATER GRUNTS: The American Military in the Air, at Sea, and on the Ground, Robert D. Kaplan, Random House, New York, 2007, \$27.95, 428 pages.

In *Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts*, Robert Kaplan continues his journey as an embedded reporter that began with *Imperial Grunts*. With these two books Kaplan has become the premier interpreter of America's 21st-century military. A keen observer of human nature, he assures us that "as always, people are more interesting than hardware." Kaplan does not conceal his admiration for the members of today's military—especially NCOs and junior and mid-level officers who constantly adapt and improvise to "make things happen" on the ground, aboard ship, or in the air. Especially revealing are his observations about the larger military culture of today's volunteer armed forces and the peculiarities of the various "tribes" or subcultures that make up the military, such as the Marines, Army Special Forces, Navy submariners and surface sailors, and Air Force "stealth bombers" and "Hogwart drivers." He contrasts the military's can-do pragmatism with the ideological mentality of political appointees.

Kaplan also tackles the issues of America's continuing involvement in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. He addresses how the intense

focus on the Middle East is eroding America's military capabilities and preventing more robust engagement in areas that promise to be of greater strategic significance later in the century, such as South and Southeast Asia, South America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Kaplan also highlights the importance of the regional combatant commands as the bearers of a significant portion of America's "imperial" responsibilities, the increasing role of military contractors, and the promise and challenge of new technologies. Especially intriguing is his chapter on how Air Force pilots at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, fly unmanned aircraft in "combat" over Afghanistan and Iraq and the curious psychological stresses this produces.

Kaplan's new book and his ongoing reporting work well at many levels. Perhaps most importantly, they honestly explain military culture to a general public that is increasingly becoming alienated from its own military forces and those who serve in them. Kaplan's work also explains the inextricable relationship between military action, both in war and peace, and American policy. And, importantly, it explains the military to the military. In a world where joint operations will be the norm, this enterprise is by no means the least of his contributions. As an officer with over 22 years of service in the Army, this reviewer learned a great deal about peers in the other military "tribes" of the Navy, Marines, and Air Force, and even Army Special Forces. As with all previous books by Kaplan, *Hog Pilots Blue Water Grunts* is highly recommended.

**LTC Prisco R. Hernández, Ph.D.,
USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE REAL ALL AMERICANS: The Team that Changed a Game, a People, a Nation, Sally Jenkins, Doubleday, New York, 2007, 343 pages, \$24.95.

Sally Jenkins's *The Real All Americans* is a fascinating history of the U.S. Army-founded Carlisle [Pennsylvania] Indian Industrial

School and its stellar turn-of-the-century football team. The book describes the origins and development of Carlisle football through the lens of important individuals at the school, particularly founder and first director Brigadier General Richard Henry Pratt, coach Glenn "Pop" Warner, and an assortment of students and players, including Delos Lone Wolf, Bemus Pierce, Albert Exendine, Gus Welch, and the legendary Jim Thorpe. The research on these subjects is impressively deep. Jenkins mined the appropriate archives, interviewed the available descendents of key figures, and cited important secondary sources on the events and characters specific to her story. But for all its depth, the work lacks breadth.

There are several examples of this shortcoming, ranging from the superficial to the essential. Jenkins asserts that Carlisle revolutionized the game of football with trick plays and the forward pass, but her descriptions of how the Indians' style departed from the rest of the sport lack key specifics to make the point clear. She paints a negative, brief, and largely uninformed portrait of Theodore Roosevelt, simply because her protagonist Pratt did not like the president. And her descriptions of the Indian Wars of the late 19th century tend to rely too heavily on the perspectives of individual Indian participants, and thus it suffers from the biases common to autobiographical accounts.

Most importantly, Jenkins never engages fully with the questions of tribal, Indian, and American identity that are at the core of understanding Carlisle's history and legacy. For sure, some of her individual characters expressed their dismay over lost identities and incomplete assimilation, while others embraced the way Carlisle gave them new and productive lives in America. But Jenkins never attempts to synthesize the various experiences into a more coherent whole, balancing what was gained and lost and putting those summations into the context of changes wrought by the modernization, industrialization, and nationalism of the progressive era.

For all that, *The Real All Americans* is still informative and highly readable. And possibly Jenkins's ambivalence on the most important matters is instructive for the contemporary military. Because she writes from the more narrow perspective of the participants, one gets a clear feel for the struggles in the relationships among the United States, the Army, and the conquered Indians. Any attempts to democratize those who have no experience with democracy, particularly in the aftermath of war, are bound to yield glaring failures and quiet successes, the loss of traditions, good and bad, and the acquisition of habits, destructive and productive. All of this should sound familiar—a cold comfort, perhaps, but a comfort nonetheless.

Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr., Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE LONG WAR: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II, Andrew J. Bacevich, ed., Columbia University Press, NY, 2007, \$75.00.

Books sometimes promise more than they deliver. Despite the contemporary hook in its title, *The Long War* is not about the global War on Terror, nor is it really about the Cold War. Consisting of a collection of essays, some by significant scholars, it mainly reprises old ideas and posits conventional partisan disagreements with Bush administration policies in Iraq and in the War on Terror.

The estimable Andrew Bacevich, compiled the essays in *Long War* but their quality is extremely uneven. The first, by Arnold A. Offner, purports to assess the Bush administration policy espoused in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) in light of American foreign policy since the founding of the republic. Instead, it roughly characterizes more than 200 years of history, and then attacks the 2002 NSS over three pages that owe more to the op-ed section of the *New York Times* than to reasoned historical assessment. The very next essay, entitled "The American Way of War," by James Kurth, simply fails to prove its case

that the American way of war has gone through four major transformations since World War II.

The book continues with essays on a wide variety of national security issues. Thought-provoking and informative essays on U.S. strategic forces, paying for military forces, universal military service, conscription or voluntary service, and moral dissent from national security policies are of value primarily as short introductions into these subjects. Other essays, not as useful, include pieces on U.S. civil-military relations, the evolution of the national security state, intelligence, and the military-industrial complex. The last essay in the collection continues the theme of Bush-bashing in a biased analysis of the media and American security policy from 1945 to the present.

Although of some utility as a single-volume source of essays on significant national security issues since World War II, the uneven quality of its essays keeps this book from being really useful as a source for military officers or others interested in these subjects.

Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DANGER CLOSE: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq, Steve Call, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX, 2007, 272 pages, \$29.95.

Service parochialism and institutional bias often degrade the role of close air support (CAS). Leading up to and during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), United States Air Force tactical air control parties (TACPs) were caught in the middle of political fights, differences in war-fighting ideology, and interservice rivalries. The Air Force has often neglected CAS and TACPs in favor of counter-air and air interdiction operations. At the same time, while TACPs are Air Force personnel who live, eat, sleep, fight, and die alongside Soldiers, many Army units habitually keep them at arms length.

In *Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq*,

Steve Call provides a history of the TACP's role in OEF and OIF. He suggests that as America's "secret weapon" during these operations, TACPs helped transform modern warfare through their determination and ingenuity. *Danger Close* includes firsthand accounts of how TACPs armed with little more than M4 rifles, radios, intelligence, and a bit of creativity worked with Army special operations forces and conventional ground maneuver units to deliver Air Force high-tech ordnance with pinpoint accuracy onto an elusive enemy. Call augments these accounts with maps, diagrams, interviews, and statistical data. He emphasizes that lessons learned about CAS coordination from OEF were rapidly transformed into joint operational procedures for OIF that integrated intelligence, unmanned aerial systems, fire support, and TACPs during conventional operations at Army corps and division levels. Most notable of these is the kill-box interdiction/CAS concept.

Call goes well beyond a simple recounting of CAS operations. For relevant background material, he provides easily understood descriptions of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, operational design, targeting methodology, munitions technology, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance planning, the tactical air control system/Army air-ground system, CAS allocation and apportionment, and Army unit organization. Call describes Operation Anaconda in almost as much detail as Sean Naylor does in *Not a Good Day to Die*, and he provides detailed descriptions of the Battle of Najaf and the famous "Thunder Run" into Baghdad.

Danger Close has some shortcomings. A consistent theme throughout the book is the negative impact of bureaucratic, institutionalized partisanship on CAS doctrine development and effectiveness; however, Call fails to include any interviews with Army personnel, which would have reinforced the authority of his claim. Also, he asserts that during OIF, the 3d Infantry Division experienced "two miraculous brushes with

near disaster" only to be saved solely by TACPs, and in two instances implies that 3-7 Cavalry would have suffered repeats of Little Big Horn had it not been for the TACPs. Certainly the TACPs played a crucial role in integrating CAS into the fight, but Call's overly dramatic assertions are not fully supported by the plethora of after-action reviews on the operations.

These shortcomings do not dilute Call's message: that fully integrated TACPs are not only combat-power enablers for Army units, but are also catalysts for synchronizing air support with intelligence, imagery, target acquisition, munitions technology, fires, counterinsurgency, and ground force maneuver. Overall, *Danger Close* is a fascinating and worthwhile book for military professionals, strategists, historians, and interested civilians.

**Brian Leakey,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

NIXON AND MAO: The Week that Changed the World, Margaret MacMillan, Random House, New York, 2007, 404 pages, \$27.95

For the American military, China is an old story reaching back to Treaty Port days and the Boxer Rebellion, and yet today Pentagon planners ponder the perplexing problem of China rising—friend, ally, or enemy? In *Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World*, Margaret MacMillan describes an important chapter in the story of China-U.S. relations: the February 1972 meeting between President Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Perhaps MacMillan claims too much by stating that Nixon's meeting with Mao wobbled the world, but certainly it was a risky venture that propelled the United States and China in a new direction, ushering in a protracted state of wary cooperation.

MacMillan's profile of Chiang Kai-shek is refreshing as she credits the generalissimo with successes and argues that had it not been for the Great Depression, he might have prevailed over Mao in the Chinese

civil war. Her description of the rise of the Communist Party includes incisive portraits of Chou En-lai, Mao, and Mao's vituperative wife, Jiang Qing. Mao is shown to be indifferent to others, including his own family. He is a crafty, amoral, womanizing, power-driven individual who effectively used murder to advance his career. How Mao and Chou survived the Byzantine world of communist politics is an enthralling story. How the unflappable Chou survived Mao by becoming the sophisticated sycophant and an indispensable master of foreign affairs in a largely insular China is a convincing tale of political deftness.

Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State William Rogers, and other key participants are all brought to life by MacMillan's lively prose. The complex Nixon-Kissinger relationship is the centerpiece, but MacMillan really captures the delicate, calculated, diplomatic T'ai Chi Ch'uan of the Nixon-Mao tête-à-tête with telling anecdotes. The Nixon-Mao verbal exchanges and the comments each made about the other out of earshot, like Mao's comment that he "liked rightists," add color.

To Chou's and Mao's perplexity, Kissinger insisted that his exploratory trips to Beijing be kept secret. Secretary Rogers and the State Department's relegation to the shadows recalls Franklin D. Roosevelt's secret trip to meet Churchill at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, in 1941, a trip of which Secretary of State Cordell Hull knew nothing.

So amidst all the hoopla, what did Nixon and Mao accomplish? While U.S.-China relations were put on a new footing, which was no small accomplishment, neither man got what he wanted from the summit. The U.S. did not convince China to push the Vietnamese into war-ending negotiations, and China did not get Taiwan and a U.S. withdrawal from Asia. The world has changed in ways neither leader could foresee, but Taiwan remains like a bone lodged in a dog's throat. In 2007, the questions swirling around China rising—friend, ally, or enemy?—are still unanswered. But *Nixon and*

Mao is a good place to start on the path to resolving this conundrum. It is highly recommended.

Hal Wert,
Kansas City, Missouri

NATO'S GAMBLE: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis 1998-1999, Dag Henriksen, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2007, 304 pages, \$24.00.

In *Nato's Gamble*, Dag Henriksen, a European airpower expert, analyzes Operation Allied Force, the confusing brawl that became NATO's gamble in the 1999 Kosovo crisis. With significant insights into American and European perspectives on the application of airpower, Henriksen exposes the frailties apparent in NATO even during this limited operation. Military leaders involved in future planning for Afghanistan, the Balkans, or other NATO areas of interest should carefully consider the political realities Henriksen has detailed.

As armed confrontation with Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic loomed, many Europeans felt that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the U.S. had pushed them into the middle of a civil war for which they had no appetite. At a minimum, they wanted UN authorization before they struck another sovereign European nation. General Wesley Clark and diplomat Richard Holbrooke then sold them on a short air campaign that almost evolved into a full-scale ground war in tough terrain. Throughout the operation, the U.S. maintained a unilateral command structure, hitting targets the other NATO nations were unaware of. As a result of all these U.S. machinations, European loyalty to this transformed Cold War institution was sorely tested, and the effects of 1999 are still being felt today.

Henriksen gives a voice to Lieutenant General Walter Short and other airpower enthusiasts frustrated by NATO political decision-making. Nineteen nations were struggling to achieve consensus concerning targets. Interestingly, Donald Rums-

feld also criticized NATO during the war. He preferred the shock-and-awe technique he would later use in Iraq. Clark was skeptical of Rumsfeld's approach and wanted to attack Serbian ground forces in Kosovo instead. NATO clearly had the means to compel Milosevic, but the "gamble" was mustering the will to prosecute an ever-bloodier operation. As the British Defence Committee assessed after Kosovo, NATO is not a precise instrument to support diplomacy. NATO consensus has been made even more complex since the Kosovo intervention by the addition of seven more nations.

In this early historical look into Operation Allied Force, Henriksen has mined many of the best unclassified sources from both sides of the Atlantic. More deserves to be written on this subject as classified sources become available, since airpower will continue to be an attractive choice to send diplomatic messages. I applaud Dag Henriksen for providing an important early contribution to this discussion.

James Cricks,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

PERFECT SPY: The Incredible Double Life of Pham Xuan An, Time Magazine Reporter and Vietnamese Communist Agent, Larry Berman. HarperCollins, 2007, 328 pages, \$25.95.

Pham Xuan An was a stringer and then reporter for several important news organizations, ending with *Time Magazine*. American educated, he was extremely well connected in both Vietnamese and American circles in Saigon. He was a friend to virtually every journalist who covered the war, and was the source for some of the most crucial press reporting of the war.

An was also a Communist spy. He had joined the party in 1953, and before long was chosen for a special mission: he was to go to the United States to learn journalism and familiarize himself with the American people and their culture. From 1957 to 1959, An attended Orange Coast College, interned on the *Sacramento*

Bee, and traveled around the U.S. He was then ordered back to South Vietnam, where he was accredited as a reporter by the U.S. military.

An's language and networking skills proved invaluable to the cause. Over the years, he became acquainted with a wide range of influential people, to include journalists David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan; CIA officers Lucien Conein, Edward Lansdale, and William Colby; South Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem; and General Duong Van Minh. An's numerous contacts gave him both classified and unclassified information that he passed to his handlers. He provided intelligence that contributed to the defeat of South Vietnamese forces at the famous battle of Ap Bac in January 1963, and information that helped plan the targets for the 1968 Tet Offensive. In 1975, as Ban Me Thuot fell to the People's Army of Vietnam, An helped persuade the North Vietnamese leadership, which believed that final victory lay at least a year away, that the time was ripe for the final push, and that they could march on Saigon uncontested.

When the war was over, An abandoned his double life; he was given the uniform of a North Vietnamese colonel and proclaimed a national hero. Ironically, however, it appears that he was never completely trusted by his superiors in the postwar years because of his close ties to the Americans during the war. He died in 2006 of emphysema, a major general in the Vietnam People's Army.

Professor Larry Berman, who teaches at the University of California at Davis and is the author of several books on Vietnam, tells An's incredible tale in a sympathetic manner, basing his account on hours of interviews with An conducted over a five-year period. He also draws on lengthy conversations with many of the influential Americans who had come into contact with An during his career. What emerges is an interesting story of a complex man who was torn between his fondness and respect for his American friends and his passionate dedication to the reunification of Vietnam. Berman

has used his remarkable access to An to produce a highly readable account of an enigmatic figure who had a significant impact on the outcome of the war in Southeast Asia. I strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in the Vietnam War.

LTC James H. Willbanks, Ph.D., USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

STALIN'S WARS: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953, Geoffrey Roberts, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2006, 468 pages.

FROM ROOSEVELT TO TRUMAN: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War, Wilson D. Miscamble, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, 393 pages, \$27.99.

MY DEAR MR. STALIN: The Complete Correspondence Of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin, Susan Butler, ed., foreword by Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2005, 361 pages \$25.00.

Few 20th-century figures have inspired more scholarly commentary than Joseph Stalin, particularly concerning his wartime and postwar relationships with Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman. Over a decade ago, the broadening of access to Russian archives (if only temporary) crowned the end of the academic version of the Cold War and generated a series of new offerings on Stalin and his legacy. Still, Stalin remains a more challenging subject than most wartime leaders by virtue of the secretive nature of the Soviet system, the enormity of events in which he participated, and his own distinctly cryptic behavior. At the same time, Stalin's American counterparts have been the objects of scholarly dispute, in part because of the extraordinary richness of the public record. Indeed, a study of the policies and personalities of FDR and Truman, and above all their readings of Stalin's intentions, continue to define our understanding of the Cold War's origins.

Geoffrey Roberts's latest work, *Stalin's Wars: From World War to*

Cold War, 1939-1953, is a well written and carefully researched volume that focuses on Stalin as wartime leader and strategist. Roberts pointedly strives to offer an appraisal independent of his subject's record of crimes against humanity; in fact, he advises the reader that the latter are not his subject. Some compartmentalization of topics is reasonable in this instance. But we cannot evaluate Stalin as a strategic decision-maker and diplomat without considering the intellectual processes and predispositions that marked the systematic brutality of his rule. The man who won the war, after all, was also the same man who grievously weakened his country in the preceding years through catastrophic purges, unproven economic schemes, and establishment of an atmosphere of paranoia.

Roberts, however, flatly asserts that ideology, more than personality, offers the key to reading Stalin's intentions. Projecting from this conclusion, he draws extensively from Stalin's own published remarks as well as records of meetings and conversations. This approach, though necessary and indisputably valuable, leans heavily on its implicit assumption that Stalin's words speak louder loudly than his actions.

Stalin seldom lost sight of political context or his overarching aims. He was far more likely to say what needed to be said to facilitate a particular objective than to bare his soul. Thus it seems that the author's attribution of great credence to Stalin's conversations with men such as Georgi Dimitrov, leader of the Comintern, is fraught with risk. Roberts describes Dimitrov's diary as "the most important source on Stalin's private thinking during the war years"; however, the extent to which Stalin confided in Dimitrov—or anyone else for that matter—is subject to doubt. In all probability, Stalin left posterity to assemble a puzzle from among a pile of intertwined facts and lies.

Like many larger-than-life leaders and politicians, Stalin saw himself as a man playing a role on the stage of history. If he enjoyed adulation, he

did not, as Roberts aptly points out, take it too much to heart. Indeed, Stalin was perhaps the least likely of men to accept expressions of devotion at face value. Almost incapable of sincerity himself, he hardly expected it from others. Thus, even his most loyal sycophants lived in fear for their lives.

Roberts's appraisal of Stalin as a leader and strategist is a favorable one with which even many of Stalin's severest critics would probably concur. After the German invasion of 1941, Roberts's Stalin was farsighted, judicious, adaptable, and discerning in his strategic and military judgment. He was, in important respects, the architect of victory. Moreover, Roberts senses that Stalin genuinely desired a generally equitable resolution to the question of the postwar European order as long as it met certain essential conditions for the preservation of Soviet security. Thus, he contends that the advent of the Cold War, as laid out in Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech, was really a self-fulfilling prophecy brought on by the West.

In *From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War*, Wilson Miscamble offers a different view: he sees the Soviet leader's personality as fundamental to understanding the origins of the Cold War. Summarizing Truman's relationship with Stalin, Miscamble concludes, "It was simply not within Harry Truman's power as a decent and responsible democratic leader to offer terms that would soothe Stalin's anxieties and insecurities." As he came to understand Stalin and Soviet behavior, Truman gave up hope of finding a *modus vivendi* and instead organized policies that put the theory of containment into practice.

In detailing the transition from Roosevelt to Truman, Miscamble looks closely at the influence of central actors such as Joseph Davies, the U.S. ambassador to the USSR from 1936 to 1938, who shaped Roosevelt's perception of Stalin as a man with whom it was possible to seek mutual accommodation. But for Davies' impact in softening the American view of Stalin, more

skeptical realists such as George Kennan, who would author containment doctrine under Truman, might have held sway years earlier.

Thus, it was the composite influence of international circumstances, domestic politics, and key players in competition for the president's ear more than any predisposition on Truman's part that molded presidential decision-making. Ultimately, Truman found that U.S. policy objectives could not be reconciled with Stalin's. In Miscamble's estimation, Cold War revisionism, which would assign equal or greater responsibility to the United States for the outbreak of the Cold War, simply cannot withstand patient analysis of Truman's earnest search for a way to deal with the Soviet dictator. The consequent handling of American security policy was on the whole rational, measured, and essential.

My Dear Mr. Stalin, a compilation of correspondence between Roosevelt and Stalin edited, with comment, by Susan Butler, offers yet another thoughtful glimpse at the most important political relationship of World War II. Both leaders seem to have understood from the beginning of their long-distance partnership that it was necessary to look beyond the defeat of Germany and Japan and to prepare for a new postwar order. Roosevelt sought a security system based on the combined might of the U.S., USSR, Britain, and China. Stalin, too, wanted a stable order, but one that ensured preeminent position for the USSR in European and Asian affairs. Driven together by wartime imperatives, Roosevelt and Stalin forged a common language of sorts. Each could be remarkably charming in person, and their correspondence reflects a sense of how to get along while deftly pursuing political aims that were often divergent.

For instance, in a message to FDR dated 7 April 1945, just a month before Germany surrendered, Stalin voices confidence in the faithfulness of the president and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, yet goes on to explain at length the disturbing

inferences that a thoughtful observer could make from German behavior. In particular, a suspicious Stalin points out that German resistance is feeble in the West, while in the East, where 147 divisions remain, the Germans fiercely defend every inch of ground: "They continue to fight savagely with the Russians for some unknown junction Zemlitsa in Czechoslovakia which they need as much as a dead man needs poultices, but surrender without any resistance important towns in central Germany. . ." Without making any explicit accusations, Stalin went on to observe that intelligence provided by General Marshall about German intentions in February 1945 proved entirely false.

That this letter came in the immediate wake of personal assurances from Roosevelt is indicative of the fragile state of relations between the two allied powers. In a message on 4 April, the president had stated categorically that no secret negotiations with the Germans had taken place and that General Eisenhower would accept no military solution short of "unconditional surrender." The rapidity of American advances he attributed to "the terrific impact of our air power resulting in destruction of German communications, and to the fact that Eisenhower was able to cripple the bulk of German forces while they were still west of the Rhine."

Given the profound differences in Soviet and American perspectives, the preservation of the coalition until the surrender of Japan serves as testament both to the fundamental importance of the allied partnership and the ability of each side to communicate its commitment and concerns.

Robert F. Baumann,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

GENERAL WALTER KRUEGER: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War, Kevin C. Holzimmer, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2007, 329 pages, \$39.95.

Kevin C. Holzimmer's biography of General Walter Krueger fills an important gap in the history of fighting in the Pacific during World

War II. Equally important, it enables readers to deepen their understanding of how MacArthur managed his command and how an important subordinate, Krueger, operated. Holzimmer's work not only helps explain important events that happened more than 60 years ago in the Pacific, but also discusses generalship and leadership at the operational and theater-strategic levels.

Born in Prussia and educated in part at home by a demanding German immigrant stepfather, Krueger excelled as a scholar/translator of German texts on tactics and operations. While just a lieutenant, he taught at Leavenworth. That he and George Marshall were the only lieutenants on the faculty suggests the measure of Krueger's excellence as a student of the art of war. He would go on to graduate from both the Army War College and the National War College.

Krueger served as chief of war plans during MacArthur's tenure as chief of staff of the Army. Later, he was a candidate for the post of chief of staff of the Army, but finished behind George Marshall. Subsequently, Marshall chose Krueger to organize and command 3d Army and support the development of an operational doctrine for the Army.

In January 1943, MacArthur asked Marshall to send Krueger and 3d Army to command U.S. ground troops in MacArthur's Southwest Pacific area. Although Marshall sent Krueger, he did not send 3d Army. Krueger became commanding general of 6th Army and for the second time during the war had to organize a field Army headquarters. He led the charge for MacArthur through to the Philippine invasion until he was joined in the field by Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger's 8th Army. Krueger cased the colors of 6th Army on 25 January 1945, departed for his home in San Antonio, Texas, and retired the next day aboard the USS *New Jersey*.

As Holzimmer points out, comparatively little has been written about Krueger, and what there is tends to show him in a bad light. Holzimmer lays out the historiogra-

phy and suggests this is so for four reasons: the war in Europe tended to overshadow the war in the Pacific, MacArthur overshadowed his subordinates, Krueger avoided publicity, and Eichelberger (who craved publicity) had little good to say about either MacArthur or Krueger. Eichelberger's memoir, published in 1950, and his edited diaries and letters, published in 1974, to a large extent set the tone for what has been written about Krueger.

Holzimmer's account is succinct, fact based, and well documented. Like most biographers, he develops a bias for his subject, but he still manages to spot and illuminate Krueger's foibles. The general was

taciturn and remained a very private man all of his life. On the other hand, from his years in combat as a private, he had learned what it was like to be afraid and hungry. That experience colored how he thought about the fate of his Soldiers and what he expected of commanders in the field. Holzimmer weaves the story of Krueger's growth as a Soldier and a man, effectively capturing Krueger's character, concern for troops, meticulous approach, and conviction about the necessity of education and learning.

Holzimmer's first-rate book suggests a number of questions that require more study—which seems surprising since more than 60 years

have passed since World War II. What judgments can be made about Krueger, or for that matter Eichelberger and MacArthur, with what is published now? What may be said about the quality of the corps commanders, both Army and Marine, who fought under MacArthur's command? How did the theater and operational commands meet the complex requirements of sustaining multiple operations sometimes spanning a thousand miles more than 5,000 miles from home? Perhaps this fine biography will open the door to more research.

**COL Gregory Fontenot,
USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

MR Letters

Rekindling U.S. Holistic Power in the 21st Century

Captain Charles Chao Rong Phua, *Singapore Armed Forces*—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's article, "Beyond Guns and Steel" (*Military Review*, January-February 2008), seeks to rekindle the holistic power that the U.S. possessed and applied after World War II, but gradually forgot about after the Cold War. Gates's call for "strengthening our capacity to use 'soft' power and for better integrating it with 'hard' power" is a necessary mindset-change if the U.S. is to deal with asymmetric warfare (terrorism), the post-war reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the transformation of national strategy. Gates rightly highlights the American institutional-financial-military power complex that has sustained U.S. world leadership in the 20th century. Indeed, it is only with combined soft-hard power that the U.S. can deter terrorism at its roots and shape sustainable global defence postures.

Stability in Iraq and Afghanistan can only be restored with "reconstruction, development and governance" led by a coordinated civil-military complex. The use of

civilian expertise and interagency cooperation to improve the lives of the local population is a creative twist to the traditional uniformed military institution. Perhaps the marriage of a disciplined, efficient, and effective military with diverse civilian expertise will become the cornerstone of the U.S. civil-military war complex—a necessary change to deal with a sophisticated operational environment, especially when the technology-savvy warrior-thinker-diplomat-humanitarian worker ideal of the new Soldier may be realistically unattainable.

Gates writes with a laudable blend of great-power realism and idealism. After reiterating the political realities of terrorism, conflicts, failed states, and global instability in the post-Cold War world, he concludes by reminding Americans of their great responsibility to the world. Throughout history, hegemony has always kept the peace; for example, ancient Chinese empires spent heavily to guarantee peace for their satellites against external enemies in return for piecemeal annual tributes as a token of respect.¹

Today, there are compelling reasons to believe that China and India

are rising faster than expected.² However, in military terms, for instance, China's fighter jets, submarines, and destroyers are 1980s weaponry; China will not achieve information transformation before 2050.³ In economic and institutional terms, it may gradually catch up by 2050, but the U.S. will remain the world's economic powerhouse and pace-setter. Till then and thereafter, the U.S. must continue to lead the world "[as in Iraq] to uphold the prestige, influence and credibility of its security guarantees."

NOTES

1. Samuel Kim, cited in David Kang, "Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations," in *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, John G. Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 172).

2. Kishore Mahbubani, *The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistable Shift of Global Power to the East* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).

3. Richard A. Bitzinger, "Pentagon Report on Chinese Military Power: PLA still has a long way to go," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), 14 Mar 2008, 22.

4. Lee Kuan Yew, "The cost of U.S. retreat from Iraq," *The Straits Times*, 11 Mar 2008, 24.

5. Yew.

Captain Charles Chao Rong Phua is a staff officer in the Singapore Armed Forces. He holds a BSc (Honours) and MSc (Research) with Merit in international relations from the London School of Economics. The views expressed here are entirely his own.

THE MAN HE KILLED



Had he and I but met
By some old ancient inn,
We should have set us down to wet
Right many a nipperkin!

But ranged as infantry,
And staring face to face,
I shot at him as he at me,
And killed him in his place.

I shot him dead because—
Because he was my foe,
Just so: my foe of course he was;
That's clear enough; although

He thought he'd 'list, perhaps,
Off-hand like—just as I—
Was out of work--had sold his traps—
No other reason why.

Yes; quaint and curious war is!
You shoot a fellow down
You'd treat, if met where any bar is,
Or help to half a crown.

—Thomas Hardy



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Your efforts as the Editor of *Military Review* have truly brought this publication to the forefront of the information age; and I want to thank you for your invaluable contributions to the profession of arms, for your exceptional commitment to our Soldiers and their Families, and for your steadfast leadership. Your legacy will live on for years to come as the many young Soldiers, Noncommissioned Officers, and Officers you trained and mentored lead our Army into the future.

—William S. Wallace
General, U.S. Army

Appreciate all your support and want to thank you particularly for your invaluable contributions to the Combined Arms Center as editor and prime mover of *Military Review*. Under your leadership, *MR* has become a must-read in the world of military affairs and it is now known as “the professional journal of the U.S. Army.”

—William B. Caldwell, IV
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Commanding General

With this edition—his 25th—*Military Review* bids farewell to its editor-in-chief, Colonel Bill Darley, who is retiring from the Army after a stellar 31-year career. We don’t ordinarily publish news of office events in the journal, but this one is, for us, seismic. You would have had to work with COL Darley to truly appreciate the vision, enthusiasm, and just sheer momentum he brought to the job every day, all day. Under his stewardship, this relatively small Army pub has become a go-to source for information and debate on military affairs. The *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *U.S. News and World Report*, the BBC, NPR—even *Jon Stewart’s Daily Show*—have cited *MR*, with more than one calling the journal “influential” while applauding it for the breadth of its discussion. All of the success *MR* has had is directly attributable to COL Darley’s instinct for the next big issue in military affairs, his relentless pursuit (read: hounding) of good writers, and his step-on-the-gas attitude toward production. To top it all off, he is a generous, good-hearted, and principled man, much better at giving praise than receiving it. We hope this short encomium doesn’t embarrass him too much. Boss: it’s been a pleasure. Thanks for all, and best wishes for a long and productive second career.

—the staff of *Military Review*